EUROPEAN UNION DELEGATIONS IN EU FOREIGN POLICY

A DIPLOMATIC SERVICE OF DIFFERENT SPEEDS

Frauke Austermann

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*Alex Warleigh-Lack is currently on leave as an editor of the series

European Union Delegations in EU Foreign Policy

A Diplomatic Service of Different Speeds

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palgrave
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To my family

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Foreword

This thorough analysis of the role of EU Delegations in EU foreign policy by Frauke Austermann is most welcome, both for its substance and for its timing. For substance, because the representation of EU matters abroad has become an important tool for European public diplomacy in other countries. Timely, because at a time where 'more Europe' or 'less Europe' tends to polarize public opinion, it is important to make sure EU Delegations get things right. With the previous European Commission network taken over by the European External Action Service, under the Lisbon Treaty, a first review of the new system has been published in July 2013.

The analysis of why things are the way they are with EU Delegations is also helpful because it is true that the gradual development of the previous network of European Commission Delegations since the 1950s has not had a single, but many architects over time. And there has not been a single master plan either. The basic Treaties that make up the Union of today remained silent about external representation by Delegations until recently. The European Commission, at least initially, did not have in mind to set up diplomatic offices abroad. It rather wanted to support policy action divested by Member States to the European level and for which the Commission was in charge. Resources permitting a 'critical mass' of policy issues and relationship elements triggered the opening of a Delegation abroad. This did not pass unnoticed in other similar or regionally close foreign countries, and the resulting push and shove led to further openings of Delegations. Efforts to limit numbers and to ensure coverage through regional Delegations had limited success because of what was seen as 'discrimination' in the countries left without a proper European representation.

So, are there other reasons than the policies of the time and the *rapport de force* at headquarters and with foreign governments, determining sequence, and speed of opening Delegations? There surely are, and this is why I was delighted to contribute an introductory remark to Dr. Austermann's analysis, an in-depth study of the kind practitioners in active service would never dare addressing. The territory covered is still very fresh in my mind, having been Ambassador and Head of Delegation myself from 2001 to 2009, after having been involved

the decade before in External Relations and external services reform, Delegation inspections, and Delegation management in the European Commission. A key question has always been how to define, as precisely as possible, the mission of each Delegation. Host countries are different from one another, and so are the policy expectations at headquarters. Also, Member States watch carefully that the European representatives do not overstep their role or competences. Europe is complicated.

The European Union Delegations represent the Union abroad. This sounds straightforward, but what is it more precisely that they represent? It is useful to be aware that what we call 'European Union' today has always been and still is very much a construction site. It is work in progress, and people are often taken by surprise when they realize that European policies are in fact a patchwork built upon specific competences transferred from the Member States. Some policy fields are more complete than others: economic or single market issues for example; others much less so, because they are held up as backbones of national sovereignty. Security and defense, home office, or Ministry of the Interior affairs come to mind here, and so do foreign policy and diplomacy. As EU Delegations represent the Union through its policies, the rather complex distribution of competences between Member States and the Union must be reflected in their work. Fine-tuning of activities between Delegation and Member State Embassies can be quite delicate. As Dr. Austermann rightly points out, this makes Delegations different from one another across third countries, and with her book she contributes to uncover the underlying logic that is needed to implement such fine-tuning.

The absence of a full EU competence for External Affairs is surprising, since opinion polls among the people of Europe consistently point at foreign policy and defense or security at large that should be taken up at European level in order to punch Europe's weight. But yet, while a number of EU foreign policy elements have fallen into place over the last couple of years, and the European External Action Service is one of them, foreign policy as such has very much remained in the hands of Member States. Unanimous decisions of the (now) 28 Members are the rule, and it is more often than not the slowest vessel in the convoy which determines the way to proceed.

The key elements of genuine external affairs competence at the European level were taken care of by specific departments within the European Commission. Trade policy and, up to a point, development cooperation fall into this category. And so do, accelerating with globalization, the external aspects of internal policies entrusted to the Union.

These three elements have been the focal points around which the Commission organized its external relations. Not with a single foreign policy department like a Foreign Ministry, but with separate departments for trade, for development and services within the departments for energy, environment, science and technology, and so on. Only the 1990s saw the creation of an external relations department proper. And only since the Lisbon Treaty there is a *de jure* external representation of the Union, and only since then has the European Parliament the full supervision of all external policy activities of the Union.

By definition, EU competences and the organization at the home front have been mirrored in the build-up of the network of Delegations since the mid-1950s. By the 1970s, the first two dozen or so of Delegations were essentially located in developing countries, in OECD capitals and international organizations under the authority of the services in charge of trade policy. They were gradually becoming the face of Brussels abroad, explaining European policies at large. Delegations in developing countries were different in kind, implementing cooperation programs, but were fully integrated in the broader external representation scheme in the 1980s. With further waves of additional Delegations, following political push and pull both from third countries and at political level at home, the network had grown to far over 100 by the time the External Action Service created by the Lisbon Treaty came into being in 2010. By then, and after a long period of incrementally introducing diplomatic rules and accomplishing a wide range of *de facto* tasks, the Delegations had succeeded to channel diplomatic activity in EU matters in a way which would have been unthinkable, 10 or 15 years before. Spillover or even mission creep? No, rather value added and common sense.

The Lisbon Treaty allowed to reap the benefits of the existing network and to develop it further, giving the Delegations the formal status and command structure, adding foreign affairs tasks previously not included in the legal basis as well as a staff complemented by national diplomats. By now, the European External Action Service is in full operating mode and the review in 2013 has been the first occasion to assess what has been achieved. With this benchmark in mind, Dr. Austermann's work not only provides an accurate analysis of the past, but also succeeds in systemizing the course of *de facto* developments against the background of International Relations and European Integration theories. The study thereby provides a most welcome and timely contribution to the on-going process of review. It also laudably points at the challenges lying ahead and likely to be addressed in this context, such as the cohesion and efficiency of the present system of common diplomacy and the

loyalties of its staff. Likewise, for the assessment of achievements in the light of Member State *de facto* conduct of diplomatic business abroad in an era of globalization and dissipation of state sovereignty.

I would like to thank Dr. Austermann for this most valuable contribution to an on-going debate.

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Acknowledgements

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries
AD	Administrator (hierarchy of the EU bureaucracy)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CEEC	Central and Eastern European countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CINC	Composite Index of National Capability
CNP	Comprehensive National Power
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DG	Directorate General
DHOM	Deputy Head of Mission
DV	Dependent Variable
EC	European Community
ECD/EC Delegation	European Commission Delegation
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEA	European Economic Area
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
H1-H4	Hypotheses 1 to 4
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Historical Institutionalism
HoD	Head of Delegation
HOM	Head of Mission
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission

IG	Intergovernmentalism
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations (as an academic discipline)
IV	Independent Variable
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LoN	League of Nations
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NF	Neo-Functionalism
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPE	Normative Power Europe
PRC	People's Republic of China
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
SC	Social Constructivism
SN-IGOs	Intergovernmental Organizations with Supranational Characteristics
UN(O)	United Nations (Organization)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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Introduction: European Diplomacy after Lisbon – Different Speeds Instead of One Voice

A Telephone Number for Europe

> 'Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?'
> *Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State*

Henry Kissinger supposedly asked this question to allude to the lack of a genuine European 'Union' in global politics (Rachman, 2009; The Washington Post, 2012). When it comes to foreign affairs and diplomacy, the EU is still an intergovernmental club of 28 members, each with its own distinctive policy. Instead of a unitary diplomatic actor, this makes the EU look like a Hydra-like 'beast' on the global stage, with 28 heads and therefore 28 different voices – and numerous telephone numbers for Kissinger and other statesmen to call (Risse-Kappen, 1996; Laffan, 1998, p. 250). The ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon should have solved or at least mitigated this problem. It contains provisions that are intended to channel diplomatic activity in EU matters through Brussels, by upgrading existing and setting up new EU institutions (European Union, 2010, Art. 27 and Art. 221; Nugent, 2010, p. 380).

First and foremost, the Lisbon Treaty has established the position of a 'High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' (Barber, 2010; European Union, 2010, Art. 18). Lady Catherine Ashton, a British national, is the first to fill this new position of a prototype EU 'foreign minister' (Willis, 2009). Some may be skeptical about this comparison, however, calling the new High Representative a prototype foreign minister at the EU level does not seem like an exaggeration. After all, the Lisbon innovations are not so new. There used to be a 'High Representative

of Common Foreign and Security Policy,' which was introduced at the end of the 1990s with the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Union, 1997). The former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, fulfilled this role for over ten years (Council of the European Union, 2013). In the course of the search for a Constitution for Europe, Article I–21 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of 2003 foresaw the upgrade of this High Representative to a 'Union Minister of Foreign Affairs' (European Union, 2004). Eventually, the Constitutional Treaty failed after being rejected by the French and Dutch citizens. The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the new post into the rather cumbersome 'High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.' However, the essentials of the post were kept. HR Javier Solana already managed to be involved in highly political matters (Dijkstra, 2011). Nonetheless, the new HR has extended *de jure* powers compared to the previous one. The previous HR merely assisted the country that held the rotating EU Presidency in representing the Union abroad, and in implementing the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Meanwhile, the Lisbon Treaty transfers the competences of the conduct, the implementation, and even parts of the design of the Union's foreign affairs to the new HR.[1]

The overarching purpose of the new HR can be summarized by giving the EU a common voice in the world: Lady Ashton, who is at the same time the Vice-President of the European Commission (VP), describes her portfolio as consisting of 'traditional diplomacy.' Moreover, she is supposed to coordinate the foreign policy tools that the EU has at its disposal and to build consensus among all member states. She also represents the EU in international organizations such as the UN, and has a prominent role in arguably the most sensitive foreign policy tool: defense matters at EU level (European External Action Service, 2013).

Strategic interests and objectives of EU foreign policy are still unanimously decided by the Heads of State and Government of the Union's member states (European Union, 2010, Art. 15.2, 22, 26). Somewhat at variance with this, Lisbon seeks to streamline the EU's external affairs with another new face, namely that of the permanent President of the European Council, a role that is currently performed by the former Belgian Premier Herman van Rompuy. Just as van Rompuy chairs the European Council meetings, HR/VP Ashton presides over the Council formation that deals with foreign affairs. As part of this task, she sets the agenda and makes concrete proposals on which the foreign ministers unanimously decide. Hence, for both these crucial Council formations, there is no longer a rotating Presidency (Barber, 2010, p. 58; European Union, 2010).

The most innovative element is arguably the HR/VP's institutional strength. Unlike her predecessor Solana, Lady Ashton is no 'one (wo-)man show.' She is supported by her own institution, the European External Action Service with about 3,400 staff.[2] Its headquarters are located in Brussels. Reflecting the new double role of the HR/VP, these headquarters constitute a new EU body that emerges from previously existing ones: parts of both the Council Secretariat and the Commission have been integrated into the new EEAS (Council of the European Union, 2010).[3]

This is how the EEAS works in theory. Since its inception in December 2009, the EEAS has met a 'barrage of criticism' (Duke, 2012a, p. 25). The critique has been widespread and diffuse, however, there are four major points worth mentioning.

First, the persistence of unanimous decision making in EU foreign policy is at odds with the goal of creating a more unified European voice in the world through coherent, more effective, and more visible foreign policy action (Duke, 2012a, p. 25). The fact that there are two 'new faces' in EU foreign policy, the HR/VP and the President of the European Council, has also sparked questions about the degree of CFSP coherence post-Lisbon (Chopin and Lefebvre, 2010, p. 2).

Second, many commentators have criticized the appointment of the first HR/VP Lady Ashton in the sense that she would be a consensus candidate who lacks the needed experience in foreign policy and EU politics as well as the necessary charisma (Barber, 2010, p. 61).

Third, the point of critique that has arguably been raised most often is that of institutional competition. Merging parts of the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and adding national diplomats into a new body has led to 'turf fights' between the respective institutions, departments, and officials (Rüger, 2012, p. 162; Furness, 2013, p. 110). Apart from competition over competences, budgets, and decision-making power, all these institutions had developed their own organizational cultures, procedures, and 'mind-sets' over time (Spence, 2012, p. 133; cf. Murdoch, 2012, p. 1012; Bátora, 2013, p. 598).

Fourth, even though member states and EU officials alike have stressed the complementarity of the EEAS *vis-à-vis* national foreign services, establishing a Brussels-based diplomatic service still touches sensitively on member states' sovereignty (Balfour and Raik, 2013, p. 2; Krätke and Sherriff, 2012, p. 3). They were quick to put a hold on any slightly more daring initiatives from Lady Ashton and her team, such as the suggestion to merge EU member state embassies into 'Europe-Houses' or the proposal to create EU military headquarters (Rettman, 2012a,

2013a; cf. Furness, 2013, p. 104). Somewhat paradoxically, it has also been lamented that Ashton has been too hesitant or not active enough (Dworkin et al., 2011; Furness, 2013, pp. 115, 119). As a result of each of these four points, the EEAS is more often than not criticized for insufficient output and for lacking a long-term strategy or 'vision' (Duke, 2012a, p. 27; Krätke and Sherriff, 2012, p. 6).

In many ways, the above points of critique can be questioned. At the very least, they need to be put into perspective. As far as the persisting unanimity in CFSP decision making is concerned, it should be noted that most decisions at the EU level are taken by consensus, even when qualified majority voting (QMV) is the method to use (Heisenberg, 2005). On this backdrop, a consensus project like the EU might also require a consensus candidate at its top. Regarding the 'two faces,' also at the national level, Heads of State and Government and Foreign Ministers have a division of labor regarding representing their country abroad and implementing foreign policy. A leader's charisma is quite a subjective matter and lies in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, even if a better known and maybe more charismatic person had been chosen as the first HR/VP, this would not have changed the immense workload related to the EEAS (Furness, 2013, p. 114; cf. Barber, 2010, p. 61). Concerning the latter, it should be noted that organizational change is always slow and institutional consolidation a matter of time (cf. Buchanan et al., 2006, p. 141). This implies two things: first, some commentators may have had excessive expectations to think that a new diplomatic service at the EU level, which has barely been set up, could already deliver the output foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty within just a few months (Duke, 2012a, p. 26; Krätke and Sherriff, 2012, p. 6; Blockmans, 2012, p. 2). The second implication is that many problems related to the EEAS may be solved given sufficient time (Blockmans, 2012, p. 2). To give an example, one year after the inauguration of the new service, the EEAS officials were not even located in the same building (Duke, 2012a, p. 27). Hence, an initial lack of coordination does not come by surprise, neither does the fact that things improved as soon as the team moved into the Triangle Building at the Brussels' Schuman roundabout, which was designated as the new EEAS headquarters.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the Euro crisis, which broke out one year before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and which is still on-going, has required the utmost attention and tremendous (financial) resources of EU decision makers. This increased the pressure on Ashton and her team (cf. Blockmans, 2012, p. 2). With the European integration project put in question in the course of the crisis, it was difficult to argue

for further integration in the arguably highest of politics, diplomacy (Lehne, 2012). On the other hand, financial pressure also forced many national governments to cut budgets in their foreign ministries (Balfour and Raik, 2013, p. 2).

Overall, the Treaty of Lisbon has certainly boosted the EU's political capabilities. Although there have been initial difficulties in setting up the EEAS, Lisbon seems to have paved the way for Europe to speak with a more unified voice, and an answer to Henry Kissinger's (supposed) question of whom he should call when he wants to speak to Europe. When it comes to diplomatic representation, member states have started to realize the advantages of channeling diplomatic activity through the EEAS, more specifically through the so-called EU Delegations. Their contribution to support (or to inhibit) a more united European voice in the world will be discussed in the next section.

The EEAS: a diplomatic service of different speeds

Diplomatic representations play a key role in implementing foreign policy 'on the ground,' meaning in third country capital cities. They also provide important analyses of developments in the host country and thereby actively shape relations between home and abroad (United Nations, 1961, Art. 3). To equip the new High Representative with these tools, the Lisbon Treaty has established a global embassy-like network at the EU level (European Union, 2010, Art. 221). The Treaty provides third countries with one 'local telephone number' of Europe.

During the past six decades, the European Commission, which is the Union's executive body, had already established a network of local representations in more than 140 countries (Bruter, 1999, p. 183). Gradually they have taken over tasks and characteristics that make them comparable to traditional embassies. Examples are the involvement in traditional high politics or the acquisition of diplomatic immunities (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 21). In contrast to the EEAS, the Delegations are not an invention of the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon. Nonetheless, the Treaty upgrades these Commission Delegations into full-fledged 'European Union Delegations.' This upgrade is considerable. Before Lisbon, member state embassies executed the rotating Presidency of the EU Council abroad. Now, the EU Delegations take over that role (Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 5.8; Hocking, 2005a, p. 295). As a result, EU Delegations replace national embassies when it comes to leading EU internal coordination of diplomatic action abroad. They, for example, now chair the local coordination meetings of EU officials and

member state diplomats, which deal with of all sorts of issue areas, from trade over science and technology to defense matters. Moreover, the Delegations take away the privilege from the member state embassies to represent the EU externally. Thus, the Head of the EU Delegation is now empowered to speak on behalf of the entire EU towards the host country in all Union-related policy matters and on a permanent basis (European diplomats, 2010). Overall, Lisbon stipulates that increased coordination and unified external representation shall trigger a more coherent European voice in the world (Rettman, 2010a; Drieskens, 2012). As far as diplomatic practice is concerned, this means a higher level of channeling diplomatic activity in EU matters through the EU and notably its Delegations, which I conceptualize in this book as the centralization of European diplomacy in third countries.[4]

As indicated above, many scholars, commentators, and national diplomats themselves claim that the EEAS and its Delegations at best complement national MFAs and their embassies – now and in the future (European diplomats, 2010; Boomgaarden et al., 2009). At worst, the EEAS may become yet another body in the Brussels institutional jungle with little to no impact (Vaisse, 2010; Adebahr, 2013, p. 14). Others conceive of the idea that the Treaty of Lisbon has sparked off a 'creeping revolution,' meaning that the EEAS may truly challenge the traditional structure, and in the long term possibly even the existence of Union members' embassies (Sek, 2012, p. 2; Hocking, 2005a, p. 295; Solana in Spence, 2009, p. 253; Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 13; Blockmans, 2012, p. 1). The latter would be the ultimate evidence for a genuine centralization of sovereignty. After all, diplomacy is traditionally seen as the archetype of high politics (Glarbo, 1999, p. 634).

In this book, the EEAS and especially the Delegations are seen as a case of upward dissipation of sovereignty at the expense of national foreign services as they are now, though not at the expense of member states as such. While this may seem like a rather pro-integrationist view, the book's central message is quite skeptical about the prospects of the EEAS in giving Europe a single voice in the world. Although the Lisbon Treaty's rules are on paper the same for EU Delegations in every third country, the level of centralization of European diplomacy, meaning the channeling of diplomatic activity in EU matters through the European Union, always depends on the target country. In some third countries, the EEAS is and will be able to easily and quickly centralize European diplomacy while this endeavor is more difficult and slower in others. Put differently, there are different speeds of European diplomacy centralization around the world and the EEAS is hence a 'diplomatic service of different speeds.'

An interesting detail about the Lisbon-upgrade of EU Delegations indicates this variation. Notwithstanding the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, the exact workings of the new Delegations were not yet clear. After all, the EEAS first had to be set up (Council of the European Union, 2010). Nevertheless, 54 of all Commission Delegations were already transformed into EU Delegations in January 2010 (Rettman, 2010b). This partial transformation is puzzling: why were some Delegations already transformed and others were not? Another frequently cited example indicating variation of European diplomacy centralization is that the EU does not speak with one voice, notably towards countries such as the People's Republic of China (Fox and Godement, 2009; Renard, 2009, p. 4; Körber Stiftung, 2011; Willis, 2011a). Meanwhile, such complaints are rare with regards to speaking with one voice towards Australia, Myanmar, or East Timor.

Such variation makes Europe's new External Action Service look like a 'diplomatic service of different speeds.' The reproach of the Union being a disunited diplomatic player is ubiquitous. However, the underlying logic, the reasons for these different speeds, is under-researched, mostly due to a lack of comparative studies across non-EU states.[5] This book seeks to close this research gap by answering the overarching research question: why can the EU centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others? The phenomenon to be explained, the dependent variable (DV), is the level of centralization of European diplomacy in third countries. The independent variables will be the level of development of a third country, its economic and its strategic importance, and its political culture. Before outlining the chapters and the results of this book, the following section will further explain why a change of analytical perspective from the EEAS headquarters in Brussels to the European Union Delegations (EUDs) worldwide is necessary.

A change of analytical perspective: from Brussels to the World

Even though many scholars in European studies regard the EU as an international organization *sui generis* (Risse-Kappen, 1996, p. 56; Hix, 1998, p. 38; Knelangen, 2005, p. 7), there is a global trend of establishing intergovernmental organizations with supranational characteristics (SN-IGOs) similar to and sometimes also on the basis of the EU model (Babarinde, 2007). Groups of nation-states collaborate or they even pool sovereignty through common institutions (Etzioni, 2001, p. xix). The

EU is certainly the most advanced case (Waever, 1995, p. 389; Etzioni, 2001, p. xxi). It can therefore deliver interesting research results: first, concerning the marginalization of the nation-state as the key actor in global politics, and second, regarding the centralization of sovereignty from the national towards the supranational level.

This centralization of sovereignty is a key question in European Union studies, where it is usually termed 'European integration.' Researchers have delivered in-depth examinations of the variation of sovereignty centralization across policy domains (Weale et al., 2003). It is already common knowledge that the supranational EU institutions in Brussels, notably the Commission, have more agenda setting, decision making, and implementation power in trade policy or development aid than in foreign and security policy (Smith, 2006).[6]. Until now, what is traditionally referred to as high politics that is foreign policy, diplomacy, and defense, remains least centralized (Curzon, 1974). Therefore, many scholars agree with the view that the EU is an 'economic giant' but a 'political dwarf' (Diez Medrano, 2004). As a result, state-centrism tends to persist in the study of EU foreign policy, even after the Lisbon Treaty has been implemented (Smith, 2004, p. 23; Söderbaum and van Langenhove, 2005, p. 256; Union for Staff of the European Institutions, 2010). This view, however, has three shortcomings.

First, with the Lisbon Treaty the EU took a very bold step in centralizing the high politics field of diplomacy. It does so by establishing a Brussels-based foreign service, which is headed by a prototype supranational foreign minister (European Union, 2010, Art. 27.3). The Lisbon Treaty thereby puts the prominent assumption that high politics has not and will not be subject to centralization to a strong test. Second, most analyses of the Lisbon Treaty and of the EEAS have been insightful, but also rather preliminary and speculative, sometimes with a 'normative bias,' and lacking a proper framework of analysis (Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 1; Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012, p. 276; Behr et al., 2010, p. 3; Duke, 2010; Drieskens, 2012; Blockmans, 2012). This is not a surprise. After the Lisbon-ratification, the EEAS first had to be set up (O'Sullivan, 2011). It should be stressed once more that whereas the EEAS is still in the making, the predecessors of the EU level diplomatic missions, the Commission Delegations, have their origins in the 1950s (Bruter, 1999, p. 183). Although Lisbon constitutes a major step in terms of Delegation responsibilities, it is only one step in the almost 60 years long history of EU missions abroad. Plenty of observable evidence is available (Carta, 2012, p. 1). Therefore, with the simultaneous presence of Commission Delegations and member state embassies, third country capital cities have been a 'microcosm of

EU foreign policy coordination, far away from Brussels' for a long time already, whose analysis is very promising to understand the logic of diplomacy centralization (Austermann, 2012b, p. 86).

The third shortcoming is that most research in EU foreign policy ties up to EU internal factors (Furness, 2013; Erkelens and Blockmans, 2012; Murdoch, 2012; Vanhoonacker and Reslow, 2010; Van Vooren, 2010). This may sound paradoxical, but there are good reasons for this approach. After all, it is up to the member states to decide which policy domains are communitarized and which ones remain under national authority (European Union, 2010, Art. 24.1). As a consequence, the EEAS headquarters in Brussels attract most attention at the time of writing this book since the service was still in the phase of being set up. As mentioned above, it is reasonable to assume that the initial problems of setting up a new institution can be solved or at least mitigated over time. However, what the Lisbon Treaty cannot streamline are the characteristics of and the conditions in third countries under which EU Delegations act and interact with other players. In other words, actors and influences outside of the integration process can speed up or slow down European integration. They constitute important triggers for or brakes of sovereignty centralization.

Philippe Schmitter has called this mechanism 'externalization' (Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). Because of externalization students of European integration need to study what is happening outside of Europe, too. Despite the (necessary) focus on Brussels to understand the EU's multiple speeds, a number of students have done so. However, given that the EU's most powerful foreign policy instrument is arguably its enlargement policy, studies based on the idea of externalization are often limited to the EU's direct neighborhood. Much of this research has been very insightful (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Maurer, 2011). Nonetheless, it only covers a small number of third countries of a particular region. As a result, it is insufficient to explain the EU's role in the world. In times of globalization such understanding is, however, invaluable.

By answering the central research question of why the EU can centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others, this book addresses all three above mentioned shortcomings. First, the persisting assumption of state-centrism in EU foreign policy is put to test through an in-depth analysis of the EU's role in centralizing European diplomacy. The second shortcoming of this far rather speculative analysis of the EEAS is being addressed by delivering comprehensive empirical evidence of the development and the current state of Commission/ EU Delegations with a focus on their role in the post-Lisbon era. This empirical evidence is then linked to the

most important theories of European integration. The goal thereof is to create a systematic and encompassing analytical framework for the investigation of the EU Delegations' role in the world. A key contribution of the book in this respect is the development of a tool that I call the 'European Diplomacy Centralization Index' (EU-DCI) to measure the impact of European diplomacy in the world comprehensively across space and time. Finally, and most importantly, the third shortcoming of the common focus on Brussels and the EU's direct neighborhood to analyze the EU's role in the world is being addressed by focusing on EU Delegations abroad rather than on the EEAS headquarters back home. This will be done by taking the diversity and the characteristics of all third countries worldwide, and not just of one specific region, as independent variables. The book refrains from examining the EU in international organizations such as the UN or the World Trade Organization (WTO), and aims at complementing the scholarship on the EU in international affairs by looking at its impact in other non-EU nation-states (Jørgensen, 2009; Blavoukos and Bourantonis, 2011).

Outline of the book

The book is sub-divided into seven chapters. The purpose of each chapter is the following: The current Chapter 1 contextualizes the Lisbon Treaty changes with regards to the European External Action Service, in particular the Union's diplomatic representations, the so-called 'EU Delegations.' The chapter then introduces the central research question that this book seeks to answer: why the EU can centralize diplomacy more easily in some third countries than in others. It thereafter summarizes the rationale for this question and how it will be answered.

In the following Chapter 2, the theoretical literature on upward dissipation of nation-state sovereignty will be reviewed, of which the centralization of European diplomacy is an example. Key concepts such as the state, high and low politics, state authority and sovereignty, and the pooling thereof, most notably in Europe, will be discussed. As centralization of sovereignty in Europe has even been extended to diplomacy, which is among the highest of political areas, Chapter 2 will then discuss the concept of diplomacy and give a brief account of its history and evolution. Emphasis will be put on the role of embassies in general as well as the role of the European Commission Delegations (ECDs)/EUDs in centralizing European diplomacy at the supranational level in particular. Based on this discussion, the centralization of European diplomacy will be conceptualized as the formally assigned and informally obtained

channeling of diplomatic activity in EU matters through the European Union's physical presence that is the Union Delegations, in the capital cities of non-EU countries. There are four aspects to it: first, the breadth of the EU Delegation network, meaning the presence or absence of fully fledged EU Delegations in third countries; second, the internal coordination of EU policy among EU Delegations and member state embassies via the EU Delegations; third, a unified external representation of the EU towards third countries via the EU Delegations; and fourth, the diplomatic professionalism of the Delegation network, meaning the similarity of the Delegations' profiles to traditional nation-state embassies.

Chapter 3 starts off with a historical review of how the Commission Delegations have been able to centralize European diplomacy, already before the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified. It provides empirical evidence about which factors have accelerated or inhibited the centralization of European diplomacy in the past and in which types of locations. It turns out that the Commission Delegations located in developing countries tended to be perceived in these countries as the diplomatic representation of the EC and later the EU, even if, officially speaking, they used to be mere agents to implement European development aid. In important trading countries such as Japan and more recently China, the Delegations have boosted their diplomatic standing by providing crucial expertise, which for instance helped convince Japan to open its markets for European countries. At the same time, the diplomats from the EU member states regularly reminded their EU colleagues of their limited political competences and thereby clarified who the 'real' diplomats were. Even after the Treaty of Lisbon, some are still sensitive about the Head of an EU Delegation using the title 'EU Ambassador.' Nevertheless, analyzing the historical development reveals that through functional spillover and entrepreneurism by the EU officials, the Delegations evolved from mere information offices in the 1950s to prototype 'embassies for Europe' at the dawn of the new millennium. The remainder of the chapter focuses on how the Lisbon Treaty fosters the centralization of European diplomacy and what limitations remain. It will discuss both the Treaty's stipulations as well as first empirical evidence since the Treaty has been implemented. Since Lisbon, the Delegations constitute the official diplomatic representations of the EU abroad. From the perspective of third countries, this is more coherent than the previous EU Presidency, which rotated every six months among the EU members. Member state diplomats, by contrast, are still skeptical about the new leadership role. After all, this also comes at the expense of their own visibility and it gives a clear information advantage to the Delegations.

Such EU internal problems may be mitigated over time. However, the Treaty of Lisbon cannot streamline the differences across third states. This remains one of the most crucial limitations when centralizing European diplomacy. As a result, the new EEAS remains a diplomatic service of different speeds.

Chapter 3 has given an answer to the main research question based on historical evidence, which offers many insights but remains anecdotal in character. Therefore, the remainder of the book explores more systematically the factors that potentially speed up or slow down the centralization of European diplomacy. To that end, I develop four guiding hypotheses in Chapter 4. These hypotheses are informed by the main theories of European integration: firstly, Neo-Functionalism and Historical Institutionalism; secondly, (Liberal) Intergovernmentalism; and thirdly, Social Constructivism supported by the concept of Normative Power Europe. A concise review of these theories will help identify key factors that are most likely to accelerate or to slow down the different speeds of centralization of European diplomacy across third countries. Neo-Functionalists and Historical Institutionalists would expect that the less developed a third country is, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. The reason is that Delegations have been placed in development countries longest. Therefore, they have developed deep, long-term institutional knowledge and expertise on the ground. Intergovernmentalists for whom the Union's member states are the key drivers of EU integration would rather assume that the lower the strategic importance of a third country is, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. Liberal Intergovernmentalists equally believe in the influence of the Union's members but are more open when it comes to states' preferences. Trade relations are highly integrated in Europe, but they are more and more important for states to keep control over as well. Liberal Intergovernmentalists would expect that the higher the economic importance of a third country, the stronger the EU Delegation *and* the stronger the member state embassies are. Hence, in countries of high economic importance, the level of centralization of European diplomacy is ambiguous. Social Constructivists have portrayed the European Union as a diffuser of norms. They may assume that the more different the political culture of a third country is compared to the EU member states' political culture, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. But there are also special circumstances that impede or facilitate the centralization of diplomacy through the EU such as the colonial past between a single EU member and a third country, former Communist ties, or the prospect of EU membership of a country. I will

discuss these special cases and will provide empirical evidence to evaluate their influence on the centralization of European diplomacy.

In the subsequent Chapter 5, I develop a systematic way of measuring the centralization of European diplomacy. Different indicators through which the centralization of European diplomacy can be measured will be introduced and examined. These are mostly quantitative indicators such as the distribution of Delegations across the world, the number of diplomatic staff in each Delegation, or the level of seniority of the Head of the EU Delegation. Taken together, these indicators form the ground work for the 'European Diplomacy Centralization Index,' a tool that I have developed to measure the impact of European diplomacy in the world comprehensively across space and time. Because numbers cannot fully reflect the complexity of diplomacy, a set of qualitative indicators has also been developed to analyze the diplomatic professionalism of the EU Delegations in five countries. These countries are China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Algeria.

Chapter 6 contains the systematic answer(s) to the question of why the EU can centralize diplomacy more easily in some countries rather than in others. I divided the analysis into three steps: first, the breadth of the Delegation network; second, internal coordination of EU policy and unified external representation of the Union; third, I examine the diplomatic professionalism of the EU Delegations across countries. The results show that there is indeed a negative relationship between the level of development of a third country and the possibilities to centralize European diplomacy. The relatively high degree of European diplomacy centralization in developing countries is not only based on the long-term expertise of the local Delegations but is also due to the fact that few national embassies are present in the capital cities of the poorest countries in the world. Moreover, the Delegations are not better resourced than elsewhere such as in terms of diplomatic personnel. Next, the data quite surprisingly reveal that the EU is no longer the notorious 'political dwarf' (Diez Medrano, 2004). The Delegations can centralize European diplomacy well in countries of high strategic importance. But member states are also very well represented in such countries. This relationship also exists for economic importance but it is less significant. This reveals that EU Delegations have become important diplomatic players, even *vis-à-vis* emerging states such as China. Moreover, it testifies to a reversal of high and low politics: trade policy seems to be more and more important for Union member states. Therefore, they do not want to leave economic diplomacy to the EU alone. Finally, the data show that the EU does not use its Delegations to diffuse its norms

and values. Some anecdotal evidence that supports the view of the EU being a normative power should be recognized: the newly established EU Delegations in Libya and Myanmar have mainly been opened to support political reform in these countries.

Chapter 7 and final chapter summarizes the main findings about why the EU can centralize diplomacy more easily in some countries rather than in others. The results' meaning for the EU's role in international affairs will be emphasized. I will also discuss the most important areas for further research. Research on centralizing diplomatic representation should, for example, be extended to other cases of intergovernmental organizations that exhibit supranational characteristics. This would make a decisive contribution to understanding the centralization of diplomacy, and hence sovereignty, from nation-state to the supranational level beyond Europe. In terms of political practice, understanding why the EEAS is a diplomatic service of different speeds provides relevant insights for the general review of the EEAS, which has been published in mid-2013 and which is likely not the last one of its kind (Ashton, 2013, p. 15). I conclude the book with a number of concrete policy recommendations for the further development of the EEAS and its Delegations.

2
Centralization of European Diplomacy in Theory

State sovereignty and its centralization

The discipline of International Relations (IR) exhibits a bias when it comes to the central players in world politics. As the name suggests, the object of IR study is the interactions and relations between nation-states. Quite ironically, however, there is increasing skepticism among IR scholars of the (implicit or explicit) assumption of state-centrality. State power, authority, and sovereignty dissipate towards all sides: sideways towards private actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs); downwards to subnational players such as cities; and upwards towards international or supranational organizations (Hanrieder, 1978, p. 1278; Schmidt, 1995; Matthews, 1997; Christiansen, 2000, p. 194; Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 77; Zielonka, 2007, pp. 191–194; Segbers, 2011; cf. Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 3). As a result, renaming the discipline from 'IR' to 'Global Politics' seems appropriate (Griffiths, 2008; Held et al., 1999, p. 49; McGrew, 2008).

The central research question of this book is: why can the EU centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states but not in others? At an abstract level, it is the purpose of this book to offer an explanation of why upwards dissipation takes place. Why does state sovereignty move from nation-state level to be centralized through intergovernmental organizations with supranational characteristics (SN-IGOs) such as the European Union. As a first step in answering this question, the main concepts that are relevant to the nation-state and its changing role, specifically about the centralization of sovereignty via agents above the nation-state, are introduced and discussed in this section.

Before embarking on this discussion, a preliminary conceptual clarification must be made. To capture the phenomenon under investigation,

the term 'centralization' is used rather than the term 'integration' or 'upward dissipation.' The term 'integration' is very closely connected to the European experience, that is, 'European integration.'[1] However, the process of sovereignty shifting from the national to the supranational level can be observed in other parts of the world as well. I therefore take the view that the term 'centralization' is a more geographically neutral one. This study is focused on the European experience, but the purpose of this focus is to learn from the arguably most advanced case of centralization of sovereignty. Thus, the findings can be applied to other non-European cases in future studies, an endeavor that necessitates a more neutral terminology.

Moreover, European integration refers to the formal or intended transfer of competences, usually decision making only, from European Union member states to the EU institutions in Brussels. 'Dissipation,' by contrast, carries a passive connotation, referring to processes that are beyond the control of governments. 'Centralization' is less biased towards either kind. In this study, it refers to shifts in competences and decision making which are formal in nature, such as legal stipulation, but also informal ones, such as through bureaucratic practice (May and Wildavsky, 1978).

Finally, centralization is used because it draws a connection to the assumption of traditional, Neo-Realist IR theory of a centrally, hierarchically structured domestic sphere and a non-centrally, anarchically structured international sphere (Lake, 2003, p. 306). This constitutes the core assumption that is challenged through developments such as a diplomatic service at EU-level and other examples of dissipating sovereignty. Consequently, 'centralization' is used to describe the phenomenon under investigation.

Given the importance of the nation-state in IR in general, and for this study in particular, we need to grasp its conceptualization first. For that purpose, we have to go back to seventeenth century Europe when, during the Thirty Years War, the Habsburg Dynasty strove for universal power, legitimized by the Roman Catholic Church, against 'particularist' forces such as Denmark or France. The latter were successful, and the conflict was settled along the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* in the Treaty of Westphalia. The ruler who controlled a given territory was to decide on the prevailing religion and on political matters in more general terms (Gross, 1948, p. 22; Osiander, 2001, p. 252; Krasner, 1995, p. 115).[2] The state as a new political entity was born.

A crucial characteristic of the state is related to power and authority.[3] Internally, states have power in that they possess the monopoly

of violence *vis-à-vis* the population of their territory (Thomson, 1995, p. 221). States not only have the means but also the authority; they have the legitimate right to exert such violence. For European empires and kingdoms, this authority was usually linked to a divine legitimacy (McKitterick, 2008, p. 78; Amen et al., 2011, p. 1). The religious vacuum that emerged through the process of modernization and secularization in Europe in the centuries following the Thirty Years War was partly filled with nationalism, that is the state of consciousness of European peoples to belong to different nations that share the same heritage, language, traditions, and so on (cf. Greenfeld, 2001, p. 3). As of the nineteenth century, the state as a geopolitical unit and the nation as a cultural entity coincided. First in Europe and later worldwide, the nation-state became the predominant unit to structure global politics (Hanrieder, 1978, p. 1276; Berridge, 2002, p. 11; McGrew, 2008, p. 24; McCarney et al., 2011, p. 217).

Authority of modern nation-states is connected to a responsibility for the well-being of the nation living therein. In theory at least, and notwithstanding the political system, every state government is supposed to provide 'basic social values' for its people (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 3). Examples are welfare, order, and most fundamentally, security from outside intruders (Hanrieder, 1978, p. 1278; Andreatta, 2005, p. 20). Despite the immense differences of states in terms of geography, population size, level of development, and so on, these similar functions have caused IR scholars to consider states as 'like units' (Waltz, 2007, p. 93; Nicolson, 1961, p. 40).

On the international level, sovereignty can be seen as a special kind of authority relationship. In the Westphalian system, all states are formally regarded as like units and are therefore independent of each other (Lake, 2003, p. 306). In other words, no state 'is entitled to command; none is required to obey' (Waltz, 2007, p. 88; McGrew, 2008, p. 24). Krasner calls this 'international legal sovereignty' (Krasner, 1999, p. 4). Sovereignty is hence 'an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two principles: (1) territoriality and (2) the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures' (Krasner, 1999, p. 20; McGrew, 2008, p. 23). Most important for this book is the latter principle, the decentralization of authority at the international level (Lake, 2003, p. 310).

Linking this definition to the book's overarching research question, one can say that a state government in the Westphalian sense constitutes one centralized voice as the political organization within a state is theorized to be hierarchical in nature. By contrast, there is no such

centralized voice at the international level but many different ones which are all formally equal and independent (although they vary in actual power; Waltz, 1986, p. 91). This means that international life is structured anarchically as opposed to the hierarchical structure within a state, meaning an ordering principle of de-central character.

To some IR scholars, state sovereignty is fixed, 'indivisible' (McGrew, 2008, p. 28), and absolute: '[a] polity either is or is not sovereign' (Lake, 2003, p. 306). To ensure their independence, central state governments need to defend their territory and inhabitants against intruders from outside. They do so by diplomatic means that is through bilateral talks, negotiations, multilateral conferences, or ultimately through military means (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 5). Hence, 'statecraft' as in ensuring the state's survival in relation to other states is essentially about foreign policy, diplomacy, and warfare (Freeman, 2002, p. ix). They are tools related to 'life and death issues of political order and violence' (Andreatta, 2005, p. 21). This is why Neo-Realists call them 'high politics.' Low politics, by contrast, are not fundamental to a state's survival. Economics, social policy, culture, and education are traditionally considered to belong to that category as these matters are about 'relative gains' and redistributive in nature (Hanrieder, 1978, p. 1280; Barnett, 1990, p. 531; Baun, 1995; McGrew, 2008, p. 624; Muller, 1999).

The history of IR is full of violations and restorations of sovereignty. Whereas the traditional type of sovereignty violation is linked to coercion, the opposite is also possible. States may partially and voluntarily limit their sovereignty through international cooperation, rules and regulations, or even hand it over to fully fledged common organizations and thereby establish international hierarchy (Lake, 2003, p. 312). This development speaks against the ideas of Realist theorists to whom the assumption of state sovereignty is a 'holy cow' (cf. Lake, 2003, p. 315).[4] Paradoxically, the most important example for such centralization of sovereignty has its roots in Europe, the cradle of state sovereignty. Over the past six decades, European 'political actors in several distinct national settings [were] persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.' The result is 'a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones' (Haas, 1958, p. 16). This is how one of the founding fathers of EU studies, Ernst Haas, defines 'European integration.'

Although Haas formulated his definition in a way that it can be applied to other regions in the world, the establishment of this new political community has taken place under quite unique circumstances. IR in

nineteenth century Europe were marked by the emergence of the Realist 'balance of power' logic: nation-states mushroomed as new political entities and they were concerned with state-survival and one another's expansion (Little, 2009, p. 7; Magstadt, 2012, p. 9). This logic proved to be destructive and eventually led to a world war. While the balance of power logic goes back to the mutual mistrust among state governments, which is characteristic for Realist IR theory, Liberalist political philosophy became influential in the twentieth century (Kydd, 2005, p. 7; Doyle, 1983, p. 216). In order to overcome their mutual mistrust and competition, Liberalists suggested that states would need to institutionalize cooperation within the framework of an open, inclusive international organization. This is why the League of Nations was established in 1919, which was the predecessor of the United Nations Organization (UNO; Henig, 2010, pp. 1–24).

The League of Nations (LoN) did not, however, prevent another world war (Sharp, 1997, p. 619). Many thinkers were convinced that one of the decisive reasons behind the LoN's failure was that state sovereignty remained untouched, which kept its members relatively independent (Stone, 2000, p. 214; Diehl, 2005, pp. 3, 5). Amid the ruins of European cities, European politicians sought to establish international cooperation in such a way as to institutionalize mutual dependence of European states (Wurm, 1996). The way to do so was to limit state sovereignty by centralizing it under a new supranational authority. However, bold plans to impose a completely new government of a European superstate failed. After all, the individual European governments would not voluntarily 'dig their own grave' and simply give up their power and sovereignty (cf. Dedman, 2009, pp. 9–10).

The well-known compromise was to centralize sovereignty only partially, notably through the establishment of a common market starting with coal and steel, and then expanding to all sorts of goods (BBC News, 2007). Trade was considered a 'low politics' area (Jones, 2001, p. 45). Yet, the focus on coal and steel was central for arms production. Moreover, it satisfied the French government's security interests which sought to gain control and influence over the coal and steel production of its neighbor and long-term adversary Germany (Dedman, 2009, p. 54). The architects of the European Communities theorized that, given the efficiencies and advantages of a common market, integration will eventually spill over to all other policy areas, including high politics (Jones, 2001, p. 45). This process did not turn out to be as linear as the founding fathers thought it would be, and even today there is no European superstate in sight. Nevertheless, the European Communities have grown

into today's European Union, an intergovernmental organization with 28 member states, with more to come, that has 'strong supranational characteristics' (abbreviated in this book as 'SN-IGO'; Fossum, 2004, p. 23; Mastenbroek, 2005, p. 1108).

Conceptually, SN-IGOs are first and foremost entities whose members are nation-states. Secondly, these entities are based on a written document which is signed and ratified by its members (Encyclopaedia Britannica, no date). Thirdly, the written document gives the SN-IGO the legitimacy to take decisions in 'significant matters' (Etzioni, 2001, p. xix). Fourthly, it establishes bodies that prepare, take, and / or implement decisions which are not directly instructed by the member states' governments (European Union, 2010, Art. 17.3; Etzioni, 2001, p. xix; Stroby-Jensen, 2007, p. 89). Fifthly, the decisions are legally binding to its members and / or private actors such as companies or individuals. Finally, the enforcement mechanism of SN-IGOs' decisions is speedy and effective (Etzioni, 2001, p. xix).

It is fair to say that by international comparison, the EU is an IGO with many highly developed supranational characteristics. However, there are limitations, such as its limited geographical coverage, its sometimes ineffective jurisdiction, such as with the Stability and Growth Pact, or the on-going economic crisis which has put the European integration project as a whole into question. Due to the EU's varying nature, Leuffen, Rittberger, and Schimmelfennig have called the EU a 'system of differentiated integration' (Leuffen et al., 2013, p. 1). Most important for this book is the following limitation: despite the considerable degree of authority for supranational EU-bodies like the European Commission or the European Court of Justice, the Council of Ministers, which assembles the governments of the Union's member states, is still the most important decision making body, notably in traditional high politics (Sherrington, 2000, p. 1; European Union, 2010, Art. 26). Early attempts in the 1950s to communitarize defense, the policy area that touches most sensitively on the member states' sovereignty, failed (Dedman, 2009, p. 80). Although high politics have been coordinated at the EU-level for some time, CFSP remains subject to unanimous decision making with little influence from the Commission and even less from the European Parliament (European Union, 2010, Art. 26).

Additionally, not all member states participate in all policy domains equally. Hence, only 18 members have chosen to introduce the common currency, the Euro (European Commission, 2013). Moreover, Union membership is restricted for some member states, at least temporarily so. Thus, citizens from the Central and Eastern European member states

are still denied complete freedom of movement (Schultze, 2011). This differentiation of European integration across issue areas and across member states has caused scholars and other commentators to speak of a 'Europe of different speeds' (Habermas, 2001; Oswald, 2003; Dyson and Sepos, 2010, p. 4; cf. Leuffen et al., 2013). All in all, the presence of the European Union has, however, resulted in authoritative, hierarchical, and centralized IR on the European continent, even if integration is not up to the same level across policy areas and across member states (Lake, 2003, pp. 313, 316).

Even though the EU may be the rare or even unique case of very advanced centralization of sovereignty, the trend of international hierarchy intensifies rather than reverses, which is part of the wider phenomenon of globalization. It does not only take place in Europe but in all parts of the world, such as Africa and South East Asia, strengthening the role of the African Union, AU, and deepening integration of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), (see NEPAD, 2012; Magliveras and Naldi, 2002; ASEAN, 2013; Jetschke and Murray, 2012); East Asia, establishing a free trade area between China, Japan, and South Korea, despite historical animosities (see Bloomberg News, 2012): or North America, turning the North American Free Trade Agreement into a 'North American Community'(see Manley et al., 2005). To understand this development, we first need to discuss globalization conceptually. David Held defines it as:

> a process [...] which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact – generating transcontinental flows or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and the exercise of power. (Held et al., 1999, p. 16)

While 'territory' is at the heart of a nation-state's definition, globalization, by contrast, is inherently border-transgressing and floating (McGrew, 2008, p. 18; McCarney et al., 2011, p. 217). Globalization is a clear 'challenge to the state' (Neumann, 2007, p. 6). At the same time, globalization has not made the nation-state obsolete. Rather, it has made states and other new players in global politics dependent on each other. In such an interdependent world, the major tasks of states are no longer to simply accumulate and – if needed – apply military and economic means, but to 'achiev[e] some degree of coordination of resources' and secondly to 'set [...] goals and mak[e] priorities' (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 76).

In the post-1989 world, military means are still important but they do not play the same role anymore as they used to (Hanrieder, 1978, p. 1280): the high degree of interdependence of current global politics forces states to talk, negotiate, and communicate more and more (Berridge, 2002, p. 27). In other words, '[t]raditional sources and bases of state power are downplayed since they are less efficient and appropriate instruments' to pursue contemporary politics. 'Instead, collaborative instruments' are needed (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 92). Diplomacy is such a collaborative instrument. It 'involves essentially [...] representation, reporting, communicating, negotiating, and maneuvering' to establish and handle relations among states and other political entities (Plischke, 1972 in Freeman, 1994, p. 102). This has been touched upon already, for instance by contrasting it with warfare, and it will be elaborated upon in more depth in the next chapter.

For now, and in a nutshell, diplomacy is one of the central means for states to achieve the two tasks of setting priorities and of achieving coordination. In the words of a senior German diplomat, 'diplomacy is statecraft, by definition' (Boomgaarden et al., 2009; Kissinger, 1994). Given its importance, one would expect that diplomacy will remain under firm member state control, not least since the Treaty of Lisbon, this is no longer the case, at least on the European continent. In the next section, the concept of diplomacy and its evolution, especially in light of globalization will therefore be discussed.

The concept of diplomacy then and now

Semantically, the notion of diplomacy is based on the Greek word 'diploma,' which quite simply refers to an official folded document (Satow, 2011 [1917], p. 3; Sharp, 1999, p. 37). In IR theory and practice, diplomacy still fundamentally means the negotiation and 'written exchange of documents between states' (Neumann, 2007, p. 5). These in turn serve as the basis for the conduct of states' relations. As Raymond Cohen put it, 'diplomacy remains the 'engine room' of IR' (in Sharp, 1999, p. 33). The art of diplomacy is then the *skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiations* (Satow, 2011 [1917], p. 3). A more encompassing definition has been given by Elmer Plischke:

> Diplomacy is the political process by which political entities (generally states) establish and maintain official relations, direct or indirect, with one another, in pursuing their respective goals, objectives, interests, and substantive and procedural policies in the international

environment; as a political process it is dynamic, adaptive, and changing, and it constitutes a continuum; functionally, it embraces both the making and implementation of foreign policy at all levels, centrally and in the field, and involves essentially, but is not restricted to, the functions of representation, reporting, communicating, negotiating, and maneuvering, as well as caring for the interests of nationals abroad. (Plischke, 1972 in Freeman, 1994, p. 102)

Plischke's definition is encompassing, and serves as an appropriate basis for this book. However, he does not make a very clear distinction between 'diplomacy' and 'foreign policy.' The above definition shows that, for him, diplomacy is part of foreign policy. While the two are undeniably linked, one could say that 'diplomacy' refers to the interaction between one state and another while 'foreign policy' refers to the interest of one country vis-à-vis another. I In other words, diplomacy is a strategy how to deal with that other country, which is adopted through a formal decision making process among the (governmental) stakeholders of a state (Hudson, 2007, p. 4; 112; Carlsnaes, 2002, p. 335). Foreign policy is not only more specific than diplomacy but it is also prior to it. As a consequence, I distinguish 'European diplomacy' from 'EU foreign policy' in this book as follows: the former refers to the sum of diplomatic activities of EU member states but also of EU institutions. The latter refers to the EU's interests and strategies towards non-EU countries and other external entities, such as international organizations, as decided in the framework of the EU's common foreign and security policy.

It was highlighted in the previous chapter that the distinction between high and low politics becomes blurred. Nonetheless, diplomatic techniques such as negotiation, talks, or bargaining are of growing importance for states to maintain significance in an interdependent world (Cohen, 1995 in Sharp, 1997, p. 609). This makes it all the more puzzling that EU member states have recently agreed to establish a common European foreign service. To further investigate this puzzle, I will begin with a discussion on the concept of diplomacy over time with a particular emphasis on the role of embassies as key diplomatic tools. Thereafter, the insights of this discussion will be applied to the case of the European Union.

As Plischke's definition above indicates, to maintain diplomatic relations, a central component is the permanent presence of an envoy of one state residing in another (Satow, 2011 [1917], p. 4). In ancient Europe, such as during the Greek and the Roman Empire, *ad hoc* intermediaries were already employed 'to solve, through negotiations, the disputes that

arose between [different political entities] and to promote peaceful rela-
tions' (de Magalhães, 1988, p. 22; Numelin in de Magalhães, 1988, p. 16;
United Nations, 1961; Nicolson, 1961, p. 39). *These envoys or intermediaries
were called 'Ambassadors.'* Etymologically, the meaning of the term derives
from the Ancient Greek word 'presbeia,' which means 'a mission of note-
worthy or venerable people' (de Magalhães, 1988, p. 19). Consequently,
the process of appointing Ambassadors has always been highly selective
(de Magalhães, 1988, pp. 16, 19; Nicolson, 1961, p. 43). *In other parts of the
world, this was common practice.* In the Laws of Manu, one of the key works
of Hindu civilization written in the third century BC, the view was taken
that '[p]eace and its opposite (that is war) depend on the Ambassadors,
since it is they who create and undo alliances' on behalf of a government
(de Magalhães, 1988, p. 17; Sharp, 1997, p. 615). *Today, these intermedi-
aries* are still called Ambassadors. They reside and work in an embassy, a
physical establishment. This serves as the permanent hub to conduct and
to administer state relations 'on the ground,' meaning in the capital city
of another state (United Nations, 1961, Art. 1 (i)).

The concrete tasks of Ambassadors back in ancient times and the
profile of modern diplomatic missions are remarkably similar. A minister
of the ancient Indian emperor Chandragupta, who lived and reigned
around 300 BC, summarizes the tasks as follows:

> a) transmitting the points of view of their governments; b) preserving
> treaties; c) defending the objectives of their state, if necessary by
> threats, by spreading dissension, by creating secret organizations, by
> gathering intelligence about the movement of spies, by rendering
> void treaties unfavorable to their state, by winning over the offi-
> cials of the host country; d) gathering all information about military
> installations, wealth, and so on, of the host country. (de Magalhães,
> 1988, p. 17)

Meanwhile, the central document stipulating the role and tasks of
modern nation-state embassies is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations from 1961. With over 170 state parties, it is considered to be
'one of the surest and most widely based multilateral regimes in the
field of international relations' (Brown in Berridge, 2002, p. 115; United
Nations, 1961; United Nations, 2012b).

Based on Article 3 of the Vienna Convention, a diplomatic mission is
defined as the representation of one sovereign nation-state in another.
It has five basic functions: first, it represents the 'sending State in the
receiving State.' The Ambassador outlines his or her country's policies

to high level officials and politicians of the receiving state. He or she also addresses the general public such as by appearing on TV programs, holding lectures, or keynote speeches at conferences, and through his or her presence during all sorts of ceremonies and banquets (Berridge, 2002, pp. 117–8).

Second, an Ambassador needs to protect his or her sending state's interests as well as the interests of his or her fellow nationals who happen to reside or travel in the host country (United Nations, 1961, Art. 3.1 (b)). In case the host country adopts a policy which goes against his or her own country's viewpoints and goals, the Ambassador would officially launch a protest towards the local authorities (see for instance EU Business, 2012). Vice-versa, the local authorities may summon the Ambassador of a country whose government acted against the receiving state's interest (Berridge, 2002, p. 16). If a country is suddenly struck by a natural or man-made catastrophe, the embassy is responsible to take care that all its nationals are safe (British Embassy Sofia, 2012). Issuing visas for the locals of the receiving state to travel to the sending state's country is also part of the daily routine of embassies (de Magalhães, 1988, p. 102). Due to affordable transport facilities, this type of work is much more extensive today than only a few decades ago (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 2; European diplomats, 2010).

Third, on behalf of the sending state, the Ambassador is entrusted with the mandate to negotiate and implement inter-state agreements, treaties, and international law with authorities of the receiving state (United Nations, 1961, Art. 3.1 (c)). In case the Head of State, the Head of Government, or a minister is visiting the host country, the embassy takes care of the organization of that visit. Part of this organizational work is providing the visitor with the latest news and intelligence about developments in the host country (European diplomats, 2010). In the case of a visit, information provision is of particular importance; embassies constantly feed their governments with reports consisting of information gathered on the spot (de Magalhães, 1988, p. 51). Hence, the fourth main embassy task according to the Vienna Convention is gathering information (United Nations, 1961, Art. 3.1 (d)).

The Vienna Convention was drafted in a Kantian spirit. This becomes clear when noting that the final main task of embassies is to promote 'friendly relations' between the two states. This task is fulfiled most effectively if the Ambassador and his or her team of diplomats are familiar with the local customs, ideally speaking the host country's official language fluently (Berridge, 2002, p. 119; Sharp, 1999, p. 41; Nicolson, 1961, pp. 41–2).

In order to ensure that embassies can fulfil these tasks, the remainder of the Vienna Convention pertains mostly to practical aspects. These include diplomatic procedures, ranks, status and immunity of Ambassadors and other diplomats, their freedom of movement to enter and to travel the host country, and so on. Table 2.1 summarizes the main tasks of embassies according to the Vienna Convention.

If globalization fundamentally challenges the nation-state in international politics, it naturally also has a vital impact on embassies, whose work is at the heart of state sovereignty. After all, embassies 'symboli[ze] the existence of the society of states' (Bull, 1977, p. 172). To analyze this impact, we should revisit a crucial characteristic of globalization: de-territorialization. First and foremost, the advancement of communication and transport technology implies shrinking distances. People meet virtually in addition to or even instead of having physical meetings. New communication technology seems to make the physical presence of one country in another less important (Nugent, 2010, p. 393; European diplomat, 2010; Sharp, 1999, p. 40).

Claims that embassies would be doomed are, however, not new. Similar predictions were made with the arrival of the telegraph in the nineteenth century, but they did not materialize (Neumann, 2007, p. 8). By contrast, the opposite proved true as embassies mushroomed, leading to a 'diplomatic inflation,' not least since the ratification of the Vienna Convention, and the simultaneous wave of new nation-states emerging from colonial rule and the disintegration of the Soviet Union into new independent nation-states (Sharp, 1997, p. 616; Reychler, 1996 in Sharp, 1999, p. 33; Sharp, 1999, p. 42). Iver Neumann observes that in contrast to merchants or military, diplomats tend to react slowly to changes, notably to technological ones (Neumann, 2007, p. 8). Paul Sharp agrees as there is little empirical evidence to prove the disappearance of diplomacy (Sharp, 1997, p. 631).

Such 'resistance' can be justified to some extent. After all, virtual communication does not exhibit the same characteristics and qualities

Table 2.1 Overview of the main tasks of embassies according to the Vienna Convention

(1) Representation of the home state in the host state
(2) Defense of home state interests *vis-à-vis* the host state government
(3) Negotiation with the host state government on behalf of the home state government
(4) Information gathering and reporting for the home state government
(5) Promotion of friendly relations between home and host state

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

as face-to-face meetings (Sharp, 1997, p. 611). This is of particular significance regarding diplomacy which is a secretive endeavor that necessitates trust (Nicolson, 1961, pp. 39–40). The permanent presence of diplomats in another country therefore helps connect the home with the host state. Apart from that, the publication of leaked diplomatic cables by 'Wikileaks' has made the risks of the new communication technologies of the twenty-first century for diplomacy all too clear (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011; cf. Nicolson, 1961, p. 45). Finally, the presence of diplomats on the ground naturally improves the quality of their reporting as they can follow developments with their own eyes and ears (Nicolson, 1961, p. 46). Overall, maintaining embassies is still advantageous to support diplomatic relations.

Nevertheless, too much Neo-Realist-style skepticism about globalization's impact on traditional diplomatic practice is inappropriate. While embassies are not vanishing, they are certainly being transformed, just as nation-state sovereignty is being transformed by globalization. Some old characteristics remain, new ones emerge, and synergies are formed. A central characteristic of globalization challenging nation-state sovereignty is that states today face similar problems. This in turn requires common, multilateral action. When it comes to diplomatic representation, one consequence is that embassy-like permanent missions are established to the administrative and decision making centers of SN-IGOs such as the United Nations in New York, the World Trade Organization in Geneva, or the European Union in Brussels (cf. Sharp, 1997, p. 609). Moreover, international organizations also maintain their own permanent missions to states and towards other IOs.

Whereas the Vienna Convention defines embassies as the representations of one sovereign nation-state towards another, states are no longer the only diplomatic players (Fennessy, 1976, p. 62; Dembinski, 1988, p. 11). Meanwhile, the size of these permanent representations usually exceeds that of most other bilateral embassies (European diplomats, 2010). This, however, does not mean that diplomats in bilateral embassies will be soon out of work. By contrast, with growing interdependence, their schedule has become ever tighter. As previously indicated, ministers, Heads of States, and Heads of Governments constantly visit each other bilaterally or they attend multilateral conferences (European diplomats, 2010). Such summit diplomacy has exponentially increased, particularly since the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in 2008 (Johansson and Tallberg, 2010; The Economist, 2012). In order to manage this schedule, there are separate departments now in Ministries

of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) that deal with multilateral diplomacy and international organizations (Berridge, 2002, p. 11).

Given the common pressures, there are some prominent examples of closer state-to-state cooperation up to the point of fusing embassies. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland maintain a common embassy building of the 'Nordic states' in Berlin (Jørgensen, 2005, p. 86). A similar 'cohabitation' is planned for the Polish and Swedish embassies in Algiers (European diplomat, 2011a). Usually, such projects are of limited depth. The goals for this type of collaboration are not so much substantive political cooperation. Rather, Ambassadors seek to save resources by acquiring cheaper office rents or by sharing the costs for security services (Hocking, 2005b, p. 5; Spence, 2009, p. 255; European diplomat, 2011). However, one should not underestimate the power of physical proximity, which automatically increases direct personal interaction between diplomats from different countries and trust. This may eventually lead to closer political cooperation (Duke, 2012a, p. 27).

These examples hint at another important problem. Although global interdependence increases the need to maintain offices abroad, diplomatic representation is a very costly business. This aspect has even higher significance in times of economic crises and a decreasing tax base (Hocking, 2005a, p. 276). MFAs therefore need to make choices regarding where to maintain their diplomatic premises. For some countries, it simply makes more sense to open an embassy than for others. Due to the financial pressures, they may be forced to collaborate closer with another state's embassy. Examples are the issuing of visas for small EU member states. Due to a lack of resources and infrastructure, such states may decide to let larger states, such as their European neighbors, issue visas on their behalf in countries where they do not have a diplomatic presence. Another example is the execution of the EU Presidency prior to the Treaty of Lisbon. Countries such as Slovenia can only afford a network of a limited number of embassies worldwide. When Slovenia presided over the EU in 2007, other EU member states embassies presided on their behalf in third countries where Slovenia was not present (European diplomats, 2010).

Another central change brought about by globalization, which relativizes nation-state sovereignty, is the complexity of issues and policies. Nation-states are interdependent, which makes the distinction between high and low politics difficult. As a result, not only Heads of State and Government and foreign ministers pay bilateral visits or attend multilateral conferences, but the schedules of ministers of development, of the environment or of finance and economics ministers have also been

tremendously internationalized (European diplomat, 2010b). This shows that both the problems faced by state governments and the solutions thereto are interdependent, and extremely complex in nature (Nicolson, 1961, p. 40). High quality information not only about the policy preferences and positions of single countries, but also factual, technical knowledge, and a thorough understanding of a subject matter are needed in times of global politics (Rooney et al., 2003, p. 39; Hocking, 2005b, p. 3).

This has consequences for the work of embassies. The key personnel working in embassies are trained diplomats. They are usually generalists with a background in international politics, often equipped with an expertise of a specific region in the world. They have highly developed skills in negotiation and the handling of questions of protocol. However, they usually do not have specialized technical knowledge, for instance on climate change. To compensate for this, more and more officials from ministries other than the MFA nowadays populate national embassies (European diplomat, 2010c; European diplomats, 2010; Hocking, 2005b, p. 319). Therefore, it can be said that the traditional structure of embassies is challenged from within the state. Paul Sharp goes even further by claiming that 'diplomacy is losing both its professional and conceptual identity' (Sharp, 1997, p. 630). Nevertheless, this does not make traditional diplomats unemployed. While the MFA officials may lack technical expertise, the officials of other ministries lack skills in terms of mediation, negotiation, and inter-cultural competence (European diplomat, 2011b). More important for the subject matter of this book is that regardless of which ministry they are from, they are still representatives of states.

However, the decisive relationships in global politics are not limited to those between and among states. Diplomats and other state officials are not the only ones who are busy liaising with the local state authorities. All-round sovereignty dissipation can be observed quite clearly in capital cities all over the world: sideways of the state, MNCs and NGOs have regional branches in capitals and other first-tier cities abroad; below the state level, regions or cities maintain liaison offices; and above the state level, international organizations also maintain embassy-like antennas worldwide. As a result, there is an 'increasing number of groups that look like functional equivalents of diplomats' (Neumann, 2007, p. 12; Amnesty International, 2012; United Nations, 2012).

In many ways, these people complement the work of diplomats. They are, for instance, an important source of information and expertise, and help deal with the more and more complex tasks of embassies. At the same time, NGO-workers or business people also need the support of

local embassies. As the latter represent state governments, their standing is very high, as is their influence on the host government (European diplomats, 2010). If the business community faces market access problems or if an NGO cannot implement its development programs, diplomats can help mediate (Neumann, 2007, p. 11). Hence, the boom of 'foreign representationism' of entities other than nation-states can be seen as a division of labor.

After all, diplomacy remains an elitist business. Despite the diversification of groups and actors that require the services of embassies, nation-states are still embassies' main 'clients.' Diplomats must respond to governments (Boomgaarden et al., 2009; Sharp, 1997, pp. 609–10). In line with state governments, diplomats from different countries recognize each other. The fact that the 'circle of relevant others is widening' does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with a widening of recognition (Neumann, 2007, p. 13). Consequently, scholars and (unsurprisingly) diplomats themselves are skeptical about sovereignty centralization when it comes to diplomatic representation (Sharp, 1997, p. 629). The next section will further investigate whether or not such skepticism is justified by analyzing the centralization of European diplomacy.

Centralization of European diplomacy

So far, the dissipation of state sovereignty in the course of globalization to all sides, notably upwards, towards international organizations has been stressed. I have termed this latter phenomenon 'centralization of sovereignty.' This phenomenon of centralization of state sovereignty includes planned transferal of competences from the national to the supranational level, and spontaneous dissipation, which may be beyond the control of nation-state governments. The EU is an ideal example for both types. Its member states voluntarily subordinate themselves to international rules, cooperation regimes, and even to fully fledged supranational organizations (Lake, 2003, pp. 311, 313). However, it should not be forgotten that in order to transfer more competence to the EU, it still takes an intergovernmental conference of all EU member states (European Union, 2010; See Declaration no. 18 in relation to the delimitation of competences). They all have to agree to any competence transferal: Germany just as well as Malta. In this sense, international hierarchy implies a change 'from direct to indirect rule' with nation-states still having the last word (Neumann, 2007, p. 15; Moravcsik, 2002, p. 605; Cheneval, 2005, p. 14).

Nonetheless, once established, an international institution is 'difficult [...] to eradicate' (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 55). A decision negotiated

at the supranational level may not be in line with single state inter-ests. More critical, though, is that the international agent may develop its own interest. This may be different even from that of the member states' lowest common denominator of interests (European diplomat, 2010d). The growing expertise of SN-IGOs together with the increasing complexity of contemporary global politics may advance the independ-ence of SN-IGOs over their member states. Consequently, nation-states run the risk that 'planned changes [to centralize sovereignty at supra-national level] trigger spontaneous institutional changes.' These may 'extend beyond what the original reform aimed at' (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 77). At that moment, institutions such as the EU would become actors in their own right instead of merely constituting the agents of the 'principles,' that is the member states (cf. Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 3).

Indeed, SN-IGOs are not just outcomes of globalization. Provided that they manage to develop into fully fledged actors, it would be in the interest of institutions such as the EU to centralize authority even more (Pierre and Peters, 2000, pp. 77–8). This is also what the aforementioned idea of a functional spill over mechanism in European integration is about. As a long-term result, the influence of single states over such tran-snational institutions may turn out to be very limited (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 85). Scholars therefore have started to investigate bureaucratic politics of such SN-IGOs to explain outcomes in IR rather than only investigating state governments (Vanhoonacker and Reslow, 2010).

Hence, the dissipation of state sovereignty embraces formally stipulated laws and regulations, but also informal aspects such as daily bureaucratic practice. As previously stated, centralization of sovereignty is arguably most advanced on the European continent, but not limited to this region in the world. It is noteworthy that the Europeans have taken an important and unprecedented step in furthering the centralization of sovereignty by establishing a diplomatic service at EU-level. Traditionally, diplomacy is seen as 'high politics,' and even though the distinction of high and low politics is blurred and hence disputed, not least due to globalization, it is not entirely obsolete. After all, states are more ready to compromise their sovereignty in some policy fields than in others. This is also true for the European Union. This is why we will now examine the stipulations of the Lisbon Treaty, which has established the European External Action Service (EEAS), so as to find out in how far it – theoretically – centralizes European diplomacy (cf. Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 2).

As mentioned already in the introductory chapter, at the head of the new EEAS is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), who 'conduct[s] the Union's common foreign and security policy' (European Union, 2010, Art. 18.2). The current HR,

Catherine Ashton, like all future HRs, is appointed by the 'European Council, acting by qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission' (European Union, 2010, Art. 18.1). One of her most important tasks is the permanent presidency over the Council-formation that gathers the foreign ministers of the European Union. As of Lisbon, there is no longer a rotating scheme with member states' foreign ministers taking turns (European Union, 2010, Art. 18.3; Barber, 2010, p. 58). 'Permanent,' however, means for a maximum of five years. The HR's term of service lasts for 2.5 years and it can be renewed once (European Union, 2010, Art. 15.5). This relative permanency shall 'prevent the tendency of the rotating presidency to launch overambitious and ill-thought out initiatives and provide greater strategic direction and follow-up to EU policy initiatives' (Behr et al., 2010, p. 5).

Despite the fact that the European Council, that is the Heads of State and Government, still identifies strategic objectives and interests of the EU's external relations, and although actual decision making in the Council remains in unanimous mode, the HR's presidency over the Foreign Affairs Council constitutes an important step in centralizing European diplomacy. It implies tasks such as setting the dates and agenda, chairing the meetings, and producing and disseminating notes after each meeting which give the HR considerable influence in steering the course of the decision making process (cf. Tallberg, 2003). Moreover, it needs to be mentioned that the new HR takes part in the meetings of the European Council (European Union, 2010, Art. 15.2).

Once a decision is taken, the HR and the member states are responsible for the implementation (European Union, 2010, Art. 26). While the European Court of Justice generally has no jurisdiction in these matters (European Union, 2010, Art. 24), the introduction of the HR has strengthened the links to another institution, which has so far largely been excluded from EU foreign policy, namely the European Parliament (EP). According to Article 36 of the Lisbon Treaty, the HR informs and consults the EP. The final feature that completes the function of the HR as a 'coherence-glue' for member states' foreign policy as well as the EU institutions' external action is that the HR is at the same time part of the College of Commissioners. She thereby replaces the pre-Lisbon position of a Commissioner for External Affairs. The HR is also one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission (hence the abbreviation 'HR/VP'; see European Union, 2010, Art. 17.4, 18.4; Willis, 2009).

Overall, the HR/VP has close links to every EU institution as well as the member states, which – at least in theory – enhances coherence in EU foreign policy making and arguably constitutes a precondition for the

centralization of European diplomacy. Figure 2.1 below visually summarizes the institutional set-up for EU foreign policy after the Lisbon Treaty:

To complete the picture, the HR has similar powers regarding the most sensitive policy domain concerning member states' sovereignty, namely the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The CSDP is considered an 'integral part' of the CFSP according to Article 42.1 of the Lisbon Treaty.

As mentioned in the introduction, some of the tasks of the HR/VP were already enshrined in the pre-Lisbon post of the High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, in contrast to her predecessor Javier Solana, Lady Ashton is not a 'one (wo)man show.' In order to implement her many tasks, and similar to other foreign ministers, she is assisted by her own 'diplomatic corps,' the EEAS, 2013; European Union, 2010, Art. 27.3). The EEAS is widely considered to be an institution '*sui generis*' as it merges departments of previously existing institutions into one, notably of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission, but also temporarily seconded staff from the member states' diplomatic services (European Union, 2010, Art. 27.3). As of July 1, 2013, officials from all EU institutions may apply for vacant positions in the EEAS, too (Council of the European Union, 2010, (11)). By mid-2013, there is over 3,400 staff working for the EEAS, which includes over 1,600

Figure 2.1   Decision making in EU Foreign policy after Lisbon

permanent staff members[5] and another 1,800 national experts as well as contractual and local agents. About 1,500 are located in Brussels and over 1,900 work in Delegations (Ashton, 2013, p. 14).[6] The EEAS' total budget grew slightly from about EUR 460 million, for both headquarters and Delegations (Nielsen, 2012) to about EUR 520 million (Waterfield, 2013). Given that the EEAS is supposed to represent the Union as a whole, that is the collective of the 28 member states as well as the EU institutions, these are quite humble figures if compared to national foreign services (Balfour and Raik, 2013, p. 167). Next to aspects such as Ashton's charisma and the institutional turf fights in setting up the EEAS, the service's budget has been criticized by the member states for being too large (Barber, 2010; Lamont, 2013). In particular, the (costly) deployment of EU officials in Delegations abroad was questioned.

This may come as a surprise. After all, Lady Ashton did not have to build up her network of diplomatic representations from scratch. Throughout the six decades before Lisbon, the EU's executive institution, the European Commission, had built up a network of representations of an impressive breadth, spread all over the globe (Spence, 2009; Austermann, 2012a). In the year 2009, at the dawn of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission was present with its so-called 'European Commission Delegations' (ECDs) in close to 140 countries and territories worldwide. The Commission also maintained representations to the most important international organizations for instance the African Union, the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the OECD. The following map illustrates the breadth of the network.

Figure 2.2   Global network of EU delegations

Note: The map is taken from Austermann (2011, p. 53). New Delegations have recently been opened in Libya and in Burma (see European Commission, 2011; European Voice, 2012).

It was not only convenient to use these ECDs as a basis for her network of prototype embassies, but it was a logical consequence of Lady Ashton being the High Representative and the Commission's Vice-President at the same time.

We know already from the previous section how vital nation-state embassies are when it comes to the conduct and the implementation of diplomacy. Given that the EEAS is in many ways an institution '*sui generis*' that distinguishes itself from 'regular' national foreign services, how are the Delegations different from regular embassies? And given their role as diplomatic representations of the EU, what is their (potential) contribution to centralizing European diplomacy, and hence member state sovereignty?

To begin with, the sheer presence of the European Union 'on the ground' in third countries is a fundamental condition for diplomacy centralization. As Susan Strange rightly puts it, 'power can effectively be exercised by "being there"' (Strange, 1996, p. 26). However, what certainly also matters regarding the centralization of European diplomacy are the competences, the concrete tasks, and the characteristics of these Delegations.

Given the nature of governance in the twenty-first century in general, and the decision making system of the EU in particular, all output of EU decision making is essentially the product of coordination, negotiation, and compromise among all EU member states (Hocking, 2005a, p. 280). The EU is a forum for coordination and the Commission, which chairs some and participates in other Council meetings, is the facilitator of coordination and compromise (Nedergaard, 2008). With the presence of member state representations on the one hand, and the European Commission on the other, third country capital cities have been a 'microcosm of EU foreign policy coordination, far away from Brussels' (Austermann, 2012b, p. 86), long before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The centrality of internal coordination on the ground in third countries is reflected in the Maastricht Treaty. After a brief mention in Article 30 of the Single European Act, which was ratified in 1987,[7] the Maastricht Treaty officially recognized the Commission Delegations and their meaning for EU foreign policy for the first time in European integration history. According to Article J.6 of the Maastricht Treaty,

> [t]he diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying

out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community. (European Union, 1992, Art. J.6)

Mirroring the Commission's role in Brussels, the pre-Lisbon Commission Delegations have already been the key coordinating force of European policy on the ground. This has not only been the case for policy domains that fall rather clearly in the EU's field of competence, such as trade, but also for traditional high politics such as the CFSP (European diplomats, 2010).

One of the main tasks of diplomatic representations is to put into practice policy that has been decided upon back home. Hence, the Commission Delegations were busy with 'presenting, explaining, and implementing EU policy' (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 6). Already before the Lisbon Treaty, they were the natural point of contact if a third country's government, local businessmen, journalists, or citizens wanted to get information about the EU as a whole.[8] As a result, the Commission Delegations had already represented the EU as a whole towards their host countries pre-2009. The fact that they had been referred to as 'EU Delegations,' with the Head of Mission being called the 'EU Ambassador,' much earlier than was legally stipulated, underlines this representational role (European diplomats, 2010).

Digging deeper into the concrete tasks of the Commission Delegations, we find that they have made up an 'impressive list' prior to Lisbon as well (Chaban et al., 2009, p. 278):

> The European Commission plays a key role in the implementation of the EU's foreign and other policies and in this it relies heavily on its 130 delegations and offices around the world, which act not only as the eyes and ears of the Commission in their host countries but also as its mouthpiece vis-à-vis the [host countries'] authorities and society as a whole. [...]; analyzing and reporting on the policies and developments of the countries to which they are accredited; and conducting negotiations in accordance with a given mandate. (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, pp. 5–6)

The reason why this list is quite impressive is its level of congruence with the tasks of nation-state embassies as stipulated in the Vienna Convention discussed above. If the Delegations are to centralize internal coordination of European diplomacy and external representation of the EU abroad, their own transformation into proper diplomatic missions is an important precondition. Due to the hierarchical and elitist structure

of diplomatic representation, they need to be acknowledged and recognized by the in-group of nation-state diplomats (Neumann, 2007, p. 13). This can best be done by becoming more and more like 'one of them,' both *de jure* and in the perception of the other 'traditional' diplomats.

In summary, at the dawn of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission Delegations had considerable potential to centralize European diplomacy abroad. Shortly before the Delegations obtained a substantial formal, legal upgrade, they had already been the informal and *de facto* channels of diplomatic activities in EU matters. This was the case in four different aspects: first, the Delegations were present in as many as 140 third states to maximize their impact; second, they internally coordinated European diplomacy among diplomats from all member state embassies. This was notably the case for the issue areas of Commission competence but also sometimes beyond that. Third, they had been vital in ensuring a unified external representation of the European Union towards third countries. Fourth, to be able to fulfil functions 2 and 3, Delegations need to become fully fledged diplomatic players. As a matter of fact, and as we will see in the next chapter, their diplomatic professionalism was already at a high level before Lisbon. In other words, their profile and organization are similar to traditional nation-state embassies. It is in this vein that I conceptualize the term 'centralization of European diplomacy in third states' for the rest of this book:

Table 2.2   Definition of the centralization of European diplomacy

The centralization of European diplomacy refers to the formally assigned and informally obtained channeling of diplomatic activity in EU matters through the European Union's physical presence, that is the Union Delegations, in the capital cities of non-EU countries.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Table 2.3   Four aspects of the level of centralization of European diplomacy in third states

1. Breadth of the EU Delegation network: presence/absence of fully fledged EU Delegations in third countries
2. Internal coordination of EU policy among EU Delegations and member state embassies via the EU Delegations
3. Unified external representation of the EU towards third countries via the EU Delegations
4. Diplomatic professionalism of the EU Delegation network: similarity of Delegations' profiles to traditional nation-state embassies

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

In order to understand the Delegations' potential to centralize European diplomacy after Lisbon across different countries, we need to understand *how* the Delegations could reach the above-described potential at the dawn of the Lisbon Treaty, and why and how this potential has differed across countries. In line with the general evolution of the European Union, the Union's diplomatic network has developed without a 'master plan.' Nevertheless, the network has become gradually more diplomatic in character, even without a detailed legal basis. Consequently, the evolution of the Delegation is a 'political and social process,' which requires detailed analysis (Wiener and Diez, 2009). I will therefore trace the historical development of the network of EU Delegations in the following chapter, while paying attention to the definitions above as an analytical framework.

3
Diplomatic Representation of the EU Over Time

Having discussed diplomatic representation and the centralization thereof conceptually, let us now turn to European practice. The following chapter will review the historical development of how the diplomatic representations of the EU have been able to centralize European diplomacy. This review will point out what factors have accelerated or inhibited the centralization of European diplomacy throughout the past decades and across different countries in the world. I will first examine the development of the EU Delegations' predecessors, the Commission Delegations, from the early 1950s until 2008, the year before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect. Thereafter, a close look will be taken at how the Treaty of Lisbon fosters the Delegations' impact to centralize European diplomacy and what limitations remain.

Ernst Haas, the founding father of the first theory of European integration, Neo-Functionalism, abandoned his own theory as early as the mid-1970s. One of the main reasons was that European integration did not spill over to so-called high politics. On this backdrop, it is surprising how apt this theory is to explain the historical development of the EU's diplomatic representation in the world – which is arguably the highest of policy fields. Through functional spillover and entrepreneurism by the EU officials, the Delegations evolved from mere information offices in the 1950s to prototype 'embassies for Europe' at the dawn of the new millennium.

While the Treaty of Lisbon has boosted the Delegations' role even further, it does not do away with differences of diplomacy centralization across countries. This makes the European External Action Service (EEAS) look like a diplomatic service of different speeds instead of the new institution that gives the Union one voice. The Delegations located

in developing countries have largely been perceived by their hosts as the diplomatic representation of the EC and later the EU – even if, officially speaking, they used to be mere agents to implement European development aid. In key trading countries such as Japan, the Delegations managed to increase their diplomatic standing by providing technical expertise. They decisively helped convince the Japanese to open their markets to the EU members. Yet, more often than not this involved a power struggle with member states' diplomats who feared intrusion in their domain of competence, especially in strategically important countries. Not least due to the limited legal status, the Delegations had to back off.

Nevertheless, their work has also been welcomed by the national ministries of foreign affairs. The Delegations had been instruments to ensure the diffusion of European values long before the concept of 'Normative Power Europe' was coined (Manners, 2002). Most recently this has been the case in Libya or Myanmar, but also much earlier when Delegations were established in post-Franco Spain or post-Salazar Portugal to support democratic reforms and to eventually prepare these countries for Union membership. With these essential results in mind, let us trace the development of the European Union Delegations in the world in more depth.

The history of the Commission Delegations

To systematically analyze the Delegations' role over time, the previously introduced four aspects of centralization of European diplomacy will guide us: first, the growing breadth of the Delegation network over time; second, the Delegations' role in internally coordinating European diplomacy with the member states on the ground; third, the Delegations' role in externally representing the EC/EU towards host country authorities; and fourth, the Delegations' diplomatic professionalism.

The first Commission Delegations back in the 1950s were by no means meant to become a diplomatic service. Neither the Treaty of Paris nor the Treaty of Rome mentioned anything about setting up offices abroad to officially represent the nascent community. However, Jean Monnet, one of the Union's founding fathers, was convinced that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) needed an identity in relation to third countries (cf. Carta, 2012, p. 3). The very first representation was then opened in Washington DC in the year 1954. The choice of location reflects the close relationship between Western Europe and the United States after the Second World War. After all, starting off the European integration project took place under the tutelage of the USA. Local

representations of the ECSC were also important for potential members. Hence, information offices were opened in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1956 as well as in Ireland (1964; European Union Delegation to the US, 2012; Hocking, 2005a, p. 288; Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 11; European Commission official, 2012). The role of these first offices back in the 1950s was limited to merely informing the host country authorities about the ECSC's policies. This is somewhat comparable to external representation in diplomacy but on a much more modest level. After all, the Delegations were far from being involved in the internal coordination of the member state embassies' diplomacy abroad.

Having signed and ratified the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the European integration project was transformed from an institution that merely handled steel and coal production towards a European Economic Community of general nature (EEC). The most important innovation was the goal of a common European market as well as cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy (EURATOM). Meanwhile, the role of the Delegations in economic diplomacy was still marginal. In the first years of the EEC project, economic integration was still a process dominated by internal consolidation. The first step, establishing a customs union among the EU members, was completed in 1968. In that sense, the Delegations were far from being 'chambers of commerce,' and even further from being embassy-type institutions (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 19; Dedman, 2009). This is also reflected in the very informal process of opening Delegations. While traditional nation-state diplomacy is about protocol, official procedures, ceremonies, and records, the written record of the exact process of opening Delegations is very thin. It was *ad hoc* and subject to change – which is arguably the opposite of diplomatic standardization.

Jean Monnet's original idea of triggering European integration through functional spillover should not be underestimated. In fact, it was through a series of internal and external functional pressures that the Delegations' tasks spilled over from mere information offices to prototype embassies (Hocking, 2005a, p. 288; Carta, 2012, pp. 2–3). However, in some countries, it was easier for the Delegations to develop a diplomatic profile than in others. Their involvement in actual diplomatic practice slowly started off in the 1960s. In the same decade, at least 12 new offices were opened. Ten of them were located in Africa. The reason for this concentration was that the Treaty of Rome included a mandate for the EEC for development cooperation. This mandate reflected the interests of former colonial powers such as France or Belgium. They considered the EEC a potentially coordinating and a centralizing force

of European development aid.[1] In a way, the Delegations back then loosely represented a 'European development ministry' rather than an MFA. Delegation staff was technical, mostly with an expertise in colonial management and development. Teams of contractors were employed who could not develop a career within the Commission (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, pp. 14–16). Nevertheless, these Delegations' work was not limited to development aid. The procedure to designate a new Head of Delegation was for instance similar to that of the arrival of a member state Ambassador.

In the 1970s, the spillover effect was fostered, notably through a new international agreement in development policy, the Lomé Convention. This Convention was not just about development aid. It also covered areas such as trade, culture, or regional integration. As a result, the Commission Delegations were 'constantly involved in representational activity' and gained ground as coordinators of European diplomacy abroad (Spence, 2004, p. 65). A subsequent fundamental review of the Delegations' tasks followed in the year 1977. It turned the Delegations into the first as well as the official contact points and information hubs on EC matters; this was not only the case for the host countries' authorities and their wider public but also for the local member state embassies who began to cooperate and coordinate with each other (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 24). Beyond that, the Delegations' role in implementing EU policy in more general terms was strengthened. Finally, and just like national embassies, the Delegations supported EC officials from Brussels who went on missions abroad.

These trends could spread in many more third countries as Delegations mushroomed in the 1970s. Twenty-one out of over 35 newly opened Delegations were located in Africa and five in Central and South America, thereby reflecting the accession to the EEC of the former colonial power Great Britain. A number of offices was opened in countries where the main purpose was not development cooperation: four in Asia, among them Japan, four in Eurasia/the Middle East, among them Turkey, as well as a Delegation to Canada.[2] Delegations located in developing countries were already quite involved in the internal coordination of European diplomacy and the external representation of the European Communities. By contrast, the new Delegations in other types of countries first had to be acknowledged and respected by the local member state embassies – and thereby justify their usefulness in centralizing European diplomacy abroad. In Japan, for instance, they did so by negotiating export quotas favorable to the EEC and its main industries, and by convincing third countries to open their markets to the EEC (European diplomat, 2011c).

Nevertheless, member states were careful that the EC representatives did not overstep their mandate. A former Commission official remembers a French diplomat wishing him all the best for establishing an 'information office' in Japan (European diplomat, 2011c). This was a polite way of reminding the Commission of its competence limits, particularly when it comes to the 'holy cow' of diplomatic representation. The EC representatives experienced a similar treatment on the ground, in Tokyo. Internal coordination of EU affairs among the EU member state representatives already mattered a great deal back then in the Japanese capital. The role of the Delegation in this coordination exercise was very different from today. The Head of Delegation was invited to participate in the meetings, but he or she had to leave the room when the national diplomats discussed any political issues (European diplomat, 2011c).

The host countries' authorities, by contrast, rarely questioned the diplomatic character of the EC and its Delegations, even in strategically very important countries. China is a case in point. The rationale for the Chinese leaders to establish diplomatic relations with a mere regional trading bloc, 20 years before Russia did so, was highly political: the Chinese leadership saw in the European Community, the potential for a geopolitical counterweight against the USSR and the US. Strengthening the EC, for example by diplomatic recognition, was seen as a way to transform the global bipolar structure into a multipolar one (Duchâteau, 2004, p. 10; Wei, 2010; European diplomat, 2011c). This reveals that the People's Republic of China (PRC) saw in the EC a true diplomatic player and even a strategic weight as early as the 1970s. Nevertheless, there were still differences to ordinary diplomatic practice. One of them is the remarkable time lag between the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1975, the establishment of a Delegation in Beijing in 1988, and the opening of a Chinese mission to the EU in 2008. When the PRC established diplomatic relations with EC member states, it usually took less than a year to mutually open up embassies (Wei, 2010; Delegation of the European Union to China, 2011; Austermann, 2011, p. 55).

There was an undeniable trend of the Delegations gaining professionalism as diplomatic representations. Given their *de facto* tasks, it was decided that they should enjoy the needed access and diplomatic immunities and protection. Therefore, the Commission decided that each new opening of a Delegation should be based on an official *accord du siege,* which is an official establishment agreement for diplomatic representations (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, pp. 25, 32; Dimier and McGeever, 2006, p. 497; European diplomat, 2011c). These *accords* were based on the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and they equipped the Head of Mission as well as the European staff with full diplomatic

immunities. Member state embassies were still very sensitive about the Ambassador title for the EC Heads of Mission or the Delegations' usage of the EC flag in official meetings. However, these major steps towards a higher level of professionalism testify to the EC's nascent foreign service. As Bruter put it, they were able to 'create original diplomatic functions within their unusual constraints [...] with limited resources, without a central leader, a clear foreign policy, diplomats, and, finally, a state' (Bruter, 1999, p. 203).

Reflecting the expanded EU membership, 22 more Delegations and other EC liaison offices were opened in third countries as diverse as Brazil, Angola, and Pakistan throughout the 1980s. As European economic integration deepened, Delegations were also accredited to important trading partners, for instance Australia or Norway. With this distribution, the Delegations no longer only represented a 'European development ministry' but also a trade and an 'enlargement ministry.' Concerning enlargement policy, the Delegations became an important connecting element between Brussels and third states that aspired Community membership. After Spain, Portugal, and Greece overcame their authoritarian regimes, they swiftly signaled their desire to take part in the European integration project. As a response, the EC soon established offices in the capital cities (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, pp. 24, 47).[3] This shows that the Delegations did not only represent the Commission as an institution but the European Community as a whole, including certain values that it stood for such as democracy and liberty. This role gave the Delegations an important political edge and a key role in diffusing policies and norms. Nevertheless, the EC's growing economic weight of the 1980s was probably the most seductive aspect about accessing the Community. Hence, in the end of the 1980s, Delegations were established in the neutral states of Sweden and Austria, which foreshadowed the EFTA accession in the mid-1990s.

Overall, the speed of growth of the nascent 'European MFA' was impressive. In the early 1980s, the service counted 1,000 people working in 50 Delegations, a size similar to the MFA of Belgium. By contrast, Belgium needed over a century to build up a foreign service of that dimension. About a decade later, there was 1,500 staff in 89 Delegations. If the EC was a state, it would have ranked sixth when it comes to the size of EC members' foreign services. In addition, the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s strengthened the EC's competence to coordinate 'foreign policy proper.' This rather loose institution can be considered the precursor of the CFSP which was only established with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Bonvicini

and Regelsberger, 2007, p. 261; Nugent, 2010, p. 378). Since 1981, the Commission is also completely associated with the EPC. As a result, the Head of Delegation was closely involved in high political matters with his or her national counterparts on the ground, even before foreign and security policy was part of the *acquis communautaire* (Nugent, 2010, p. 391; Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 32).

Deepening the role of the Delegations in the daily coordination of European diplomacy abroad remained a delicate task. The relationship between the first Head of the Beijing Delegation, Pierre Duchâteau, and the local Ambassadors was smooth as long as Duchâteau did not over-step his competences. While the Delegation staff provided expertise in trade, agricultural, and development matters, the member state embas-sies took care of political matters. Nonetheless, Duchâteau certainly no longer had to leave the room when the other Ambassadors 'talked poli-tics' as it was the case for the Head of the Tokyo-Delegation in the 1970s. But forbidden territory was penetrated through practical means: during the weekly EC Ambassador meetings Duchâteau 'traded' information such as on the Chinese position concerning WTO accession, for all sorts of political information (Duchâteau, 2004, p. 11).

Regarding the external representation of the EC, the Commission still deemed it necessary to remind the Heads of Delegation 'to exercise the greatest tact and discretion' and not to seek the title 'Ambassador of the European Community' (Krenzler, 1991 in Bruter, 1999, p. 190; European diplomat, 2011c). This demonstrates that the Commission set a clear priority to treat member states' sovereignty sensitivities with care, so as to avoid any tension. This tension appears obvious in the frequent letters of protest by national Ambassadors about the ECDs stretching their functions (Bruter, 1999, p. 203). Such moves caused confusion on the part of the host countries' authorities and public. Notwithstanding diplomatic rivalry, the diplomatic professionalism of the Delegations was further strengthened. Thus, the Commission established an inspection unit in 1982 to monitor the work of the Delegations and to evaluate their performance. It was also decided that the contract staff should be made Commission officials (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, pp. 33, 37). In this sense, the development of today's EEAS headquarters can be traced back several decades before it was actually enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty.

One should, however, not overstate such developments. In times of diplomatic crises, the Delegations were not in the position to cut off and subsequently re-establish relations with third countries. Such was the situation after the freezing of EC-China relations as a consequence of the 1989 Tiananmen protest crackdown. Back then, the Delegation in

Beijing could not continue their work of liaising with China up until the member states decided to re-warm relations with the PRC.

As the fall of the Berlin Wall marked a new era for global politics in general, EU foreign policy also experienced a sea change – and so did the Delegations. Firstly, the pace of expanding the network did not slow down. In the 1990s, another 24 Delegations were opened in all parts of the world. On top of that, 13 Delegations were opened in candidate countries for accession to the EU. Even more important were the changes in the Delegations' role for internal coordination of European diplomacy abroad. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Maastricht Treaty officially institutionalized the Delegations, notably their role in the newly adopted Common Foreign and Security Policy. Consequently, the Delegations started drafting political reports together with member state representations. For that purpose, they were also invited to attend CFSP coordination meetings in third countries. By the 1990s, these had been expanded to 'monthly or bimonthly meetings of the economic, political, cultural, and ambassadorial committees' (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 9; Spence, 2004, p. 63; Bruter, 1999, p. 195). With the growing complexity of foreign policy and diplomacy, the imperative to coordinate diplomacy on the ground got stronger.

The increased complexity provided another window of opportunity for the Delegations. We know from the previous analysis that they were eager to show their added value, for instance, through their competence and expertise in development policy or trade relations. In the 1990s, the projects which the EU implemented abroad increased in diversity. The Delegations gained expertise in all sorts of policy areas and on the specific local context, which turned them into genuine expertise and information hubs in the countries to which they were accredited. This was convenient for the local member state embassies, given their own increasingly diversified and technically sophisticated bilateral agendas. As a result, the capacity of the Delegations to coordinate European diplomacy in more general terms grew as well (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004; European diplomats, 2010; Lecorre, 1995, p. 21).

While these developments took place in all third countries, the role and expertise of Delegations located in future member states was even more important. To support the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), as well as Malta and Cyprus, on their way to preparing for Union membership, the Commission drafted programs and instruments of considerable financial volume. The local Delegations then played a crucial role in implementing these programs. Hence, their visibility grew and this increase of influence in coordinating EU foreign policy had repercussions on the Delegations' capacity to externally represent the EU.

Based on the new legal recognition from the Maastricht Treaty, the ECDs also officially supported the High Representative of CFSP, Javier Solana, and other key figures in EU politics on their trips around the world. This increased their involvement in highly political and sensitive tasks (Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, pp. 40–3). This was probably one of the reasons why the European Commission Delegations were frequently (and falsely so) called 'EU Delegations' and the Heads of Mission 'EU Ambassadors.' Since this only officially eventuated with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, we can again speak of a moment of functional spillover.

Next to top officials of the EU institutions, the Delegations also handled the European Parliament's relations with third countries such as their travels abroad (cf. Furness, 2013, p. 111). As the Parliament is known for its outspokenness on sensitive matters such as human rights, countries like China often held the Delegations accountable for the EP's actions (European diplomat, 2011c; Barnett, 1993). This can be seen as yet another moment of spillover as the Delegations represent the entire EU, including the Parliament, only since Lisbon. It confirms once more that the Commission Delegations already represented the Community, not only when it comes to the legally delineated competences, but also well beyond that.

The visibility of the Delegations, and also of the EU as a whole, for the host countries' authorities certainly grew. Nevertheless, the ECDs were still largely unknown to the wider public in third states. If they were known, it was as donor organizations or as trade experts rather than as diplomatic institutions in the classical sense. The role of trade experts should not be underestimated given the increasing role of commercial diplomacy, notably since the establishment of the WTO in the mid-1990s. Within the WTO, the Commission speaks on behalf of the EU members at virtually all meetings (European diplomats, 2010; Bleker and Verhagen, 2011; Lee, 2004; World Trade Organization, 2012). With regards to WTO law with specific third states, the Delegations have the exclusive mandate to negotiate with their host country's authorities on behalf of the Commission. The vast changes in the 1990s of EU foreign policy created pressure to further deepen and professionalize the Commission's Delegation system. The most important aim was to increase effectiveness and coherence across Delegations so as to develop a '"unified" External Service.' For that purpose, a new Directorate General dedicated to deal with the Union's relations to third countries was introduced. Human resources were seen as the key to achieve these goals. Among the measures taken were upgrading staff training, strengthening staff mobility, and boosting the role of the Heads of Delegations. This last measure was implemented through a biannual conference and a permanent bureau of

Heads of Delegations (HoDs; Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 44; Bruter, 1999, p. 191). While it still took another decade to establish the EEAS, the way thereto was paved in the 1990s already.

In the course of the 2000s, another 28 Delegations opened. Towards the end of the decade, the Union championed diplomatic representation without being a nation-state (Bruter, 1999). In fact, it ranked fourth in terms of network size compared to the Union members as we can see in Figure 3.1[4].

Figure 3.1   EU diplomatic representation in comparison

The breadth of the Delegation network further increased. Moreover, their role in the internal coordination of European diplomacy abroad was fostered as well. More and more often, the Commission Delegation itself initiated new coordination groups. Again, this can be considered as a functional spillover: based on the Delegations' broad expertise, they could establish EU coordination groups themselves, especially groups with a more technical character (such as on financial regulation or environmental matters). Due to the complexity and interdependence of a globalized world, such groups gained political importance. In fact, the role of Delegations as hubs for information and technical expertise spilled over to the highest levels of representation. Member state embassies used the Delegations as sources of information. Apart from that, the Head of the EC Delegation also started to accompany the Ambassador of the state that held the Council Presidency to meetings with the host countries' authorities. Particularly when small member states were in the driving seat, the Delegations performed a sort of 'shadow-Presidency,' for example by 'inspir[ing the Ambassador who represented the Council Presidency]

what [...] to say' in high level meetings. The Head of Delegation was the 'animator of [the] circle of Ambassadors largely before being their Chairman' (European diplomat, 2011d; Moran and Ponz Canto, 2004, p. 9). Chairmanship is a competence that the Delegations only got with the Lisbon Treaty. The Delegations had become the unofficial centralizers of European diplomatic representation abroad.

However, the increasing role of the Delegations in internal coordination and external representation were certainly not just due to the Delegations' entrepreneurism. Two much more fundamental steps in European integration boosted the EU's and the Delegations' significance: firstly, the introduction of the common currency was a milestone in European integration. It put trade opportunities of third countries with the EU on a whole new level. It also implied a new era of political integration within the Union. As a consequence, the ECDs were busy explaining the new common currency and its implications to the host countries authorities, media, and the wider public. This again boosted the Delegations' overall visibility. The second major development, the Union's Eastern enlargement, had a similar effect. Between 2004 and 2007, no less than ten new member states accessed the European Union. In particular, the increased size of the common market and also the Union's growing political weight made third states much more aware of the European Union and raised the Delegations profiles, too (European diplomat, 2011c).

As a consequence, throughout the 2000s, the work of Delegations clearly resembled the tasks of embassies as stipulated in the Vienna Convention. A former Head of Mission describes the top tasks of his Delegation as follows: firstly, they kept up relations between the Commission and the third country's authorities, in particular the 'Relex family' Commissioners as well as the Commission President.[5] They did so by reporting and providing analyses of the host country in relation to the EU. A big part of their work was the preparation and organization of official visits. Secondly, they managed all the Commission's projects in third countries and negotiated on its behalf. Finally, just like for regular embassies, a growing task of the ECDs in the twenty-first century was public diplomacy. The tasks included soft power issues such as the promotion of values like democracy or human rights. The Delegations also dealt with traditional hard power politics. As the European Security and Defense Policy took shape, the Delegations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were all busy implementing the first EU-led police and military missions there (European diplomats, 2010).

Such involvement in high politics implied an increased professionalism of the Delegations. However, this was not only an advantage: the previous analysis has shown that more often than not the informality and the lack of a blueprint had been an asset for the Delegations. There had never been a permanent flow of instructions as it is the case for national embassies. This allowed Delegations to act more rapidly and efficiently than national embassies. Even though the constant efforts for more professionalism certainly paved the way for Delegations to become much more similar to traditional diplomatic representations, this did not come without a trade-off: the Delegations lost some of their flexibility (European diplomat, 2011e; Bruter, 1999, p. 189; Haffner, 2002 in Dimier and McGeever, 2006, p. 499).

Aware of this trade-off, the Commission decided to return this strength to the Delegations through the so-called 'deconcentration policy.' Part of the plan was to send more staff into the field, which caused a sharp growth in the average number of staff per Delegation, namely from 20 by the end of 2000 to about 40 only eight years later.[6] Consequently, the Delegation network (re-)gained the status of a very autonomous and devolved representation system in relation to the administrative headquarters (Spence, 2004, p. 72; Dimier and McGeever, 2006, p. 499). Somewhat paradoxically, this regained flexibility impacted on the further formalization of the EU's diplomatic system. EU politicians started the new millennium with the ambitious project to provide the Union with a Constitution. A central innovation of the 'Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe' was the EEAS. Given the already existing ever expanding and increasingly professional Delegation network, it was clear that the ECDs would constitute the foundation of the Union's prototype embassies of this new EEAS. This idea had been fiercely rejected by member states only a couple of years earlier (Hocking, 2005a, p. 293). The Constitutional Treaty (CT) failed. While the CT foresaw the introduction of a 'Union Minister of Foreign Affairs,' the successor Treaty of Lisbon renamed the new post into the rather cumbersome 'High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' (European Union, 2004, Art. I–21). Nonetheless, the Treaty of Lisbon, kept most of the foreseen substantive institutional changes as foreseen in the CT, notably HR's competences, the establishment of the EEAS, and the boosted role of Delegations. Given the number and the *de facto* role, tasks and influence of the Commission Delegations, the changes merely appear like the 'icing on the cake': they empower the Delegations to take over the role of the member state embassies of officially representing the EU abroad. As a consequence, the HoD may sign treaties and agreements on behalf

of the EU (European Union, 2004, Art. III–296; Art. III–301; Art. III–328). This innovation can be interpreted as yet another instance of functional spillover in the history of the Delegations.

The above analysis shows that the EU's political capacities are not only based on formal legal competences. They are also derived from the EU officials' entrepreneurial spirit 'to read and exploit unique contexts,' such as the successive enlargements or the introduction of the Euro (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 83; Amen et al., 2011, p. 2). This is reflected in the previously introduced definition of the centralization of European diplomacy: the formally assigned and informally obtained channeling of diplomatic activity in EU matters through the Union Delegations. Since formal and informal aspects are equally relevant, familiarizing with the legal basis is a very limited method to understand the Delegations. Nevertheless, it is a necessary step. This is all the more the case because a number of analysts are convinced that the legal establishment of the EEAS through the Treaty of Lisbon is a 'once in a lifetime chance.' They consider that it has the potential to 'endow Europe with a greater voice and more influence in international affairs.' In other words, Lisbon implies a major step towards the centralization of European diplomacy (Behr et al., 2010, p. 3; Willis, 2009). We should therefore turn to the concrete changes stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty and their implementation.

Before doing so, the main points of this section should be summarized. When comparing the Delegation network at the dawn of the Lisbon Treaty with the first steps being taken in the 1950s, the ECDs/EUDs changed dramatically. These changes have all led to a high degree of centralization of European diplomacy. First, the Delegation network exponentially increased with offices spread all over the world. Second, by exploiting microlevel functional spillovers and macrolevel geopolitical conditions, the Delegations became central players in internally coordinating EU foreign policy. Third, they also became crucial in externally representing the EU towards host country authorities and the wider local public. Finally, the Delegations as well as the headquarters back in Brussels increased in diplomatic professionalism. At the dawn of the Lisbon Treaty, their profile resembled more and more traditional embassies and their MFAs – albeit to different degrees, depending on the third country where they are located.

Lisbon, the decisive step?

Although the Treaty of Lisbon is in many ways a stripped down version of the Constitutional Treaty, it nevertheless marks a new era

for European diplomatic representation. It is therefore vital to study the legal stipulations about the new 'EU Delegations' that are included in the Lisbon Treaty and the related legal documents. To check if the Lisbon Treaty is merely a paper tiger or not, I will subsequently discuss empirical evidence about the implementation of the new rules and regulations. This evidence will show that the biggest obstacle in providing the EU with one voice abroad is the diversity of third countries where the Delegations are located. As a result, the EEAS can be regarded as a diplomatic service of different speeds.

When it comes to the legal innovations, we should begin with the most clearly stipulated one: that of external representation. For Brian Hocking and David Spence, this change is absolutely fundamental. Back in 2005, when this innovation was not yet evident, they stated the following:

> If the Delegations also replace the rotating EU Presidency in the host country and as such become responsible for coordination with member state embassies, this would involve far-reaching changes in the political role and management culture of the External Service, effectively transforming it into a foreign service of the EU as a whole and posing fundamental questions for the role of national foreign ministries, embassies and diplomatic staff. (Hocking, 2005a, p. 295)

Fast-forwarding to 2009, the legal conditions for such a transformation were implemented. Art. 221.1 of the Lisbon Treaty concisely states that the 'Union delegations in third countries and at international organizations shall represent the Union.' This means that the Delegations, in particular the Head of Mission, speak not just for all EU institutions instead of only the Commission, but also for the EU-27. As a result, and in accordance with the HR/VP who puts an end to the rotating Presidency in the Foreign Affairs Council, the Union Delegations take over the rotating EU Presidency on the ground in third country capitals. Consequently, it is only with Lisbon that the Heads of Delegation may officially be called 'European Union Ambassadors.' Despite the *de facto* influence of the Commission Delegations before the Lisbon Treaty, it should not be forgotten that diplomacy is all about official code, conduct, and protocol. In that sense, this innovation is a big step towards the centralization of European diplomacy.

Another remarkable innovation when it comes to truly representing the Union abroad is the staff composition in the EEAS and its Delegations. As previously mentioned, the EEAS is composed of officials from the

Commission, from the Council Secretariat, and, since July 2013, officials from other EU institutions, such as the Parliament, can join as well (Ashton, 2013, p. 15).[7] The Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS also stipulates that when the service is at 'full capacity [...] at least one third of all EEAS staff at AD level' shall come from member states' MFAs (Council of the European Union, 2010, Preamble (11), Art. 6.9; Euractiv, 2011).[8] Although exchanges of diplomats across foreign services have been frequent practice over the past centuries, this marks a sea change (Neumann, 2007, p. 10). It puts an end to the awkward situation that the pre-Lisbon Delegations have in fact represented the European Community/Union in many ways, while being staffed with personnel from the Commission only (cf. Furness, 2013, p. 104).

With the EU Delegations now officially representing the EU as a whole, efficient and effective internal coordination is more imperative than ever before. Consequently, Article 32 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that member states' embassies and Union Delegations are required to cooperate. They need to do so when it comes to the implementation of common CFSP approaches and also in formulating them.[9] Article 35 of the Lisbon Treaty gives more detail by requiring both, national embassies and Union Delegations to 'step up cooperation by exchanging information and carrying out joint assessments.' This is not a particularly new requirement because it has been stipulated in a very similar form in Art.J.6 of the Maastricht Treaty. Novelty is introduced through Art. 5.9 of the Council Decision on the EEAS. It reemphasizes the necessity for the Delegations to closely cooperate and to share information with the national embassies. The member states for their part 'shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area' (European Union, 2010, Art. 24.3).

The scheme of coordination meetings of EU and member state diplomats is a vital tool to implement this goal. A key change for more centralization in this respect is that since Lisbon the Union Delegations prepare, convene, and chair these meetings. This does not only count for Community affairs but also for the intergovernmental policy areas of CFSP and CSDP. They are still an informal tool of coordination and information exchange. This means that neither the Treaty of Lisbon, nor the Council Decision explicitly mention these meeting schemes. Nonetheless, interviews for this study have revealed their importance in centralizing European diplomacy (European diplomats, 2010).

Given the new employment regulations, which bring together EU officials and member state diplomats within Delegations, loyalty also needs

to be nurtured from within. Therefore, both groups of staff 'shall have the same rights and obligations and be treated equally, in particular as concerns their eligibility to assume all positions under equivalent conditions' (Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 6.7). Spurring the loyalty of the Delegation staff is fundamental because each Delegation is 'under the authority of a Head of Delegation' (Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 5.2). In other words, the HoD is responsible for all the staff working in his or her Delegation. He or she is in turn directly accountable to Lady Ashton.[10] This is why the double hatting of the HR/ VP (that is her affiliation to both, the Council and the Commission), is mirrored in the position of EU Ambassador: he or she can speak on behalf of both institutions.

This brings us to a critical point regarding the internal coordination of European diplomacy abroad. Member states' potential 'disloyalty' is not the only obstacle in the process of centralizing European diplomacy through internal coordination. Inter-institutional inconsistency in Brussels can be problematic, too. This problem became evident in the way the EEAS was set up (cf. Murdoch, 2012, pp. 1011–12). As stipulated in Declaration no. 15 on Art. 27 attached to the Lisbon Treaty, the drafters planned that 'as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon [was] signed, the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Commission and the Member States should begin preparatory work on the European External Action Service.' Yet, this supposed preparatory work turned into a genuine turf war. It was much more difficult than expected to separate some parts of the Commission and most parts of the Council Secretariat to subsequently integrate them into the new *sui generis* institution of the EEAS. The struggle to keep and to gain competences went all the way up to the highest ranks of the EU bureaucracy. At the time that the main research for this book was carried out, detailed arrangements for lines of instructions yet needed to be made (Mahony, 2011; Behr et al., 2010, pp. 6–8; Council of the European Union, 2010, Preamble (13)). Later interviews show that the situation has already substantially improved (European diplomat, 2012; European diplomat, 2013).

One of the most important stipulations concerning the fourth criterion of the centralization of European diplomacy, that is the Delegations' diplomatic professionalism, is Art. 5.6 of the Council Decision. It 'ensure[s] that host States grant the Union Delegations, their staff and their property, privileges and immunities equivalent to those referred to in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.' Access to technical means so as to protect classified information shall be ensured via

Art. 10.4 of the Decision. A clear mandate for negotiating, signing, and implementing contracts and other legal documents through the HoD is enshrined in Art. 5.8. Even though this has been practiced before, these privileges are now legally fixed, too. Because of the Delegations' involvement in CFSP and CSDP, EEAS officials are pressing for equipping the EUDs with military staff as well (European diplomat, 2011b, 2011f). This would make them even more similar to regular embassies. Another substantive addition to the profile of Union Delegations is their role in consular matters. Although consular matters are still largely in member states' hands, changes are emerging in this regard as well. Since April 2011, there is a common visa code, which has further boosted the role of Delegations in this policy domain (European Union, 2012a).

The new mix of Delegation staff results in the employment of 'real' diplomats from member state MFAs and is particularly important when it comes to the aspect of diplomatic professionalism. Member state diplomats are better trained and more familiar with political work than Commission staff. In order to cope with the new tasks, their presence is important so as to truly as well as symbolically represent the Union. It should be noted that the ratio of national and EU staff was heatedly debated. The European Parliament was particularly concerned that the share of member state diplomats would become too high. After all, the EP did not want the EEAS to become an intergovernmental diplomatic service. This would imply a '"de-communitarisation" of EU foreign affairs,' which in turn would defeat the purpose of a more coherent European voice abroad (Behr et al., 2010, p. 6; Hemra et al., 2011, p. 18; Wisniewski, 2011, p. 13). To strike a balance and to nurture a Union-wide diplomatic corps, Art. 6.12 of the Council Decision foresees that steps shall be taken so that all staff working in Delegations gets 'adequate common [diplomatic] training.'

As for the first aspect of centralizing European diplomacy, that is the breadth of the Delegation network, it is clear that the broader the network of Union Delegations is, the more visible the EU becomes in third countries. This adds to its rise as a diplomatic player. High level EU officials have confirmed intentions to open up new Delegations. The Union thereby caters to demand from third states (Embassy of Mongolia to Austria, 2011; Drieskens, 2012). Nevertheless, there are no specific instructions as to where and how many EU Delegations are still to be opened. National MFAs take such decisions on an *ad hoc* basis as well, depending on the changing constellations and needs of international relations. In contrast to the pre-Lisbon era, the drafters of the Council Decision have come up with a clear procedure for the opening of

Delegations, once the location is decided. The respective decision 'shall be adopted by the High Representative, in agreement with the Council and the Commission' (Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 5.1). This puts an end to the *ad hoc,* non-transparent internal Commission procedure of opening Delegations, and introduces more formal diplomatic code and protocol.

Overall, this section has shown that the Lisbon Treaty and the Council Decision to establish the EEAS contain a number of legal provisions concretely relating to most aspects of the centralization of European diplomacy via Delegations. The following section will investigate more closely the implementation of these stipulations. The analysis will again be structured along the four aspects of the centralization of European diplomacy: first, the Delegation network's breadth; second, their role as internal coordinators; third, the external representation of the EU via Delegations; and fourth, their diplomatic professionalism.

EU Delegations after the Treaty of Lisbon

Relying on EU Delegations becomes especially relevant in countries where few member states maintain embassies. There are over 70 states with no more than five member state embassies. However, given the extensive Delegation network, the Union is present in most of these countries. More often than not, it is also among the best equipped embassies. Since Lisbon, a number of new Delegations have already been opened or will be opened soon such as in Burma, Libya, or Mongolia (Bruter, 1999, p. 188; BBC News, 2011a; European Voice, 2012).[11] However, even after Lisbon, the expansion of the EUD network does not come without obstacles. As a matter of fact, the obstacles seem to have increased. The EEAS and its revamped Delegations have attracted considerable attention and have put the network's breadth in the spotlight. Some Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) showed a complete unawareness of the Delegation network and required the Commission to explain what the parliamentarians considered to be 'shadow diplomacy.' Other MEPs criticized, in their eyes, overly large and costly Delegations. Given that the EP is increasingly flexing its muscles in EU foreign policy, future openings of EU Delegations may become more time-consuming (Muscardini, 2012; Ashton, 2009b; Wisniewski, 2011; Raube, 2012; Furness, 2013, p. 113).

Moving on to the second aspect of centralizing European diplomacy, the internal coordination between member state embassies and EU Delegations, the most important innovation is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty: since Lisbon, the Delegations are in charge of managing the

EU coordination meetings. Although these meetings remain informal, they nevertheless reflect the Council meetings back in Brussels. In concrete terms, the Delegations now draft the agendas of these groups; they chair the actual meetings; and Delegation staff takes the minutes of the meetings and distributes them thereafter. As a result, they have a considerable influence over what is being discussed and in which order. They can influence what information is given out and how. Research on the Council Presidency has shown that the position of the chairperson is vital in putting through one's own agenda (Tallberg, 2003, p. 8).

Despite the fact that the EU Delegations have functioned as information hubs already in the pre-Lisbon period, a member state diplomat considers the changes 'a kind of revolution' (European diplomat, 2010e). With the exception of the economic counselors' group in some places, the Commission Delegation staff used to act like an observer in the pre-Lisbon meetings. They would not take the floor or initiate discussions. Since Lisbon, they do not only have the legal competence to do so, but it is also a practice accepted by the member states. Being equipped with the Presidency mandate has put the Delegations in a much more powerful position to execute an EU-wide agenda than before the Lisbon Treaty. First evidence from Brussels demonstrates that Lady Ashton centralizes the agenda by selecting priority topics and by limiting the speaking time of the foreign ministers (Willis, 2011b). Similar developments can be observed abroad such as the tendency to talk more about classic Commission issues (European diplomat, 2010g). As a result, Lisbon has further strengthened the EU Delegations as communication hubs that tie all the member states embassies in a given country together. Table 3.1 illustrates the extent of internal coordination that the EU Delegation in Moscow is in charge of (see Table 3.1 on the next page).

Even after Lisbon, the EU only has limited competences in areas such as culture or consular affairs (European Union, 2010, Art. 4.2(j), Art. 6(c), Art. 77.4, Art. 167). However, due to the advantages of channeling internal coordination of European diplomacy through one local institution and because of the EUDs' information hub character, it happens that the local EU Delegation manages these groups, too. The consular group in India, which is co-chaired by the local EU Delegation and the member state embassy, serves as an example. In China and Algeria, the EU Delegation is fully in charge of the consular affairs group (European diplomat, 2011g, 2011h). One should certainly be careful in equating the amount of coordination that is going on with the degree of the EU speaking with one voice. Nevertheless, coordination of European diplomacy in all sorts of policy areas has become unthinkable without the EU Delegation. This is certainly an indicator for a higher level of diplomacy centralization.

Table 3.1   EU coordination meetings in Moscow after Lisbon

Formation	Chairmanship	Number of meetings per year	Attendance rate by member state embassies in percent
Heads of Mission	EUD	12	>90
Dep. Heads of Mission	EUD	12	>90
Political Counselors	EUD	12	>90
Human Rights	EUD	12	>90
Commercial Affairs	EUD	12	80
Agriculture/Fisheries/ Food safety	EUD	12	75
Consular Affairs	Member state embassies	n.d.	n.d
Science and Technology	EUD	4	80
Transport	EUD	2	50
Energy	EUD	4	50
Environment	EUD	3	75
Schengen Group	EUD	12	>90
Press and Cultural Affairs	EUD	6	70
Administrative Affairs	EUD	6	85
Group on Partnership for Modernization	n.d.	6	>90
Higher Education	n.d.	2	>90
NGO/CSO Donor Group	Flexible chairmanship	4	n.d.

Source: Compiled by the author based on telephone investigation with European diplomats (2011).

Beyond that, the EU Delegations have also occasionally taken over the coordination of common reports on the host country. For such reports, the EUD prepares the main text while the member state embassies contribute expertise in specific fields. Thereafter, the EUD sends the final report to Brussels. EEAS officials then forward it to the member states' MFAs (European diplomat, 2010f, 2011b). It goes without saying that even for the relatively well-staffed EU Delegations, the internal coordination means a lot more work. In order to help them execute their tasks, some embassies have started to feed the Delegation-chaired coordination groups with their political reports (European diplomat, 2010e). Despite still being a rather rare occasion, this is another instance for a genuine and transparent centralization of European diplomacy abroad (European diplomat, 2013). A symbolic indicator for European diplomacy centralization, specifically regarding internal coordination, is that most meetings

now take place in the premises of the EU Delegation. Next to the new loca-tion of the coordination meetings, the seating order is another practical as well as a symbolic indicator for increased centralization of European diplomacy. In line with the seating order in the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels, the Delegation representative and the national diplomat of the member state that holds the Council Presidency sit next to each other. Before Lisbon, the Presidency and the Commission Delegate were sitting opposite to one another (European diplomats, 2010).

The implementation of internal coordination has not come without difficulties. The Delegations frequently reaffirm their commitment to the sharing of information and to a 'bottom up' style of internal coor-dination. Nevertheless, member state diplomats report difficulties when it comes to reaching this goal as Delegations have the priority to inform Brussels rather than the local member state embassies. They 'sometimes [even] seem to "clean" their own reports submitted to the EEAS headquarters before sharing them with member states' (European diplomat, 2011f, 2010g, 2010h; Waterfield, 2011). This is one reason why member states are eager to participate actively in the EU coordina-tion meetings as Table 3.1 on the situation in Moscow reveals. After all, personal relationships are very helpful for diplomats to access informa-tion. Unsurprisingly, the attendance rate is highest for the most political coordination groups such as the Heads of Mission, the Deputy Heads of Mission, or the Political Counselors. The level of control exerted, however, has its limits. Eventually, member state diplomats simply have to rely on and trust their colleagues in the Delegations. After all, the member states decided to do so, based on the professionalism of the Delegations (European diplomat, 2010i).

The aspect of professionalism is a questionable point in itself. As previously mentioned, the Treaty of Lisbon only gave the starting signal for preparing the implementation of the EEAS. The aforementioned turf wars about bureaucratic responsibilities between institutions and departments were also felt 'on the ground,' that is in Delegations abroad, such as concerning accountability between EUDs and Brussels. Also, Delegations have to separate the financial administration related to the EEAS and to the Commission, which has led to considerable administra-tive burden (Rettman, 2012b; Vogel, 2012).

Continuing with the third aspect of centralizing European diplomacy, a unified external representation of the EU via Delegations, the new EUD competences, have played out right after transforming the first batch of Commission into Union Delegations on January 1, 2010 (Rettman, 2010b; European diplomat, 2010j): the Delegations have become the

porte parole for the 28 member states towards the host countries by conducting diplomatic *démarches* in the name of the EU (European diplomats, 2010). Third countries also liaise with the Delegation for anything related to the EU, for example, through briefings. Subsequently, the EUDs inform the local member state embassies about the host countries' message. The embassy representing the member state that presides over the EU back in Europe is now, at best out of courtesy, the first among equals *vis-à-vis* the other Union member embassies.

In line with the plans and ambitions of the EU member that holds the rotating Presidency in Brussels, local embassies still organize events. However, they are usually 'second-tier' cultural events that have to be coordinated with the EU Delegation (Zajączkowski, no date; European diplomat, 2011i). As a consequence, the actual first among equals is the EU Delegation. The member states' embassies have lost out when it comes to the prestige of conducting the EU Presidency. Prestige was not the only aspect attached to the Presidency. It also had practical advantages. Some diplomats from small member states report that only after they were in the EU driving seat, the host countries' MFA placed competent people to deal with these countries bilaterally. Such changes lasted even after their EU Presidency was over (European diplomats, 2010b). Despite the loss of such privileged positions, and notwithstanding different styles of member states to deal with this new situation, there was a fairly quick adjustment after January 2010, notably in strategically important locations such as Beijing.[12] From the perspective of the host countries' authorities, the EU's coherence abroad has been strengthened considerably. The EU's representation in third countries does no longer change faces every semester. Diplomats assume a new post, usually every four years, which increases the incentives for both the EU Delegation staff and the host country's authorities to invest in personal relationships. However, host country diplomats such as in the PRC consider the change to be incremental because already before Lisbon, the EU Delegation to China 'coordinated on all policy fronts' (Chinese diplomat, 2011). In any event, through the increased visibility of the EU Delegations after Lisbon, more continuity has been the result. Table 3.2 illustrates this.

Table 3.2 shows that there used to be great variation in the number of staff involved in conducting the different Presidency terms during the pre-Lisbon period. The equation 'the more human resources an embassy has, the better the quality of a Presidency becomes,' is too simplistic. However, the style and character of a Presidency certainly changes with the number of people involved in executing it. This variation has come to an end on January 1, 2010. Instead, the well-resourced EU Delegation in Beijing has taken over, which is the biggest bilateral Union Delegation worldwide.[13]

Table 3.2   Recent EU presidencies in Beijing

Year	Term	Member state	Staff in Beijing
2007	first	Germany	190
2007	second	Portugal	20*
2008	first	Slovenia	9
2008	second	France	250*
2009	first	Czech Republic	23
2009	second	Sweden	55
2010	permanently	EU Delegation	120

Note: * estimate based on number of diplomatic personnel.

Source: Compiled by the author (2011).

As a trade-off for more coherence, diplomats expect a less dynamic and enthusiastic Presidency in the mid to long term. Indeed, member state embassies were very eager to be in the spotlight for six months, no matter how small they were. Although there is some regret among diplomats, they can only rarely enjoy this prestige. After all, the Union has by now close to 30 member states. Also, when it used to be their turn, the embassies of small member states partially or entirely 'put aside bilateral issues' for one semester (European diplomat, 2010k). With Lisbon, they do not have to do this anymore. In this regard, many of the national diplomats are quite content about the EUD taking over the Union's Presidency for good. It implies a genuine relief in terms of work load. Other (founding) member state embassies have assisted the Delegation when it first took over the Presidency abroad (European diplomat, 2010l). Such models of collaboration indicate a true centralization of European diplomacy.

Member state diplomats also consider the new EU Presidency performed by the Delegations to be positive because of its relative neutrality compared to the pre-Lisbon method. One of the reasons is that embassies of big member states sometimes pursued quite a bilateral agenda while executing the EU Presidency (European diplomat, 2010k). But even when smaller members were in the driving seat (who usually had no choice but to put aside their bilateral affairs for six months) another problem kicked in: the low density of their embassy network. In countries where the incumbent EU Presidency did not have an embassy, other member states used to help out, which made the Presidency even more incoherent across all third states (Spence, 2004, p. 73; Hocking, 2005b, p. 4; Willis, 2009).[14] After all, the relationship between a given third country and each of the EU member states varies enormously. After Lisbon, there is now one and the same partner in most third countries who is (supposed to) aggregate the interests of all member states with the host country. Together with the fact that the EU Delegation network

is so extensive already, this exercise of centralizing EU representation abroad has made European diplomacy more coherent. Aware of this impact, Lady Ashton sought to seize the opportunity and suggested the creation of 'Europe Houses' which 'group [...] together EEAS embassies with member states' embassies and consulates in the same buildings in foreign capitals' (Rettman, 2012a). That way, financial resources could be saved and the EU's visibility could be strengthened.

The future of this proposal does not look so bright when we consider the limits of EU Delegations centralizing the external representation of the EU. Most fundamentally, the EU institutions and the member states 'share a common understanding of the necessity of forming an effective service, but simultaneously they each fear for their own prerogatives' (Behr et al., 2010, p. 11). Despite all the advantages that have started to materialize, they took a precautionary measure and attached a declaration to the Lisbon Treaty which explicitly states that the EEAS will not in any way replace member states' diplomatic services (European Union, 2010, Declaration No. 14). Although the member states pay lip service to the goal of a coherent external representation, member states intend to keep up the heterogeneity of EU foreign policy. Taking this intention into account, EU Delegation diplomats are still careful, even after Lisbon, about their new leadership role. In particular, the Union Ambassadors seek to promote a picture of them as 'Chief Facilitating Officers,' which is analogous to the role of the new President of the EU Council (European Union, 2010, Art. 15.6(c); European diplomat, 2011b). Also, using the EU Ambassador title is still not self-evident for the HoDs: towards third countries, it is used; towards their member state colleagues, the EU Ambassadors are 'Heads of Delegations' (European diplomat, 2013). As for Ashton's initiative on common diplomatic representations in the form of Europe Houses, the HR/VP clarifies that such '[c]ooperation at EU level is a complement, and not a substitute' for national embassy networks (Ashton, 2012a).

In an effort to balance their loss of visibility, EU member states support their top diplomats in applying for key EEAS positions such as HoDs. So far, national diplomats are only temporarily seconded to the EEAS. As a consequence, their strongest loyalties are likely to remain with their national foreign services. This may be problematic when it comes to a unified external representation of the Union abroad. Underlining this issue of loyalty, research has shown that member states sometimes speak with 'two voices,' one that is conciliatory towards the other EU members and a different one when they interact with host country institutions. This is also the case after Lisbon. In April 2012, the EU Ambassador to China protested against the detention of the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei.

Subsequently, European Ambassadors in Beijing drafted a common statement supporting the EU Ambassador's protest. Eventually, however, they did not allow the EU Delegation to speak on behalf of the entire EU in this case. As a result, the text was published in the name of the Head of the EU Delegation only (European diplomat, 2010h; Delegation of the European Union to China, 2011; European diplomat, 2011b).

But centralized representation on such sensitive political issues is not the only difficulty. Another one is trade policy. Because of the competences of the Commission in trade and competition policy, most analysts have little doubts that the EU represents a 'single voice' when it comes to this policy domain. The previous analysis has also shown that the Commission Delegations used their competence and expertise in trade to increase their own profile. Regarding general trade rules, the EUDs are clearly in the driving seat. However, as a national diplomat put it, the 'real deals' are still made on a bilateral basis (European diplomat, 2010a). Investment promotion remains in the hands of member states, even after Lisbon. Trade departments are also the sections in national embassies that expand rapidly (Bungenberg et al., 2011, p. 177). In this sense, there are limits to the EUDs' capacity to keep up the image of the EU as a unified economic player.

Finally, a major problem is the perception among third country officials about the supposedly new external representation. Some third country diplomats did not feel a great change about the role of EU Delegations and their relationship to member state embassies. Others were confused and disappointed by the Lisbon promise of a more united European Union. In an interview for this book, a third country diplomat stated that the work of the Delegation no longer seems really different from that of the national embassies. This implies a duplication of resources with the Delegation becoming the embassy of the '28th Member State' instead of a centralization force (European diplomat, 2011b, 2011f). Some European diplomats fully concurred with this point of view.

This overlap is closely related to the final aspect of centralizing European diplomacy, namely the diplomatic professionalism of the Delegation network. To what extent are the post-Lisbon EU Delegations now similar to traditional embassies? Most fundamentally, the process of opening a Delegation has been formalized. Previously, even staff in the Commission's archives division could not find out the opening year of some Delegations.[15] Since Lisbon has been implemented, Catherine Ashton has issued several public announcements, and informs the Council and the Parliament on her intentions of broadening the network (Ashton, 2009b). Checking the list of tasks as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the kind of work of EU Delegations

resembles more and more that of regular embassies. With the representational upgrade of the Delegations, the organization of high level visits gains even more importance. Further functional pressure is also put on one of the most traditional diplomatic tasks of embassies, namely reporting. The fact that Delegation staff members coordinate, prepare, and chair meetings since Lisbon has greatly increased their reporting skills. As a result, especially small member state embassies sometimes just take over the Delegations' reports. For some locations, such as Hong Kong, diplomats are even considering to outsource the political analysis to the EU representation. On an abstract theoretical level, this hints at changing the role of the EU as an agent of the member state into a principle. Practically, it may lead to leaner national embassies in terms of staff (European diplomat, 2011b, 2010l, 2013).

Concerning communication with Brussels, the Delegations also increasingly resemble nation-state embassies. While much of the information sent from Delegations back to Europe was classified to be technical, a process of politicization is going on. A European diplomat describes the system as follows:

> [M]ore information 'travels in a Maybach rather than by bike from [our Delegation] to Brussels': instead of a simple email, selected information is encrypted through the Ambassador's office and directly delivered to Ashton's, Barroso's and van Rompuy's desks. (European diplomat, 2011b; directly quoted from Austermann, 2012b, p. 99)

This indicates that Delegations now play a bigger role in setting agendas such as for summits and for policy shaping in general. In order to fulfill this task upgrade, political departments of Delegations are expanded or set up for the first time. As a result, the EU Delegations post-Lisbon should not be considered 'just "a little more political"' as it once said on the EEAS' website (Austermann, 2010). By contrast, the basis is set for the EU Delegations and their Ambassadors to be '"more assertive" in "co-shaping" the global agenda.' Commission President José Manuel Barroso has called for such a development back in 2010 (Rettman, 2010a). Such requests are supported by improved communication through the institutionalization of permanent committees. Next to the previously established permanent Bureau of the Heads of Delegation, which consists of eight members, there are two more such institutions: the Bureau of Heads of Administration with six members, and the Bureau of the Regional Security Officers, which has three members. These bureaus are frequently consulted for decisions that might influence the Delegations' work (Ashton, 2012b).

With regards to the issue areas that Delegations deal with, changes towards more diplomatic professionalism can be observed, too. Lisbon maintains the intergovernmental character of the most sensitive high politics issue area, namely defense. Nonetheless, the Delegations are busy with handling this portfolio on an everyday basis. Third countries have also realized this. Thus, the PRC seeks to 'explore ways to develop military ties with [...] the EU' (Gov.cn: Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, 2010). As a result, the EU and China regularly consult with each other when it comes to issues such as crisis management. The EU Delegation to China does so through connecting with the PRC's Defense Ministry and also via *ad hoc* coordination with the military staff in the EU member state embassies located in Beijing. Through this informal approach, the benefits of security cooperation via the EU Delegation shall be made clear so as to eventually take another step towards diplomatic professionalization: the appointment of a military attaché in EU Delegations. That way, EU officials hope that Brussels will get equal access to military information compared to the member state embassies. After all, host country authorities, notably the rather conservative defense ministries, prefer 'talk[ing] to uniforms' (European diplomat, 2011b, 2011f).

While the task profile of the EU Delegations becomes ever more diplomatic in the classical sense, there are indications for an opposite trend for the member state embassies. In interviews with diplomats, they repeatedly emphasized that since Lisbon they can concentrate better on genuine bilateral matters. When asking what matters are truly bilateral at present, issues such as trade promotion, explaining and promoting the national culture, stimulating the tourism industry, or consular affairs were mentioned. Most of these items would not be considered high politics. Even for consular affairs, there is high functional pressure to hand over more responsibility to the EU Delegations (Hocking, 2005a, p. 295; European diplomats, 2010). Despite the considerable evidence that the EU Delegations are about to become 'European embassies,' limitations are evident here, too. First and foremost, member states are still eager to clarify that the EEAS by no means implies an end of their bilateral MFAs and embassies. Member states included this in the Lisbon Treaty. In practice, they are also eager to exert more control. Since January 2010, EU Delegation staff reports that the requests they get about their exact work have sharply increased (European diplomats, 2010).

Another issue is the as of yet still inadequate diplomatic training that EEAS staff can receive. This is important in two respects: firstly, to make a move from a mainly technocratic service of EU officials towards a diplomatic institution that is staffed with genuine European diplomats;

secondly, to develop an 'esprit du corps' for the new mixed group of EEAS diplomats, which consists of EU and temporarily seconded national staff needs. Even though the Lisbon Treaty stipulates respective plans, not much has happened so far in implementing a common 'European Diplomatic Academy' (Gstöhl, 2012, pp. 4–5; Duke, 2012b, p. 95). Also, the political upgrade of information sent from Delegations to Brussels has its limits: secure communication with the possibility of sending encrypted messages between headquarters and Delegations is not yet the standard for the EEAS (Rettman, 2012c). Member states would not easily allow EU Delegations to become genuine embassies. Their reaction to the proposal of military staff in EUDs illustrates this claim. Despite the EUDs' mandate in security affairs, some member states have fiercely opposed any move towards centralization in this field (The Huffington Post, 2011). Nevertheless, the successful incremental upgrade of the role of Delegations over the past decades should not be forgotten. Hence, it is yet to be seen if the Delegations' informal working mode will eventually advance security cooperation. Finally, we should recall that Delegations' increased professionalism may in turn decrease their flexibility. This may be an obstacle towards further centralization of European diplomacy.

To sum up, with the help of the analytical framework of the centralization of European diplomacy in third states, the remainder of this chapter has shown three things: first, the predecessor of the European Union Delegations, the Commission Delegations, have incrementally developed a considerable capacity to centralize European diplomacy: by exponentially expanding the network of Delegations worldwide; by virtually taking over the internal coordination of EU policy in third country capitals; by increasing the degree of a unified external representation of the Union towards third countries; and by developing a profile that is more and more similar to ordinary embassies. Second, the Treaty of Lisbon has turned out to be a decisive step to boost each of these aspects. Third, there are still significant limits in terms of the capacity of the European Union Delegations to centralize European diplomacy.

Given the incremental development of Delegations, one could conclude the analysis here by arguing that as time goes by, the EUDs' work will be consolidated and most of the previously discussed limitations are likely to be solved. This view underestimates the fact that the relationship of the EU and each of the member states to any given third country is and will remain very different from one another. A crucial message from the above analysis is that distinct national foreign policies, implemented via the Union members' own embassies, permanent representations, and consulates are very likely to remain in place for the mid- or even long-term future. In other words, the EU Delegations are currently unlikely to centralize

European diplomacy to the extent that makes national embassies outright superfluous. This likelihood decreases even more when considering that EU members tend to expand bilateral relations, notably with third countries that are important to them – for one reason or another.

This latter aspect is the key to understanding the root causes of the 'expectations-capabilities gap' of the EU Delegations (Hill, 1993): the Lisbon Treaty will not be able to streamline the characteristics of and the conditions in third countries under which EU Delegations act and interact with other players. As a result, the profiles, the constellation, and the cooperation of the EUD and member state embassies vary across third countries. In other words, the level of centralization of European diplomacy is highly dependent on the country in question. Another frequently cited example is that the EU does not speak with one voice, notably towards (re-)emerging countries such as the PRC. Meanwhile, such complaints are rare when it comes to speaking with one voice towards Australia, Myanmar, or Lesotho (Spence, 2009, p. 253; Bruter, 1999, p. 195; European diplomats, 2010). The analysis of the historical development of Delegations has given rich, yet anecdotal evidence for this variation per third state. I have gathered more systematic large-scale data that are presented in the map below. It shows the density of EU member state embassies across third countries. A small number of national embassies are no guarantee for a smooth coordination and unified external representation by the local EUD (European diplomat, 2011f).[16] However, centralizing European diplomacy certainly becomes more complex and potentially difficult, the more players are involved:

27 embassies
21–26 embassies
16–20 embassies
11–15 embassies
6–10 embassies
1–5 embassies
0 embassies

Figure 3.2   Density of EU member state embassies worldwide[17]

The differentiation across third states has had an impact on the very transformation of Commission into EU Delegations. While 54 out of all Delegations were transformed in January 2010 already, the rest followed suit six months or even more than one year thereafter. Taking a closer look, the Spanish government, who took over the Council Presidency in January 2010, successfully lobbied according to its interests. In the former Spanish colonies of Latin and South America, the local Delegations would only be put in the driving seat after the Spanish Presidency was concluded. With the exception of China, the same was true for countries with whom an EU summit was planned (Rettman, 2010b; Vogel, 2010).

This episode and Figure 2.1 provide important evidence for a recurring and central theme of European integration, namely the idea of different speeds. This idea entered the integration debate as early as the 1970s (Piris, 2012, p. 67). With more and more EU members, finding a common denominator for the terms of integration got increasingly difficult. As a result, subsequent Treaty revisions since the mid-1980s included a growing number of exemptions of EU rules and special arrangements for individual countries. Such arrangements did not exclude the option of fully partaking in EU integration at some point in the future. The result is a multispeed Europe (Nicoll, 1985, p. 200; Piris, 2012, p. 66). To give an example, while Germany generally accepts the *acquis communautaire* in its entirety, Great Britain is neither part of the Eurozone nor of the Schengen agreement.

The concept of a multispeed Europe has mostly been used within the EU that is in connection with the preferences of EU members to hand over competences to Brussels for some policy domains, or to (at least temporarily) refrain from it. In a way, this focus is also true for the EEAS as most analyses so far are limited to the exact workings of the EU's new diplomatic system as negotiated in Brussels. A crucial difference is that all member states have agreed to set up a diplomatic system above the nation-state level. Therefore, strictly speaking, different speeds of integration across member states are not intended. However, the evidence above reveals that actors and influences outside of the integration process can speed up or slow down the extent to which the EEAS and its Delegations can centralize European diplomacy.

Philippe Schmitter has called such outside influence 'externalization' (Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). In the cases of the density of diplomatic representation and on Spain's reaction to transforming the new EU Delegations, these externalization factors are third countries; more precisely, it is the characteristics of these third countries that cause the EEAS and its Delegations to be a diplomatic service of different speeds. It is due to externalization that students of European integration need to 'go out,' beyond Brussels, beyond the borders of the European Union.

Many have done so, but they did not go very far. The EU's most powerful foreign policy instrument is arguably enlargement. Studies that pick up the idea of externalization are often limited to the EU's immediate surroundings (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Maurer, 2011). While much of this research has been very valuable for the progress of European integration research, it is restricted to a number of third countries. Therefore, it is of limited value for understanding the EU's role in the world as a whole, notably its power to centralize European diplomacy. Other studies that go beyond the EU's neighborhood are very insightful, but often limited in terms of their comparative approach (see for example Fox and Godement, 2009, or Stumbaum, 2012). Hence, the underlying logic for the EU to be a diplomatic player of different speeds is under-researched. Due to globalization and worldwide interdependence, this understanding is more crucial than ever. The remaining chapters will contribute to this understanding by taking a globe spanning comparative approach of how EUDs worldwide centralize European diplomacy.

4
Analyzing the Patterns of European Diplomacy Centralization

It should be recalled that European integration is one of the most prominent instances of centralizing sovereignty in contemporary global politics. To explain this phenomenon, a considerable body of theories has developed ever since the first steps towards a united Europe have been taken (Popper, 2002a; Lerch and Bieling, 2006, p. 15). I will pick the most suitable theories on the following pages so as to formulate testable hypotheses that shall help answer the overarching research question of why the EU can centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others.

Generally, two broad strands of European integration theory can be distinguished: those that regard European integration as a dependent variable, which is an international relations approach, and those that take it as the independent variable, usually categorized as Comparative Politics (Jachtenfuchs, 2001, p. 245; Steinhilber, 2006, p. 176; Bulmer, 1993, p. 354). Considering the phenomenon under investigation, the level of centralization of European diplomacy in third country capital cities, for this study I take the former approach.

On this backdrop, it is useful to discuss the IR schools of thought that had a major impact on European integration theory. This will help select the theories that allow for an inclusion of the most plausible explanations for the centralization of European diplomacy. According to Andreatta, there are three main traditions in IR: Liberalism, Realism, and alternative approaches, notably Constructivism (Andreatta, 2005, p. 19). The first 'Great Debate' in IR theory actually took place before the end of World War II. It was a debate between Realists and Idealists. The debate was of ontological nature and at its core was the question of whether international institutions, for instance the League of Nations, can (Idealists' view) or cannot (Realists' view) decrease the likelihood

of war. Given the disastrous Second World War, the Realists 'won' this debate (Schmidt, 2012, p. 4).

We know from Chapter 2 that this result did not impress the founding fathers of the European Community. In a Liberalist vain, they continued to believe in interstate cooperation through common institutions, notably through the incremental centralization of sovereignty (Wurm, 1996, p. 18). The basic mechanism was that through functional pressures, supranational institutions would step by step gain more powers. Growing transnational interdependence, which is what contemporary globalization is all about, further fosters this process. The respective theory was called 'Neo-Functionalism' (Haas, 1958). The alternative option for European integration back then was suggested by the Federalists (Thomas, 1991, p. 180). Federalists assumed that only the sudden abolition of national independence and the introduction of a fully fledged 'institutional *deus ex machina*' instead of a gradual, incremental build up of institutions could overcome mistrust, rivalry, and the possibility of war among nation-states (Andreatta, 2005, p. 20). The Federalist account was quickly ruled out due to the lack of empirical evidence (Dedman, 2009, pp. 9–10). Neo-Functionalism, by contrast, was deemed fit to explain the early steps of European integration (Schmidt, 1996, p. 237).

As the course of European integration changed dramatically in the 1960s, Ernst B. Haas, the godfather of Neo-Functionalism, adapted but eventually rejected his own theory. The fundamental problem was again an empirical one as national interests of member states continued to play a fundamental role in determining the course of European integration (Haas, 1976; Niemann, 2006, p. 20; Caporaso, 1998, p. 6).

The 'winner' of that next debate was the Intergovernmentalist Stanley Hoffmann, whose state-centrist beliefs were rooted in Neo-Realist approaches of IR. Supportive to Hoffmann's viewpoint was certainly the outcome of the simultaneous IR debate about humanistic or behaviorist methodology, as the latter is favorable towards a Neo-Realist perspective in IR (Hoffmann, 1966; Cram, 2001, p. 60). Taking today's viewpoint, European integration has clearly widened and deepened. Hence, there are many reasons to get back to Haas' standard works from the 1950s and 1960s. After all, we have already seen in the previous chapter that the logic of incrementalism and (functional) spillover is vital to understand the historical development of EU Delegations.

The IR debate of the 1970s and early 1980s was marked by mostly epistemological inter-paradigm questions between Realist, Pluralist, and Marxist ideas (Lapid, 1989, p. 235). Critical theorists argued that IR theory requires more self-reflection, that is, understanding instead of

explaining outcomes in IR. The Positivist focus on objectively measurable evidence instead of meaning produced a bias for mainstream IR theory towards the status quo rather than to change interstate relations (Cox, 1981, p. 131; Wiener, 2006, p. 2).

Meanwhile, not much progress was made in EU Studies which has to do with a phenomenon that is commonly referred to as Eurosclerosis. It describes a period during which European integration virtually came to a halt, not least because of the oil crisis and subsequent waves of protectionism. This is the opposite of what European integration back then mainly stood for, namely trade liberalization through a common market (Waever, 2008; Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997, p. 307; Wolf, 2006, p. 79). This changed in the course of the 1980s when European integration revitalized. With his theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik explained this revitalization. He thereby bridged both basic assumptions, the Realist taste for nation-state influence and the Liberalist belief in the power of cooperation through common institutions. Despite heated debates, this theory has been tremendously influential up until today (Moravcsik, 1991, 1993, p. 480; Hill and Smith, 2005, p. 390).

Meanwhile, with the end of the Cold War, the predominance of Neo-Realism was finally doomed. Its bias towards continuity instead of change failed to account for the tremendous revisions in the world order that the fall of the Soviet Union implied (Kratochwil, 1993, p. 63). As a result, the third great debate in IR changed its focus from epistemology to ontology. Nevertheless, the questions of understanding versus explaining were still in the foreground (Wiener, 2006, p. 2). The debate still featured Rationalists, who emphasized the role of exogenously given interests, as well as Reflectivists who advocated the role of ideas, values, norms, and the underlying meaning when conducting social sciences (Wiener, 2006, p. 2; Wendt, 1998, p. 101). A theory inspired by this Reflectivist approach, called Social Constructivism, has managed to enter the mainstream of contemporary IR theory. The core claim put forward by Social Constructivists is that outcomes in international politics are determined by ideas that are constructed and not exogenously given interests (Wendt, 1999).

As the ongoing European integration could no longer be explained by looking at interests only, for example the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, European integration theorists have become interested in this new Constructivist alternative. The body of literature that takes and tests this perspective is rapidly growing; the debate is still ongoing and there is no clear winner as of yet (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Manners, 2002; Hyde-Price, 2006; Manners, 2006; Jileva, 2004).

Winner or not, when reading recent publications on sovereignty centralization in the EU, none of the 'grand theories of European integration' has vanished entirely yet. The offer is as great as ever; established theories have become refined and differentiated; new approaches based on the lenses of disciplines other than Comparative Politics and International Relations have deeply penetrated EU Studies such as Economics, Public Administration, or Psychology; and thought-to-be losers of the past debates have experienced comebacks (Christiansen et al., 2001; Niemann, 2006; Hill and Smith, 2005, p. 90; Lerch and Bieling, 2006, p. 10; Wolf, 2006, p. 81).

Drawing a link to the literature review of Chapter 2, this diversification can be seen as a function of globalization, particularly the growing complexity of issues: the more complex issues become, the more complex the explanations (need to) become. As a result, I strive for an encompassing test of what European integration theory has to offer. Based on the above discussion and the literature review of Chapter 2, three fundamental assumptions shall guide the selection of the theories based on which I will develop the hypotheses to answer the overarching research question.

Firstly, following the Liberalist IR tradition, the centralization of state sovereignty/European integration in general, and the centralization of European diplomacy in particular, are a function of globalization pressures and of the growing influence of EU institutions.

Secondly, following the Realist IR tradition the centralization of state sovereignty/European integration in general, and the centralization of European diplomacy in particular, are a function of member states' interests.

Thirdly, following the Constructivist alternative approach, the centralization of state sovereignty/European integration in general, and the centralization of European diplomacy in particular, are a function of ideas, norms, and values rather than interests of the actors involved.

Given the nature of diplomacy, which cuts across different levels of decision making, not only 'grand theories' of European integration that explain so-called 'history-making decisions' should be selected. Such theories may only explain, for instance, why the EEAS was included in the Lisbon Treaty. Since this book focuses EU Delegations, also theoretical approaches targeted at lower levels of policy setting or policy shaping need to be considered (Peterson, 2001, pp. 291–6).

Consequently, the theories that will be tested in this book are firstly, Neo-Functionalism combined with Historical Institutionalism; secondly, (Liberal) Intergovernmentalism; and thirdly, Social Constructivism

combined with the concept of Normative Power Europe. Each of these theories will now be reviewed in turn in an effort to identify the independent variables that most likely explain the variation of centralization of European diplomacy across third countries.

European Diplomacy Centralization: what speeds it up, what slows it down

Neo-Functionalism and Historical Institutionalism

Neo-Functionalism is said to be the earliest of empirical-analytical theories of European integration. Its 'founding father' Ernst B. Haas treated European integration as a process and as a macro-phenomenon. Essentially, Haas predicted that centralization of low politics would eventually spill over to other issue areas, even high politics. A kind of European super state would be the outcome. The underlying logic is a functional-endogenous link between issue areas. In other words, integration in a particular field, like coal and steel production, would 'induce policy-makers to take additional integrative steps in order to achieve their original objectives' (Niemann, 2006, p. 30). Although the supranational federal union is seen as a virtually inevitable end product, Neo-Functionalists still consider it an 'unintended consequence.' To them, there is no blueprint for this outcome as for Federalists (Haas, 1958, p. 10; Wolf, 2006, pp. 65–70; Andreatta, 2005, pp. 21–2; Niemann, 2006, pp. 14, 30).

The idea of the functional spillover, that 'political functions must be performed at the most efficient level,' is a highly technocratic one (Andreatta, 2005, p. 21). It is based on assumptions that are quite in line with the globalization literature that was introduced in the second chapter. Inspired by the writings of Emil Durkheim, Ernst Haas believed in the growing individualization of society, in the ongoing specialization of tasks, and in a resulting societal interdependence that crosses borders.

Another consequence of this view is that the division of high and low politics is eventually superfluous (Wolf, 2006, p. 79). Haas also subscribed to the view that societal power is diffused over state and other societal actors. As a result, he expected that the more power EU institutions have, the more they are in the position to exploit their influence to push for more policy domains being supranationalized. This power is not just of formal nature, for example, legally assigned competences through treaty revisions; it also consists to a large extent of knowledge and information (Andreatta, 2005, p. 22; Haas, 1990, p. 280; Niemann, 2006, p. 46). Partly based on this knowledge and information advantage,

Neo-Functionalists theorized that two other types of spillover foster the centralization of sovereignty at the supranational level: the cultivated and the political spillover. The former refers to the gradually growing influence of supranational institutions, like the European Commission, in fostering integration. This takes place through 'cultivat[ing] relations with interest groups and national civil servants' so as to convince them of further integration (Niemann, 2006, pp. 50, 29).

Recalling the previous chapter, an example would be that the Delegations have managed to convince local member state embassies of their added value such as in negotiating favorable terms of trade liberalization with the host government. As a result, they have become gradually more involved in the local coordination of European diplomacy in general. Closely linked to such logic, the political type of spillover refers to the realization by national elites that the solution to domestic problems lays at the supranational level. As a consequence, they would shift their 'expectations, political activities and loyalties to a new European centre' (Niemann, 2006, p. 34). The political spillover implies that national actors promote centralization.

Notwithstanding Neo-Functionalists' success in explaining at least the early stages of European integration, the theory has not come without flaws. One problem is of analytical nature. Even though Haas sought to develop an empirical-analytical theory that uncovers causal relationships, he insisted on grasping European integration as a process (Wolf, 2006, p. 68; Haas, 1961). This, together with the assumption of an automatic spillover, leads to considerable difficulties to distinguish between independent and dependent variables. On top of that, IR theorists see a limited value in terms of generally explaining interstate relations due to the lack, and indeed the impossibility, of a comparative approach of a union *sui generis*. In a way, Haas had built a virtually non-falsifiable theoretical construct (Wolf, 2006, p. 77; Andreatta, 2005, p. 23; cf. Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, p. 2; Caporaso, 1998, p. 6).

He tried to overcome this problem by emphasizing the need for qualitative research methods. But during the second great IR debate, during which quantitative methods prevailed, descriptive approaches lost out (Wolf, 2006, p. 70; Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 42). Another limitation was the empirical lack of a political spillover, at least when it comes to the wider European public, an aspect which has been largely neglected by Neo-Functionalists. Even if the loyalties of the national elites entirely shifted towards Brussels and Strasbourg, they are still constrained by the member states' public who vote these elites into power – or refrain from doing so. As a result, scholars have criticized Neo-Functionalists for their

overly technocratic approach, which disguises the real political power relations. This criticism is nowadays highly topical because European citizens are still much more loyal to their respective national governments rather than to Brussels (Niemann, 2006, p. 49; Wolf, 2006, p. 75; Bieling, 2006, p. 106; European Commission, 2012a).

Haas and his students faced the various points of critique by developing a belt of supplementary hypotheses to protect the core validity of Neo-Functionalism. In the 1970s, however, Haas himself refuted his theory under the pressuring evidence of the Empty Chair Crisis. This made the decisive role of national interests all too obvious, and it uncovered the fundamental weakness of a teleological approach to integration (Niemann, 2006, pp. 13, 20; Haas, 1976). Nevertheless, Haas' students tried to save the theory by introducing the concept of spill-back. This concept meant that the process of integration would not always be absolutely linear, but that it would suffer from certain setbacks. The eventual outcome, however, would still be centralization of sovereignty in all policy areas (Haas, 1976, p. 183; Niemann, 2006, p. 47).

Another addition to Neo-Functionalism is the concept of externalization introduced by Philippe Schmitter (Schmitter, 1969, p. 165). Although Haas embraced the concept of interdependence, a key component of what would later be called globalization theory, he largely assumed an endogenous automatism. As a result, Neo-Functionalists faced a lot of criticism for underestimating world politics, notably the influence of the US on European integration (Niemann, 2006, p. 32; Bieling, 2006, p. 93). Schmitter complemented this view by claiming that states 'outside the integration process can provide a stimulus for integration in the foreign policy field' (Schmitter, 1969, p. 165; Andreatta, 2005, p. 22). In a way, Schmitter thereby injects 'more IR' into Neo-Functionalism. This mitigates the criticism of Neo-Functionalism's Euro-centric approach. Moreover, the concept of externalization is also at the heart of the research question of this book: why is there variation of centralization of European diplomacy across third state capitals? It indicates that the characteristics of third states and their relationships to the Union, and its members must be seen as independent variables.

Given today's advancement of European integration, even in diplomacy, it seems that Haas gave up too early (Caporaso, 1998, p. 6; Wolf, 2006, p. 82). However, just getting back to the old theory would have brought about similar weaknesses as before. Therefore, theories with different labels and assumptions were constructed, which took over much of the basic Neo-Functionalist teachings.

Historical Institutionalism (HI) can be regarded as one of them. The application of Historical Institutionalism in EU Studies is a quite recent phenomenon, and although HI has not been explicitly developed to explain European integration, it has been viewed as an update and refinement of Neo-Functionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 937; Morisse-Schilbach, 2006, p. 283).

In his seminal article, Douglass C. North defines institutions as 'humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction' (North, 1991). He further distinguishes between formal institutions, such as laws or rights, and informal institutions, such as norms, traditions, or customs. Institutions are 'framework[s] of behavior [that] direct, channel, or guide behavior' (Groenewegen et al., 1995, p. 467). They matter when it comes to explaining outcomes in the social world. The specific variant of HIs emphasizes the rules, norms, and resources that organizations develop over time (path dependence). It means that once an institution has taken a certain way, it is hard to get back or take turns (cf. Morisse-Schilbach, 2006, pp. 273–4; North, 1991, p. 104).[1] Hence, institutions in the form of international organizations can develop a 'life of their own,' independent from their principles which are usually nation-states (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999, p. 438; Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938). As a result, they can actively seek more competences. Applied to the EU, once competences have been transferred to supranational institutions, it is hard to reverse this. This elevates the close relationship of HIs and Neo-Functional spillover, especially the cultivated kind (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp. 936; 939–41; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 27; Barnett and Finnmore, 2004 in Haftel and Thompson, 2006, p. 254, cf. Christiansen, 1997, p. 86).

The rise of the New Institutionalist school in EU Studies was linked to the so-called 'governance turn.' This theoretical movement advocated a change from the classical focus on analyzing hierarchical state government structures in Political Science towards non-hierarchical decision making networks of different public as well as private entities (Bulmer, 1993; Christiansen, 1997; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006, pp. 28–9).[2] This shift is in line with the ideas of globalization supporters about the decline of the nation-state, which became ever louder at the turn of the millennium. The key reasons were the increasing complexity of issues, the resulting overload of work for national administrations, and the subsequent delegation to specialized agencies and bureaucracies. Because EU member state governments outsource competences to agents such as the Commission, they will no longer be able to fully control European

integration (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006, p. 29; Morisse-Schilbach, 2006, pp. 271, 279; Steinhilber, 2006, p. 189).

Since these basic assumptions about globalization and interdependence were also made by Neo-Functionalists, the governance-idea is not entirely new. However, the end of the Cold War and the presumed 'End of History' revitalized a Neo-Functionalist style technocratic problem-solving attitude rather than dealing with traditional IR-concepts as for instance politics and power relations (Fukuyama, 2006). Accordingly, a number of influential articles have been authored in the 1990s and thereafter that take up Neo-Functionalist ideas to explain the evolvement of the EU (for example Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, or Caporaso, 1998). But in contrast to Neo-Functionalism, HIs was applied to understand the workings of the EU as a political system. Grand IR questions, which were prominent for Neo-Functionalism due to its teleological approach, stepped into the background (Bulmer, 1993, p. 351).

To answer the research question at hand an encompassing perspective that cuts across analytical levels of decision making is needed to answer the research question. Therefore, Neo-Functionalism and HIs should be combined. After all, their basic assumptions are quite compatible. An aspect that has been emphasized by Neo-Functionalists, but to a much higher extent even by Institutionalists is the growing expertise of international organizations, making them genuine information hubs (Christiansen and Piattoni, 2004, p. 158; Morisse-Schilbach, 2006, p. 276). That way, they develop an enormous 'organizational memory' (Pierre and Peters, 2000, pp. 77–8). Similar to Neo-Functionalism, the long-term 'unintended consequence' is a gradual transferal of formal and informal powers from the nation-state to the supranational level (Pollack, 2005, p. 364; Morisse-Schilbach, 2006, p. 279). Similar to the different sorts of NF spillover, HI theorists assume that the relevant actors are not just rational (calculus approach). Norms and values are just as well taken into consideration (cultural approach; Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 939).

In contrast to classical Institutionalism as well as Neo-Functionalism, the new strand of HI focuses less on formal laws and stresses the analysis of informal institutions. This is one reason why Historical Institutionalists consider the relationship between SN-IGOs and states not so much a teleological zero-sum game with an outright, even if implicit, assumption of the EU becoming an autonomous actor. Member states may be limited in their choices of action, but not necessarily by giving up formal authority (Morisse-Schilbach, 2006, pp. 271–83; Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 983). This is a crucial point for the research question at hand as we have seen in the previous chapter how Delegations could

centralize European diplomacy over time without even being equipped with a formal mandate. However, the heavy emphasis on process, and hence on qualitative data, makes Historical Institutionalists face problems of determinism and the difficulty to distinguish cause and effect. This is an issue that we already know from Neo-Functionalism and for which Historical Institutionalists have been criticized (Caporaso, 1998, p. 6; Hay and Wincott, 1998, p. 953). As we shall see in the next chapter, I try to deal with this problem by applying a combination of quantitative and qualitative data. Let us now apply this first theory combination to the research question at hand: how would Neo-Functionalists and Historical Institutionalists answer the main research question of why the EU can centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others?

The CFSP has only been introduced in the 1990s and is still largely controlled by the member states. We know from the previous chapter that the Commission has conducted a policy of external dimension since its very inception. Furthermore, in line with globalization and the blurred lines between high and low politics, virtually every EU policy has by now gained some sort of external dimension. When it comes to the research question at hand, a good indicator is the seconding of staff from all sorts of Directorates General (DG) to EU Delegations. Nevertheless, the external dimension certainly used to be higher in the former DG Relex compared to for example DG Employment.[3] As a result, a loose grouping has developed consisting of Commission DGs with a strong external dimension, the so-called 'Relex family.' The following DGs are part of this 'family': DG External Relations, DG Development, DG Enlargement, DG Trade, the Europe Aid Co-Operation Office, and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO; see Delegation of the European Union to Iraq, 2012).

Following the assumptions of Neo-Functionalism and HIs, the policy domain with the longest 'EU history' is likely to be the one with the highest degree of integration/centralization. Applied to the main research question, the policy domain that the EC/EU Delegations have dealt with longest should be identified. In the third countries whose relationship with the EU is primarily marked by this particular policy domain, the highest degree of centralization of European diplomacy can be expected.

In the foregoing chapter it became clear that the work of Delegations cannot be entirely reduced to a specific field of action, particularly because it has become so diverse over time. However, previous research by Michael Bruter has shown that Delegations can be categorized along their main functions. Having conducted his research in the mid-1990s,

Bruter's typology already indicates the two most likely candidates: development policy on the one hand and trade policy on the other (Bruter, 1999, p. 198). Indeed, the other candidates of the Relex family can be ruled out: the External Relations DG was only introduced in the late 1990s, following the formal institutionalization of CFSP (Dimitrakopoulos, 2004, p. 129). DG Enlargement was built in order to handle the accession of as many as ten new member states in 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, Chapter 3 has shown that it is a rather recent phenomenon that Delegations specifically deal with preparing third countries for accession. The same goes for ECHO, the Union's office dealing with humanitarian aid and civil protection. It was created in 1992, meaning that it has not been part of the Delegations' portfolios for a long time either. Apart from that, and just like the Europe Aid Cooperation Office, it is dependent on DG Development (European Commission, 2012b).

Left with the two choices of trade and development policy, the latter is the one with the longer history, at least with regards to the external relations of the EC/EU. The reason is that economic integration was first and foremost an internal project among the Community members. Major steps in its development were the completion of the customs union in 1968 as well as the Single European Market's 'action plan' of the mid-1980s so as to finally complete the internal market in the early 1990s. Hence, it took a while until it was truly completed and before it could get a truly global, Community-external dimension (Calingaert, 1999, pp. 153–4).

European development policy, by contrast, was directed towards third countries from the very beginning and it was formulated and implemented soon after the ratification of the Treaty of Rome (Arts and Dickson, 2004). It can be expected that Delegations in developing countries tend to be well resourced and experienced. Based on these resources, they have acquired a high level of expertise, not only about development matters, but about the host country in general. Given their experience, it can also be assumed that they have built good contacts, both with host country authorities and local member state embassies. As a result, member states accept that Delegations take a diplomatic leading on the ground, notably concerning the internal coordination and external representation of EU policy. This in turn allows the Delegations to push for more formal and informal competences. European diplomacy is highly centralized at the local EU Delegation. The first hypothesis to be tested is therefore:

H1: The less developed a third country is, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country.

(Liberal) Intergovernmentalism

The theory of Intergovernmentalism provides a stark contrast to Neo-Functionalism and the latter's later Institutionalist additions. Its basic assumption is that European integration is not an automatic process towards an 'ever closer union' with the federal state as the end product. It rather is and remains a function of the Community member states' interests. These are exogenously given. The fundamental Realist way of thinking behind this idea is the Hobbesian conceptualization of humans as being self-interested, power-seeking, and lacking mutual trust. Since states are a form of human organization, they 'behave' in the same way. We know from the second chapter that according to Realist thought, the community of states can only be an anarchic one. As a consequence, European integration is an empirical anomaly for Realists; a phenomenon that they have not reckoned with (Bieling, 2006, p. 93; Andreatta, 2005, p. 23; Hoffmann, 1966, p. 901; Steinhilber, 2006, p. 175).

   Stanley Hoffmann is one of the Realist thinkers who take this anomaly more seriously. The way Hoffmann has integrated it into Realist thought is, however, by downplaying the project of European integration and the influence of its institutions. Meanwhile, he stresses the role of the state, which he regards as a rather autonomous unitary actor (Bieling, 2006, p. 110). Linking his almost 40-year-old work to contemporary world politics, Hoffmann can certainly be considered a globalization skeptic. As a result, he insists that the distinctive national interests are far from becoming outdated as Neo-Functionalists suggest (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 882; Morisse-Schilbach, 2006, pp. 93, 99). For this reason, Hoffmann rejects the assumption of a new type of transnational decision making in Europe. Instead, he sees the European Community simply as a form of international politics just with more rules. Through the partial pooling of sovereignty, the states are even strengthened as they can outsource less important, but time-consuming necessary tasks. However, issues that are at the heart of any nation-state's interest are and will not be subject to centralization. At least in his early writings on European integration, traditional high political issues, for example defense and diplomacy, are for him still among the most fundamental state interests. They are least likely to be communitarized (Bieling, 2006, pp. 101–4; Hoffmann, 1966, p. 882). Events such as the failure to implement a plan for a European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s or the Empty Chair Crisis of the 1960s were strong evidence that spoke against the logic of Neo-Functionalism and in favor of Intergovernmentalism (Bieling, 2006, p. 91; Kunz, 1953). It also should not be forgotten that EU foreign policy is nowadays still decided in an intergovernmental way even after Lisbon.

Nevertheless, Intergovernmentalism in its original form is still too Realist and Realism as such is 'least promising' to understand current EU foreign policy and diplomacy (Hill and Smith, 2005, p. 389). The main reason is that even if integration in traditional high politics such as defense and security matters is a rather recent development, it has taken off. Tying up to the subject matter of this book, the presence of a European-wide diplomatic service hardly fits Hoffmann's original theoretical construct.

Concerning the further deepening of European integration, Hoffmann has shown more flexibility already at the end of the 1980s by acknowledging that the distinction of high and low politics has become blurred. To him, national interest is an exogenously given rational will for survival and to seek power, no matter the circumstances. Furthermore, it is a product of political culture, leadership, national traditions, experiences, and the powerful ideology of nationalism (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 891; Bieling, 2006, pp. 92, 98). Hence, Hoffmann is relatively open to a change of national interests, which is different from the usual Realist ontology. Due to his quite non-Realist flexibility about interest formation, he was convinced that the bold steps towards European integration of the 1980s with the Single European Act did not fundamentally shake his theory. In the year 1989, he noted that ever since the 1980s,

> [t]he main goal now is not "high politics" but the competitiveness of Europe in a world in which the number of industrial and commercial players has multiplied. (Hoffmann, 1989, p. 33)

In other words, European integration was a way to overcome economic inefficiencies and to boost the competitiveness of European economies. This is why economic integration had become a national interest even for extremely sovereignty sensitive countries such as the UK (Bieling, 2006, p. 105). In line with this openness, Hoffmann favored a methodological mixture that draws a balance. He seeks to combine the elegantly parsimonious, often quantitative, but sometimes too idealizing approaches used by Neo-Realists with the very process-oriented, qualitative methods by Neo-Functionalists. The latter may well reflect the given phenomenon under investigation. However, it does not so much allow for producing generalizable knowledge (Bieling, 2006, p. 97). I also consider this balance to be necessary. For this reason I apply a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods in this book. Despite Hoffmann's partial divergence from other Realist thinkers, he considers the hierarchy introduced with the EC/EU to be a mere 'pseudo-hierarchy.' The

member states can still and will always be able to control the European institutions in those matters that states consider to be most important (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 911).

Furthermore, notwithstanding Hoffmann's relative openness, his theoretical construct left the exact process and the variables that determine a change of national interest in the dark or at least under-theorized. The IR scholar Andrew Moravcsik filled this gap with his theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 863; Moravcsik, 1993; Steinhilber, 2006, p. 176). It must be said that Moravcsik first and foremost considers his theory construction an endeavor to advance Liberalist IR theory. More specifically, he intended to free Liberalism from its all too teleological-Idealist stigma and to systematize it along Positivist rules of theory building (Steinhilber, 2006, p. 172). Nevertheless, his theory is often put into the category of Realist-based theories. The main reason is that Moravcsik takes over the state-centered approach from the Realists as well as their focus on rational state interests.[4] At the international level, governments still constitute unitary units of analysis according to Moravcsik. Other players like multinational corporations (MNCs), international organizations (IOs), or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), may play a role for IR in general and to explain the big steps in European integration in particular. Nonetheless, their role is less important than that of states. Thus, according to Moravcsik as well as to Hoffmann, European integration, or, more generally speaking, the centralization of sovereignty, takes place if the configuration of interests across member states is congruent (Steinhilber, 2006, pp. 169, 175).

What completely distinguishes Moravcsik from Classical and Neo-Realists is the assumption about the decisive variable to explain outcomes in IR. For Realists, national interests are exogenously given, based on the distribution of power resources among states at the international level of analysis. Moravcsik by contrast opens the black box of the state by saying that state interests vary depending on the competition for power of state-*internal* societal actors. This competition is consolidated at the governmental level, based on rational considerations, notably re-election (Waltz, 2010; Steinhilber, 2006, pp. 170, 177, 185; Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997, p. 302).

Moravcsik's innovation was to explain European integration by looking at state *preferences* rather than static interests. The latter remains a function of the distribution of national capabilities. To capture the dynamism of state preferences, Moravcsik used a sophisticated stage model, which is based on Putnam's two-level games; the first game being played at the domestic level; the second one at the international level.

It is in this regard that the Liberalist ideas in Moravcsik's theory play out. Moravcsik was inspired by the Commercialist strand of Liberalism, which stresses the economic interdependence of states and the role of efficiencies. In an ever increasing globalized world, joining forces in the form of (economic) integration increases the weight of each single EU member. It stimulates information exchange among members, and the delegation of tasks to a supranational agent. This agent helps the states to focus on really crucial tasks. Apart from that, it also constitutes an independent referee to help the EU member states make credible commitments (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 523; Putnam, 1988; Moravcsik, 2002, p. 616; Krapohl, 2004, p. 523; cf. Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, pp. 42–5).

When it comes to interest formation at the domestic level, Moravcsik assumes and empirically shows that economic domestic actors, for example companies and their respective lobby groups, are able to exert the highest influence on European integration. It is also these actors' preferences that have considerably contributed to an economically Neo-Liberalist agenda of negative integration in the 1980s (see Moravcsik, 1998, p. 2).

As soon as national interests are consolidated at the governmental level, Moravcsik applies negotiation analysis to member state bargaining processes. That way, he explains the outcome of intergovernmental conferences, notably new treaties for European integration. In line with his state-centric approach, he considers these moments to be decisive in explaining European integration. Depending on their resources (big versus small member states) and their agenda (agenda for negative integration or positive integration), some member states can steer or halt the integration process more than others. In any event, Moravcsik denies a genuine influence of the supranational institutions on the course of European integration (Moravcsik, 1998, pp. 1–9). He also reaffirms the Intergovernmentalist stance that states keep their sovereignty in areas that are important to them – notably foreign and security policy. The outcome is then a European integration process of different speeds, notably across the different policy domains. Although Moravcsik's explanation for a change of national interest is more sophisticated than Hoffmann's, both theorists, implicitly or explicitly, keep up the distinction of high and low politics (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 524; Steinhilber, 2006, pp. 179–84).

Applying Moravcsik's logic to twenty-first century global politics, economics and trade becomes however more and more important for nation-states to keep their influence and legitimacy. This is why member states are willing to centralize trade rule making at the

supranational level, but not trade promotion (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 86; Bungenberg et al., 2011, p. 177). After all, EU member states are not only partners but also competitors for a share in the world market. This indicates that economics indeed seem to have become the new high politics.

By now, Moravcsik's theory, which injects Liberalist ideas into a Realist foundation, constitutes the 'mainstream point of departure' in EU Studies. It also has a high potential to explain EU external relations (Wind, 1997 in Steinhilber, 2006, p. 170; Hill and Smith, 2005, p. 390). Despite its success, Hoffmann's and Moravcsik's theories were of course subject to criticism. Tying up to the subject at hand, how is (Liberal) Intergovernmentalism reconcilable with the establishment of the EEAS, a clearly 'high political' institution? Scholars of the governance turn also criticized that Moravcsik underestimated the role of institutions and overestimated the influence of the state (Steinhilber, 2006, pp. 190–1). This is first and foremost the case for day-to-day European politics. These have become immensely detailed and complex so that states simply lose sight of what exactly constitutes their national interest, especially with regards to future implications of today's decisions (Peterson, 1995; Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997, pp. 299–300, 312). Due to the many moments of incremental spillover triggered during the daily work of the EU Delegations over the past decades, the EUDs provide a strong test for the validity of (Liberal) Intergovernmentalism.

Based on the above theoretical review, (Liberal) Intergovernmentalists do not really need to take into account the daily workings of the EU. After all, they conceptualize the EU as an agent of the member states. The member states can still control the EU in all matters of genuine importance. Applied to the EEAS and its Delegations, scholars such as Hoffmann or Moravcsik would consider this new institution to still work in a largely intergovernmental way: if fundamental state interests and preferences are at stake, governments can steer their diplomatic relations themselves. They can do so directly or via their embassies abroad, thereby keeping the EU Delegations in check where necessary.[5]

But where exactly, that is in what sorts of third countries, would such control be necessary? According to the (Liberal) Intergovernmentalist logic, the third state characteristics that determine the level of centralization of European diplomacy must be linked to the most fundamental interests of the EU members. Despite their dynamic approaches to state interests, neither Hoffmann nor Moravcsik completely reject the traditional high-low politics divide that reflects their Realist roots (Andreatta, 2005, p. 23). In other words, geopolitical security is still

most fundamental for any states' survival, including all EU members. I, therefore, have come up with the following second hypothesis to be tested:

> H2: The lower the strategic importance of a third country, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country.

The foregoing theoretical review has also shown that (Liberal) Intergovernmentalists emphasize the possibility of changing national interests, notably through bargaining at the national level (Moravcsik), but also in the course of changing global politics (Hoffmann). As we have seen in the literature review of Chapter 2, as well as the later writings of Hoffmann, it is fair to say that economic performance has become vital for state survival, too. In contemporary global(ized) politics, nation-states are more and more interested in reaping the benefits of economic centralization. At the same time, they also seek sufficient control when it comes to their economic performance.

This logic should be applied to the phenomenon of the centralization of diplomacy: because of the advantages for EU member states of delegating trade competence to a supranational agent, (Liberal) Intergovernmentalists would expect well-resourced and influential EU Delegations in countries of economic importance. However, strong national embassies are expected to be present in countries of high economic importance as well (Spence, 2009, p. 258). The reason is that economic diplomacy becomes increasingly important for nation-states in order to keep their global influence and legitimacy in relation to domestic actors. As EU member states are not only partners but also competitors for a share in the world market, the local presence of an embassy is vital in third countries of economic importance. Due to the presence of many voices on the ground, coordination by and representation of the EU through the local Delegation becomes more difficult. Overall, centralization is therefore rather ambiguous in countries of high economic importance. This leads me to the third hypothesis:

> H3: The higher the economic importance of a third country is, the stronger the EU Delegation *and* the stronger the member state embassies are. Hence, in countries of high economic importance centralization of European diplomacy is ambiguous.

So far, I have developed three hypotheses on the basis of which I will test the first two major sets of European integration theory and their

explanatory power for the centralization of European diplomacy. I will now develop a final hypothesis that ties up to the most recent debates on Constructivism and the role of norms and values in EU Studies.

Social Constructivism and Normative Power Europe

In the previous analysis it became clear that Liberalists but even some Realists, for instance Hoffmann, were ontologically rather open concerning the question of what the social world is made of. However, these theorists stated at best in some side sentences that changes in international relations are not necessarily based on rational considerations, that is interests and preferences, but on 'soft aspects.' Such soft aspects can be norms, values, or identity. Nonetheless, the mainstream of IR theory and its application in European Studies did not consider soft aspects to be relevant at all (Ruggie, 1998, p. 862).

Although approaches such as Critical Theory or Post-Modernism pointed out this lack of self-reflection in IR theory much earlier, they never made it into the mainstream of IR theory. The main problem is probably their 'own relativity.' They are highly focused on context dependence rather than the ambition to come up with a research program (Cox, 1981, pp. 135, 128). Therefore, the debate about exogenously given rational interests and endogenously constituted, socially constructed ideas only really came to the fore in the IR debate when the Cold War ended. The reason was that Realist power politics could not explain, let alone foresee, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the bipolar global system. Instead of a few law-like statements that were sufficient to grasp the logic of interaction of the two superpowers for decades, the world became much more complex all of a sudden. This made the exploration of new theoretical shores necessary – and it was the catalyst to trigger the Social Constructivist (SC) movement in IR theory (Guzzini, 2000, p. 147; Ruggie, 1998, p. 856; Schwellnus, 2006, p. 321; Sorensen, 1998, p. 84). This Reflectivist inspired approach, notably the arguably most influential one proposed by Alexander Wendt, constitutes a 'via media' between Rationalism and Reflectivism. It focuses on understanding, ideas, and constitution. At the same time, Wendt addresses 'the mainstream issues of interpretation and evidence, generalizations, alternative explanations, and variation and comparability' (Smith, 1999, p. 683; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 260).

SCs' most fundamental assumption is that ideas and mutual perceptions of actors determine international relations. These ideas and perceptions are not given or the same for every actor. Rather, they are the result of social interaction and other strategies. In other words, ideas are

constructed and can be reconstructed. A categorization of other actors into friends and foes is decisive when it comes to the question with which states or other relevant players in IR are willing to cooperate; with whom their relationship would be more competitive; or with whom it would even escalate into outright hostility. Hence, it is not the structure of state capabilities, meaning weaponry or economic assets, which explain outcomes in IR. For SCs, it is the structure of ideas (Wendt, 1992, p. 395, 1998, pp. 103, 114; Ruggie, 1998, p. 879; Wendt, 1999, p. 96).

This assumption is not entirely new as it goes back to political scientists such as Karl Deutsch who expected that more cooperation among states is possible if they have similar cultural backgrounds (Ruggie, 1998, p. 867; Wendt, 1999, p. 331). At the end of the Cold War, Stephen M. Walt, who certainly would not be categorized as a Social Constructivist as such, nevertheless pushed the SC agenda. With his Balance of Threat theory, he showed 'how the influence of ideas and perceptions in international politics can be factored into a mainstream realist account' (Dessler, 1999, p. 132; Smith, 1999, p. 683). To put the logic in a nutshell, for a given state A to decide if states B or C constitute real threats, it holds significant importance if B and C are friends of A or not – notwithstanding the fact that the governments of B and C have the same amount of nuclear weapons at their disposal.

Alexander Wendt can surely be considered a moderate SC. One main reason is that Wendt still considers the nation-state to be the decisive unit of analysis in IR. Wendt considers the regulation of violence as 'one of the most fundamental problems of order in social life' (Wendt, 1999, p. 8). As a result, Wendt also implicitly keeps up the distinction between high and low politics. Despite this congruence with one of the most central Realist assumptions, scholars from the Realist camp were quick to criticize Social Constructivism. One such critique is that SC cannot be tested along Positivist standards. However, moderate Social Constructivists insist that SC is not so much a normative theory but a theory about norms and their influence on outcomes in IR in general and European integration in particular (Schwellnus, 2006, p. 336; Checkel, 1999, p. 546). Due to Social Constructivism's preoccupation with the underlying meaning and with constitution rather than just '"brute" material forces,' there is a bias towards qualitative methodology (Wendt, 1999, p. 94). SC scholars mostly conduct research involving narratives, thick descriptions, and process tracing (Wendt, 1998, p. 107). Nevertheless, when it comes to epistemology, 'ideational factors are no less "natural" than material reality and, therefore, are as susceptible to normal scientific modes of inquiry' (Ruggie, 1998, p. 858).

Consequently, SCs can 'accept the [Positivist] explanatory strategy and use it to develop new covering law theories that recognize the workings of a wider range of cultural and ideational elements in world politics' (Dessler, 1999, p. 132; Risse and Wiener, 1999, p. 776). I subscribe to this view that Social Constructivism can be reconciled with a Positivist research design.

The end of the Cold War implied tremendous changes for international relations in general and for European integration in particular. Nevertheless, it took until the turn of the millennium that the application of SC to the puzzles of centralizing sovereignty on the European continent really took off (Christiansen et al., 2001; Checkel, 2004; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001). One of the big puzzles in EU integration that the existing menu of theories could hardly explain was the enlargement of 2004 and 2007. The majority of the ten new member states were ex-Communist countries located in Central and Eastern Europe. Given the economic discrepancies between the old and the new EU members rational calculations were insufficient to explain the agreement of the incumbent members to open their doors towards the Central and Eastern Europe Countries (CEEC; Schimmelfennig, 2001).

To use the words of Alexander Wendt, the latter example demonstrates that 'anarchy is what states make of it' (Wendt, 1992). The centralization of sovereignty depends on ideas and identities. The incumbent EU members would let in states that share the same goals and values rather than those who do not do so. The most obvious piece of evidence is the formulation of the so-called Copenhagen Criteria. This list outlines the standards and conditions that new member states have to fulfill to become EU members:

> Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. (Council of the European Union, 1993)

The above quotation shows that the EU has developed into something that is much more than a pure trade club. By now, the EU is a norm- and value-based form of close interstate cooperation. Enlargement policy is clearly part of the 'Relex family' of EU policy domains. It is arguably

among the EU's most successful foreign policy tools because of its high impact on changing internal politics in other countries (Baldwin et al., 1997, p. 125). Being a form of regional rather than global integration, the EU cannot try to seduce every country in the world with its enlargement 'carrot.' Nevertheless, it has made scholars embark anew on whether and what kind of international actor the EU is. Scholars of the SC family have been very influential in that re-emerging debate. They observe that the EU's entire foreign policy is not only determined by rational considerations, but also by norms and values and the diffusion thereof. Studies thereby cut across various levels of decision making (Bull, 1982; Manners, 2002, p. 235; Diez, 2005).

Supplementing the 'grand theory' of Social Constructivism with an approach targeted at lower levels of decision making, Ian Manners has written one of the most influential articles about the role of norms in EU Studies. He came up with the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE) which has triggered a wave of empirical tests and theoretical responses. To understand the EU's international role, Manners suggests moving away from traditional benchmarks that analyze to what extent the EU has become similar to a nation-state (Manners, 2002, pp. 238–9; Hyde-Price, 2006; Manners, 2006, 2008). This was, for example, done by Duchêne in the early 1970s. He thought that the EC was 'long on economic power and relatively short on armed force,' which made it a civilian rather than a military power (Duchêne et al., 1973, p. 19).

Instead, Manners proposes to turn towards ideational factors to understand the EU within international relations. He suggested this line of thinking despite the introduction of a CFSP with the Maastricht Treaty as well as the fact that the EU started to build up military capabilities in the late 1990s (Manners, 2002, pp. 236–8, 2006, p. 182). After all, the new CFSP continued to suffer from of a capabilities/expectations gap. This became all too clear in the mid-1990s during the civil war in the Balkans, as well as in 2003 with the European divide on the US-led intervention in Iraq (Hill, 1993; Dover, 2005; Shepherd, 2006). With a study on the influence of the EU on the abolition of the death penalty in other countries, Manners demonstrates how the Union manages to diffuse norms that are enshrined in its founding treaties. In a later article, he illustrates how the EU's 'militarizing processes' since the beginning of the new millennium are 'weakening the normative claims of the EU' (Manners, 2002, pp. 241–4, 2006, p. 182). While this interplay is highly contested, it reveals that Manners acknowledges the EU's growing military influence. He implicitly assumes a blurred distinction of the traditional high and low politics divide.

Based on the above theoretical review, how would SCs answer the research question of why the EU can centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others? As we have seen in Chapter 3, Delegations have played a key role in the implementation of the entire portfolio of EC/EU policies. As the EU becomes a normative power, SCs would consider the Delegations to be part of the EU's machinery to diffuse its norms and values. The Delegations' historical development has indeed shown that the Delegations located in accession countries have been crucial in evaluating the progress of future members in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria.

This reveals that the Delegations have an implicit but powerful mandate to diffuse EU norms. They support change and reforms in countries that are still very different in terms of values and political culture compared to the EU. Hence, taking a SC perspective, I hypothesize the following to answer the research question of this book:

> H4: The more different the political culture of a third country is compared to the EU member states' political culture, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country.

Before embarking on the empirical tests of these hypotheses, we need to spend some time on alternative explanations beyond the above theoretical review.

Keep it (Supra-)National: special cases of European diplomacy centralization

Although the empirical test of this book is encompassing, covering the major theories of European integration, it does not exhaust the range of relevant independent variables. These, however, must be discussed and if possible controlled for so as to ensure the internal validity of our study at hand (Caporaso, 1995, p. 460).

Regarding alternative explanations for the centralization level of European diplomacy, the presence or absence of special relationships between third countries and one or more EU member states, or the EU itself, is crucial. Based on historical development, individual EU member states have built 'special ties' with certain third countries outside of the European Union (Nugent, 2010, p. 377; see Marsh and Baylis, 2006). These relationships vary in kind, but two types are frequent: first, colonial ties between Western European EU members and their former colonies; second, the relationship between Central and East European member

states and the former Soviet bloc as well as other (ex-)Communist states. Countries with serious prospects to access the EU in the near future have a special relationship with Brussels: the European Commission is responsible for monitoring the preparations and reforms for the countries to enter the EU (European Commission, 2004 in Miošić-Lisjak, 2006, p. 103). We know from the previous analysis that EU Delegations play a vital role in this respect.

Maintaining special ties with certain third countries can deliver material advantages, for example in economic terms or with regards to military strategic considerations. These were important reasons for European countries to conquer and colonize foreign lands in the first place. This, however, is not necessarily so. Ideas, ideological ties or traditions, such as in the form of religion, can also play a role. In any event, special ties have often become an integral part of the national interest of single EU members or they are in the institutional interest of certain Brussels-based institutions (Mancall, 1995, pp. 1, 4; Hoffman, 1983, p. 59; Hooghe, 1999).[6]

It became clear in the historical analysis of the Delegations that once a specific country had entered the EU, Commission Delegations were opened in third countries that the new member state has had special ties with. In the 1960s, for instance, Commission Delegations were mostly opened in former French and Belgian colonies. Nevertheless, the member states are unlikely to give up the management of the relationship to the local Delegation (Hocking, 2005a, p. 300; European diplomats, 2010). They will seek to keep their influence by maintaining strong national embassies in the third country. This makes the centralization of European diplomacy more challenging. In the case of future EU members, by contrast, the Commission may show a tendency to dominate the member states through its local Delegation. On this basis, a fifth and a sixth hypothesis can be formulated:

> H5: The closer the ties of a specific EU member state with a given third country are, the stronger the EU Delegation is *and* the stronger the member state embassy in question is. In such third countries, the level of centralization of European diplomacy is ambiguous.
>
> H6: The closer the ties of the European institutions with a given third country are, such as in the case of EU membership candidates, the more centralized European diplomacy is.

Some quantifiable empirical evidence could be gathered which tentatively confirms H5 that is the influence of special relations between EU

member states and third countries: all former colonial powers retain embassies in most if not all of their ex-colonies.[7] At the same time, the majority of these former colonies also host an EU Delegation or an EU office of some other sort. Table 4.1 gives an overview:

Table 4.1 Diplomatic representation of the EU and its member states in Former European colonies

Former colonial power	Former colonies	Former colonies with national representation (embassy or other office)	Former colonies with EU Delegation	Former colonies with EU office	Former colonies with EU accreditation only
UK	44	33	21	3	20
France	23	23	21	1	1
Spain	14	14	7	6	1
Portugal	7	7	6	0	1
Belgium	3	3	3	0	0
The Netherlands	2	2	1	1	0
Italy	1	1	1	0	0
Germany	1	1	1	0	0

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Concerning the comparison of the strength of embassies and the EUDs, it was beyond the scope of this study to gather information about the staff in the national embassies. However, the number of Delegation staff gives interesting insights as well. Thus, in the year 2008, during the negotiations to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, the EU staff in almost all former colonies was higher than the average number of staff in all Delegations worldwide (above 7.63; Laursen, 2012, p. 3; Ashton, 2009a). This is even true for the UK's former colonies. The UK is also the country with the highest number of ex-colonies that do not host an EU Delegation. This reflects the British weariness of the EU as a diplomatic player (United Press International, 2011). Portugal's former colonies have particularly well-staffed EU Delegations, whereas the former Spanish colonies have EUDs with a number of staff that is below the overall average (5.92). The latter is because they are mostly no full EUDs but lower-level offices (European Union, 2012b).

This may be due to a factor that is part of our main analysis, namely the level of development: the Spanish former colonies in Central and South America are not as underdeveloped as former colonies in Africa. Because development aid is one of the main tasks of the EUDs, a well-staffed, full-fledged EU Delegation does not come as a surprise. This would give support to hypothesis 1 of this study. However, Spain actively lobbied

against an early Lisbon-transformation in its former colonies. It sought to avoid a decrease in prestige of the Spanish EU Presidency in the first semester of 2010. This, by contrast, supports the view of Spain being weary of the EU as a diplomatic player, too (Rettman, 2010b).

Member states seek to control the EU from within as well, notably through the new option of sending national diplomats to work for the EEAS. During the last rotation round of EU Ambassadors in 2010, CEEC governments specifically targeted their applications to Delegations in neighboring countries. Finally, when it comes to the Commission's institutional interests, EU Delegations posted in prospective EU member states have additional budgets. This provides evidence for the special tie between EU institutions and third states based on future accession. Table 4.2 compares the average sum of administrative credits per EU Delegation with the administrative credits available in the Delegations located in future member states for the year 2009.

Table 4.2   Administrative credits per Delegation in comparison

Third country	Amount
Average administrative credits per Delegation (n = 107)	*2,329,408*
Average administrative credits per Delegation in future member states	*4,692,931*
Croatia	3,922,705
Iceland	n.d.
Macedonia	3,757,890
Montenegro	2,074,938
Turkey	8,458,568
Albania	2,625,649
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5,608,813
Serbia	6,401,951

Source: Compiled by the author (2012); data taken from Piebalgs (2010).

The evidence provided in Table 4.5 supports the assumption that influence of 'special ties' on the leeway of Delegations to centralize European diplomacy is crucial but often anecdotal in nature. Due to the variety of colonial relationships and other historical and institutional ties, it is hard to prove the fifth and sixth hypotheses with methodological rigor. It would take in-depth qualitative case study research to really find out about the exact impact of each type of special tie. Moreover, it is doubtful to what extent these special relationships can inhibit the centralization of European diplomacy systematically and in the long run. There are five main reasons for that. First, it is fair to assume that the higher the

density of embassies in a third country is, the smaller becomes the scope to make a difference for the embassy that represents a member state with 'special ties.' Second, the example of the Spanish attempt to safeguard its Presidency's prestige was of temporary nature only: the Presidency lasted six months and eventually all EU Delegations worldwide took over the Presidency in third countries. As previously discussed, a Presidency of an 'EU-27-Plus' has become a rare occasion anyway. Third, the decisions to open new Delegations now need to be taken formally in agreement with the Council and the Commission. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the member states will seek to inhibit the opening of a new EU Delegation altogether (Council of the European Union, 2010, Art. 5.1). After all, we have seen in Chapter 3 that the presence of an EUD bears numerous advantages for national embassies, for example outsourcing work. Fourth, it also depends on a member state's resources whether or not it can reach its goals in keeping up 'special ties' with regards to the EEAS. The CEEC governments' success in achieving their goals about making 'their countrymen' EU Ambassadors in the 2010 and 2011 rounds was rather limited (Formuszewicz and Kumoch, 2010, p. 5). But even though EU member states sometimes manage to bargain for the post of EU Ambassador in a third country of their choice, they cannot freely post 'their' diplomats to all priority locations. Murdoch et al. have shown how limited the power of member states has been when it comes to EEAS staff recruitment (Murdoch et al., 2013). Also, if member states manage to get a favorable posting, the role of the EU Ambassador is only one factor among many when it comes to centralizing European diplomacy (see Section 5.1). Fifth, once a new EU member has accessed the European Union, the additional resources of the local EU Delegations run out. In fact, EU Delegations are then turned into mere information offices since the relations with the new member are by definition no longer external in character. On top of that, there were only five official candidate countries when the main research for this book was conducted (Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Turkey). Two more countries, Norway and Switzerland, are members of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) respectively, which means that they are partly integrated into the EU framework. For the entire sample of 107 countries with full EU Delegations this does not weigh heavily.

For these reasons, it is sufficient to recognize the factor of 'special relationships,' for example by providing the aforementioned evidence. It is, however, not necessary to control for it in the quantitative analysis of steps 1 and 2, the analysis of the breadth of the Delegation network and the EUDs' capacity to internally coordinate European diplomacy

and externally represent the EU. However, it will guide the selection of third countries for the qualitative analysis of step 3, which is about the diplomatic professionalism of Delegations, meaning their similarity to traditional embassies.

With four concrete hypotheses at hand, based on the main theories of European integration, the analytical framework of this book is complete. I will now move on to testing these hypotheses to see why the EU can centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others.

5
Measuring European Diplomacy Centralization

Following the influential works of King, Keohane, and Verba, I subscribe to the view that the most appropriate way to conduct social sciences research is according to a clear, Positivist, research design (see King et al., 1994, pp. 12–27; Smith, 2008, p. 12; Popper, 2002b, p. 48). The relevant elements thereof, most of all an unambiguous research question and testable hypotheses, have been developed over the first four chapters of this book. The next step to take is to perform fair tests of the four hypotheses that were developed in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I will explain how to perform these tests.

As a first step, the definition of the dependent variable should be recalled. The level of centralization of European diplomacy is conceptualized as the formally assigned and informally obtained channeling of diplomatic activity in EU matters through the European Union's physical presence, the Union Delegations, in non-EU countries' capitals. To measure this abstract concept, an initial round of exploratory interviews based on semi-structured questionnaires was conducted in autumn 2010 so as to identify the most appropriate indicators.[1] After the interview round, data were gathered from the EEAS, the EU Delegations, EU member state foreign ministries, and third country foreign ministries. This was done by accessing online databases, archives, through consulting secondary literature, and through email, telephone, and face-to-face correspondence. Data were gathered for the end of the year 2010/beginning of 2011, which was about one year after the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty. This allows for meaningful observations of the role of EU Delegations after each of them was granted the new powers as described in Chapter 3.

Towards a 'European Diplomacy Centralization Index' (EU-DCI)

Quantitative Global Coverage: Indicators for the EU-DCI

As explained in the introductory chapter of this book, many scholarly of the EEAS so far lack a proper analytical framework. Moreover, scholarship on the EU's external relations is not sufficiently comparative. A main contribution of this book to remedy these weaknesses is what I call the 'EU Diplomacy Centralization Index' (EU-DCI), a tool to measure the impact of EU diplomacy in the world in a comprehensive and comparative fashion, covering not just one or a few non-EU countries, but most or even all of them. On the following pages, I will operationalize the dependent and independent variables and on that basis develop the EU-DCI.

As a first step, the population needs to be defined. In line with the previously discussed definition of embassies as physical presences of one sovereign nation-state in another, the population consists of the EU's diplomatic representations in sovereign nation-states. EU representations to disputed territories such as Palestine, special regions such as Hong Kong, or international organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the WTO, are excluded as these are not states. Based on the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, the list of what can be defined as a sovereign nation-state is longer than the list of members of the United Nations (International Conference of American States, 1933, Art. 1). Meanwhile, for some entities it is highly disputed if they are states or not, for example when they are merely recognized by one or just a few other sovereign states (such as for instance Kosovo, see Brown, 2005). Hence, UN membership is a better indicator for relatively undisputed sovereignty.

At the time the empirical data were collected, 192 sovereign nation-states were acknowledged by the United Nations.[2] Because this book is about the foreign relations of the EU, only sovereign nation-states outside the EU are being taken into account. This is why 27 EU member states are subtracted from the overall figure of 192.[3] Four European micro-states are also disregarded: San Marino, Monaco, Liechtenstein, and Andorra are in many ways dependent on other European states. They can be seen as *de facto* members of the EU (Duursma, 1996). That leaves 161 sovereign nation-states to be examined. Since governmental institutions of states are located in capital cities, other countries' embassies are placed there, too. Many countries maintain consulates and other representations in other locations, for instance port cities. However, these are usually dependent on a full embassy in the capital city. This is why I limit the examination to capital cities of third countries.

Having defined the population, the operationalization of the dependent variable now follows. Table 5.1 recalls the key aspects of the centralization level of European diplomacy in third states.

Table 5.1 Four aspects of the level of Centralization of European diplomacy in third states

1. Breadth of the EU Delegation network: presence/absence of fully fledged EU Delegations in third countries
2. Internal coordination of EU policy among EU Delegations and member state embassies via the EU Delegations
3. Unified external representation of the EU towards third countries via the EU Delegations
4. Diplomatic professionalism of the EU Delegation network: similarity of Delegations' profiles to traditional nation-state embassies

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Given its complexity, a single indicator would hardly capture the whole concept. This is why the analysis consists of several steps, covering each aspect of the DV concept at a time. Firstly, the breadth of the Delegation network will be analyzed. Secondly, the internal coordination of EU policy and external representation of the EU towards third countries will be analyzed in combination. The reason for this combination is that the chosen indicators essentially measure both aspects as we shall see later on. Thirdly, the diplomatic professionalism of the Delegation network will be analyzed, that is their similarity compared to ordinary embassies. In the following, I will explain the exact choice of indicators by giving a rationale and, where necessary, by briefly discussing the limitations of each indicator.

As far as step 1 is concerned, capturing the breadth of the Delegation network is relatively straightforward, namely by checking the presence or absence of an EU Delegation in a third country capital city.[4] Taking a closer look, counting the Delegations' presence is a little more complex because it can be divided into four levels: first, the presence of a full Delegation, including an EU Ambassador being posted in a given capital city; second, the presence of an EU office that is usually led by a *Chargé d'Affaires* and is dependent on a Delegation and the respective EU Ambassador in a neighboring country (see for example Delegation of the European Union to Cuba, 2012); third, the mere accreditation of a neighboring EU Delegation without the presence of an EU office in that capital city (see for example Delegation of the European Union to Jamaica, 2012); and fourth, neither an accreditation, nor the presence of an EU office (such as the DPRK; see Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Korea, 2012). Analyzing in which country we find what

type of EU presence gives a fundamental hunch on the 'different speeds' of European diplomacy.

In the course of the research, it became clear that the second category of 'EU offices' includes a great variety of types of representation. Some of them, such as the EU presence in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, are merely 'technical offices' with one local staff and no EU diplomats (Delegation of the European Union to Mongolia, 2012; European diplomat, 2010j). Others practically already function as EU Delegations except that the Ambassador is not present. This is for instance the case for Cambodia or Guatemala.[5] This variety raises doubt about 'EU offices' constituting a group that is homogeneous enough to be kept as a category for the analysis at hand. More importantly, most other aspects of the level of centralization of European diplomacy are dependent on the presence of a full EU Delegation. For example, only full EU Delegations have taken over the new Lisbon responsibilities and not lower level EU offices in third country capitals (Rettman, 2010b). The early or late transfer of the Lisbon responsibilities is one in several selected indicators as we will see below.

As for the final category, 'no diplomatic relations,' it turned out that the EU does not have any diplomatic relations with only two countries that are examined in this book: Iran and the North Korea. Considering that there are 161 observations in total, no relations at all are very exceptional. It is doubtful to keep it as a separate category. At this point we should recall Susan Strange's words that 'power can effectively be exercised by "being there"' (Strange, 1996, p. 26). Consequently, the breadth criterion of the centralization level of European diplomacy will be captured with a binary categorical indicator, namely 'presence/absence of a full EU Delegation' for all 161 third states that are subject to examination.

Let us move on to the second step: the operationalization of the aspects of internal coordination and external representation of European diplomacy. Since the respective indicators for both these aspects are highly dependent on the presence of a fully fledged EU Delegation, a sample of the population needs to be drawn for step 2: only the full EU Delegations in third states, which were 107 at the end of 2010/beginning of 2011, will be examined.

In order to capture the capacity of the EU to internally coordinate and unify the external representation of the EU abroad, I settled for five different indicators. The first one measures the strength of the member state embassies in third countries; the other four indicators measure the strength of the EU Delegations in third countries. The five indicators are firstly, the number of member state embassies in a third country; secondly, the number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation; thirdly, the

seniority of the Head of an EU Delegation; fourthly, the career path of the Head of Delegation, that is whether he or she is an EU official or a diplomat from a national foreign service; and fifthly, whether the EU Delegation has experienced an early Lisbon transformation or not.

Each of these indicators will be analyzed separately at first. The purpose is to find out which indicators are really relevant in determining the level of centralization of European diplomacy. Since such an encompassing examination of EU Delegations has not yet been conducted before, this exercise adds an exploratory element. This is relevant also with a view to the evaluation of the EEAS, which has been published in mid-2013 (Ashton, 2013).

Subsequent to the separate analysis, I will combine them in a ten-point index, the aforementioned 'European Diplomacy Centralization Index' (EU-DCI). The purpose thereof is to make step 2 of the empirical analysis clearly *one* step that captures internal coordination and external representation of European diplomacy as a whole. The more points a third country yields on the EU-DCI, the easier it is for the local EU Delegation to centralize internal coordination of European diplomacy and its external representation. Each indicator has theoretical and / or practical possibilities and limitations. I will attach different weight to them by distributing a certain amount of points on the EU-DCI. The rationale for the indicators in general and for the point distribution in particular will now be discussed.

As for the first indicator, the number of member state embassies in each of the 107 third country capital cities was counted. Regarding internal coordination, the underlying reasoning behind it is that '[t]he number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens' (Schattschneider, 1964 in Hanrieder, 1978, p. 1279). It is assumed that a small number of national embassies and diplomats from member state MFAs imply relatively easy coordination. By contrast, it becomes more difficult the more people sit around the table of European diplomats abroad. To be sure, a limited number of diplomats representing EU member states do not *per se* guarantee a common voice, meaning a high level of diplomacy centralization. On some issues and in a country where all member states are represented, each national embassy and the EU Delegation may convey one and the same message to the host state government. Meanwhile, there may be other countries with only five or seven EU members being represented, but who communicate highly diverse or even contradicting views on a given matter. Overall, the initial interview round has nevertheless shown that coordination certainly becomes more challenging if more people sit around the table.

The number of EU member state embassies in a third country is also a suitable measure for unified external representation. The reason is that the fewer national embassies there are the higher is the relative degree of interaction of the local state authorities with the EUD rather than with the national embassies. Consequently, one can assume a higher visibility of the EUD compared to the national embassies. This in turn increases the level of unified external representation towards a given third country. For the ten-point scale of the European Diplomacy Centralization Index, between zero and three points will be allocated depending on how many member state embassies are present.

Since there are only five indicators in total for the analysis of internal coordination and external representation via EU Delegations, the distribution of up to three points for the first indicator (the strength of EU member states' embassies) implies that quite some weight is attached to this one. One reason is that gathering data relating to the resources and working conditions of the embassy networks of all member states was hardly possible in the framework of this research project.[6] However, based on the exploratory interview round, it is fair to assume that the higher the number of EU member state embassies in a given country is, the richer the resources are for each embassy.

But even if there are many national embassies, this can at least partly be balanced through a strong local EU Delegation. It became clear in Chapter 3 that the EU Delegations are more complex compared to ordinary embassies. Hence, the measurement for the EUD resources and conditions that are decisive for internal coordination and external representation of European diplomacy needs to be more complex as well. As mentioned above, I settled for four more indicators that will now be explained and discussed in turn.

Indicator 2 is the number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation.[7] The rationale behind examining the human resources in an EUD is that more manpower allows the EUD to better deal with the administrative workload that comes with internal coordination. Furthermore, a higher number of staff also increases the interaction with the host state's administration. This in turn centralizes external representation. The number of staff should be treated with some caution because it overstates the human resources of so-called regionalized Delegations. These are the 22 EUDs that are responsible not only for the host country but also for one or more neighboring states.[8] The opportunities and limitations are incorporated through a respective weighting in the overall European Diplomacy Centralization Index: between zero and three points for the number of EUD staff are distributed.

Indicator 3 is the seniority of the Head of each EU Delegation (HoD) as measured by the grade level in the EU's bureaucratic hierarchy.[9] The highest of EU officials are part of the 'administrator function group' (abbreviated 'AD'). There are in total 12 grade levels, from AD 5 to AD 16. The rationale behind this indicator is the more senior the HoD is, the more experience he or she has with internal coordination of European diplomacy on the ground. A more senior official is also likely to be more accepted by the local host government, which further strengthens centralized external representation. After all, up to this day, people of 'high standing,' that are 'socially eminent' and 'generally of advanced age' can climb up the career ladder to become Ambassadors within foreign services (de Magalhães, 1988, p. 19). The problem about HoD seniority is that it can hardly capture the personality of a Delegation chief. This is not unimportant for a unified external representation as well as internal coordination (House et al., 1991, p. 364). It also understates the role of the other EUD staff. Consequently, between zero and two points are allocated, depending on the HoD's seniority.

As a fourth indicator – and thereby incorporating the important Lisbon-innovation of bringing together national with supranational diplomats – the career background of the Heads of the EU Delegations will be checked. The crucial variation here is whether the HoD is an EU official or a diplomat from a member state foreign service. It is fair to assume that the vast majority of EU Ambassadors take a very professional approach and truly seek to represent the Union. After all, they are accountable to Brussels and not of any national EU capital. Nevertheless, previous research has confirmed that EU officials tend to have a more developed 'Community reflex' based on a long experience in negotiating and compromising among EU member states (Pierini, 1983, p. 13; Niemann, 1998, p. 436; Beyers, 2005). An EU official at the helm of a Delegation is likely to increase the level of internal coordination. This Community reflex is not just due to internalized European norms but also due to rational considerations (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). Under the current EEAS-rules, the affiliation of HoDs from national foreign services with the EEAS is only temporary. With a rather clear view of going back to the national capital at some point, the place where they have been socialized for most of their career, their loyalty to the respective national diplomatic service remains in place (Council of the European Union, 2010; European diplomat, 2011d; Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 2). While this is true for all nationally recruited EEAS staff, it is most relevant for the highest post in a Delegation, that of the EU Ambassador.

There is one problem about this indicator: due to circulating posts of diplomats every four years, the new recruitment rules only applied to those Delegations where the incumbent HoD's term had come to an end already. Thus, in September 2010, 27 new HoDs were recruited on that basis, and in August 2011, another 25 (European Union, 2010; Council of the European Union, 2011). Taking this into consideration, one point on the European Diplomacy Centralization Index will be distributed if an EU Delegation has an EU official at its helm. Zero points will be given if he or she is staff from one of the member states' MFAs. All Delegations with an Ambassador from the pre-Lisbon era, whose term has not yet come to an end, will be held constant by giving 0.5 points each.

Finally, and as indicated in the very beginning of this book, the successive transformation of EU Delegations according to the Lisbon Treaty will be looked at. We have seen in the third chapter that the impact of Lisbon on internal coordination and external representation has been considerable. It was also found out that some Delegations experienced an early transformation (meaning in January 2010) while others were transformed later than that (in July 2010 or even later).[10] Apparently, Delegations in some third country capitals were generally more 'ready' than others for a higher level of European diplomacy centralization (European diplomat, 2010j). Finding out which countries were the 'early birds' and which were the late-runners can deliver interesting results about the factors that trigger a high or low level of the centralization of European diplomacy. It should not be forgotten that, sooner or later all full EU Delegations will have been transformed. Consequently, this indicator should not be given too much weight: one point for an early Lisbon transformation on the EU-DCI scale, and zero points for a late Lisbon transformation will be distributed.

Before moving on to the operationalization of the independent variables, Table 5.2 gives an overview of all indicators to operationalize the dependent variable: the level of centralization of European diplomacy in third countries.

Having operationalized the dependent variable, we move on to the independent variables. Here, the operationalization is relatively straightforward since the IVs are measured with one indicator each, which are all based on established indexes. In line with the time frame of analyzing EU Delegations in late 2010/beginning of 2011, data for these indexes were gathered for the year 2010 or the year that was closest to 2010.

Recalling the first hypothesis, it is expected that the less developed a third country is, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. The first IV is the level of development of a third country. This

Table 5.2 Operationalization of the DV: level of centralization of European diplomacy

Aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy	Indicator
Step 1: Breadth of the EUD network → quantitative analysis, covering EU representation to all 161 non-EU sovereign nation-states	1.1. Presence/absence of fully fledged EU Delegation

Step 2: Internal coordination of EU policy and unified external representation of the EU abroad
 	
→ quantitative analysis, covering all 107 fully fledged EU Delegation to non-EU sovereign nation-states
→ eventually summed up to a ten-point scale, the European Diplomacy Centralization Index (EU-DCI)
→ Distinction between indicators about the Relationship of EU Delegations to member state embassies (2.1), and indicators relating to the EUD resources and conditions (2.2 to 2.5)
	2.1 Number of member state embassies in a third country capital
	  – 0: 3 points
	  – 1–5: 2.5 points
	  – 6–10: 2 points
	  – 11–15: 1.5 points
	  – 16–20: 1 point
	  – 21–26: 0.5 points
	  – all 27: 0 points
	
	2.2 EU staff per EUD:
	  – above 12: 3 points
	  – 9–12: 2 point
	  – 5–8: 1 point
	  – 1–4: 0 points
	
	2.3 HoD seniority according to Administrator level
	  – AD 15–16: 2 point
	  – AD 12–14: 1 points
	  – AD 11 and below: 0 points
	
	2.4 Origin of the Head of the EU Delegation
	  – EU official: 1 point
	  – Member state diplomat: 0 point
	
	2.5 Lisbon transformation
	  – early Lisbon transformation: 1 point
	  – late Lisbon transformation: 0 points
	  – (Not yet transformed: held constant at 0.5)

Step 3: Diplomatic professionalism of the EU Delegations → qualitative analysis, covering EU representation in five selected third countries (selection to be discussed in Section 5.2)	3.1 Self-conception and task profile of EUDs 3.2 Self-conception and task profile of member state embassies 3.3 Third countries' conception of the EU as a diplomatic player

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

variable is measured based on the ranking of the Human Development Index (HDI). As it was developed in the framework of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it is the tool of choice by the UN to measure how developed countries worldwide are (United Nations Development Programme, 2011a). The HDI is an index composed of three different items. Putting together life expectancy, education, and standard of living, the HDI was developed to capture development in a more encompassing way than merely through the GDP size of a given country (United Nations Development Programme, 2011b).

The HDI has been criticized for not including certain items such as on the environmental quality of life. Moreover, some economists consider the HDI to be outright redundant as it highly correlates with a simple GDP per capita ranking. Others criticize the HDI for using unreliable data that has led to questionable categorizations of some countries (Neumayer, 2001; McGillivray, 1991, p. 1465; Wolff et al., 2011). Despite these criticisms, the HDI has become a major reference index in development studies (see for example Faye et al., 2004, p. 32). More importantly, the HDI captures well what the EU's role in global development is about: the latter's primary objective is the eradication of poverty in the light of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs' progress is predominantly measured with the HDI (European Commission, 2012c). On a practical note, the HDI for the year 2010 has a quite universal coverage which rounds off the arguments in favor of it (see United Nations Development Programme, 2010).

Going into the concrete details of measurement, the HDI statistic that is being calculated is a score per country between zero and one. The higher the figure, the more developed a given country is (United Nations Development Programme, 2010a). For the quantitative analysis of steps 1 and 2, the entire HDI ranking from highest to lowest performing third country can simply be used. For the qualitative analysis of step 3, the scale should be divided into categories so as to perform the case selection. This division will be made later.

As a second hypothesis, it is expected that the lower the strategic importance of a third country, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. The second IV of strategic importance is operationalized on the basis of the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). The latest data at the time of research were those of 2007. The CINC is a statistical measure for national power. It was developed by J. David Singer and his well-known 'Correlates of War' project (Singer et al., 1972). Singer's approach to measure national power is resource oriented. He considers the three dimensions of military, demographic,

and economic strength as the fundamentals for a state to have influence over outcomes in international relations. There are six items, two for each dimension, which Singer combines and weighs in equal terms. Because power is a relative concept, most of the six items are measured as ratios or shares of one country compared to the entire world's total: first, a state's population; second, its urban population; third, its iron and steel production; fourth, its primary energy consumption; fifth, its military expenditure; sixth, its military personnel.

There are many alternative ways to measure national power. A number of scholars criticize that Singer's index purely looks at hard resources. It misses the political power over actors, and the fact that not all types of capabilities are fungible for all situations (Baldwin, 2005; cf. Strange, 1996, pp. 17–8). Organski and Kugler, therefore, tried to include political power more directly in their index, which puts emphasis on the taxing capacity of a given state (Organski and Kugler, 1991). Other scholars are more radical and see 'capabilities and resources [overall] as a poor way of judging relative power' (Strange, 1996, p. 25). This is all the more the case due to the increasing importance of so-called soft power in contemporary global politics (Nye, 2004). Nevertheless, the CINC is well-known and widely used to measure national capabilities and to operationalize strategic importance. More importantly, hypothesis 2 shall test the validity of Realism-based theories of European integration. As a consequence, power needs to be measured in a traditional Realist way, which the CINC does. On a practical note, the concrete statistic is a figure between zero and one, where one represents all states' capabilities added up. The CINC has the advantage that it is universal as it covers all 161 third states with which the EU can have diplomatic relations and a respective local presence.

Recalling the third hypothesis, it is expected that the higher the economic importance of a third country is, the stronger the EU Delegation *and* the stronger member state embassies are. Hence, in countries of high economic importance, the level of centralization of European diplomacy is ambiguous. The third IV is therefore the economic importance of a third country. This will be operationalized by checking the trade volume of the third country with the EU. The European Commission publishes a list of top ten trading partners of the EU on an annual basis. More precisely, it looks at the sum of EU exports and imports in million Euros per year with all third countries (European Commission – DG Trade, 2010).

Despite its straightforward character, this indicator does not come without any obstacles. For once, economic aspects are partly already integrated in the CINC. Indeed, there is likely to be some correlation

between the second and the third IV if we think, for example, of the United States or China. After all, capabilities such as military strength need to be financed, and states make money by trading with other states. Taking a closer look, the economic resources measured in the CINC, for instance iron and steel production and the consumption of energy, are quite different from overall trade. More importantly, the latter expresses the economic relationship between the EU and third states. This aspect is missing if we only look at the amount of resources and the presence or absence of nuclear weapons. A final argument in favor of the indicator of trade volume is that data are available for all 161 non-EU countries under examination (European Commission – DG Trade, 2010).

Recalling the final hypothesis, I expect that the more different the political culture of a third country is compared to the EU member states' political culture, the more centralized European diplomacy in that country is. The fourth and final independent variable is the similarity of political culture of a given third country compared to the EU member states. Although measuring a rich and abstract concept such as culture is notoriously difficult, there is a long tradition in doing so, notably in the field of international management (Taras et al., 2009). Similar systematic methods have also been applied to the fields of IR and EU studies (Wirt, 1991; Brummer, 2009).

For this study, the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership, which were discussed in Chapter 4, provide the conceptual basis to operationalize the EU's political culture. Most of the third states under investigation are unlikely to actually join the EU. However, the political and the economic dimension of the Copenhagen Criteria are an appropriate point of reference to conceptualize the EU's political culture. The Copenhagen Criteria's political dimension consists of four aspects: democracy, rule of law, human rights, and minority protection. The economic dimension requires future member states 'to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union' (Council of the European Union, 1993; European Union, 2010, Art. 2 and 3).

Regarding the political dimension, all aspects are covered through the index produced in the annual survey 'Freedom in the World' by the US-based think tank Freedom House, which was founded as early as 1941. Freedom House takes the UN Declaration of Human Rights as the most basic reference to capture the concept of freedom. Thereafter, the think tank distinguishes two broad categories to measuring how free a country is: firstly political rights, including the participation of individuals in free and fair elections; and secondly, civil liberties, namely freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule

of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights such as access to private property (Freedom House, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).

Conceptually, this is congruent with the political Copenhagen Criteria, which are further distinguished into three aspects: firstly, a government based on electoral processes that meet democratic standards, notably universal, free, fair, and secret elections; secondly, political pluralism and sufficient space for citizens' participation; and thirdly, a government that actually functions (for instance, as opposed to a 'failed state'; Council of the European Union, 1993; Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, 2005).

The practical advantage of the Freedom House survey is that it relies on a broad range of sources, including news, NGO reports, academic research, or field work in a given country (Freedom House, 2012a, 2012b). The end result is a ranking between one and seven, where one stands for 'most free' and seven means 'least free.' Similar to the HDI, the developers of the Freedom House survey group all countries into categories, notably 'free' (score of 1.0 to 2.5), 'partly free' (3.0 to 5.0), and 'unfree' countries (5.5 to 7.0; Freedom House, 2012b). There have been some scholarly controversies about Freedom House's ratings being biased (Steiner, 2011). Despite such critique, the reports produced by Freedom House are widely used in political science research. Most importantly, they approximate the ideal of the Copenhagen Criteria. Beyond that, the survey is also encompassing, covering '194 countries and 14 related and disputed territories' (Freedom House, 2010a).

Whereas the Freedom House survey is an integral part to approximating the fourth IV of political culture, it is incomplete. The reason is that the Copenhagen Criteria also include an economic dimension. After all, the internal market is still at the heart of European integration (European Union, 2010, Art. 3.3; Council of the European Union, 1993). This Copenhagen Criterion will be operationalized through the 'Index of Economic Freedom' by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. The former is an American conservative think tank (Miller and Holmes, 2010; The Heritage Foundation, 2012). 'Conservative' in the American context implies views that are economically liberal. The conceptual basis of the Index of Economic Freedom is rooted in the works of Adam Smith. It essentially measures the existence and effectiveness of rules and institutions in a given country (or territory) to protect the ability of each individual to pursue his or her economic interests. Hence, the more economically open a country is, the more apt it is to fulfill the economic dimension of the Copenhagen Criteria. The Index of Economic Freedom is composed of ten categories such as the freedom

to start a business, property rights, or the absence of corruption. The eventual score per country is a figure between zero and 100. A score of 100 stands for perfect economic freedom.

The data are taken from trustworthy sources such as the International Monetary Fund or the OECD. Nonetheless, the Index's authors have had to face criticism for the unclear categories that it uses (Miller and Holmes, 2010; Karlsson, 2005). However, the Index of Economic Freedom still reflects the Copenhagen Criterion and the EU institutions' agenda, notably that of the Commission. Finally, it is available for virtually all sovereign nation-states (Scharpf, 1999 in Moravcsik, 2002, p. 617). In summary, it is an appropriate indicator to capture the economic dimension of the Union's political culture.

The calculation of my new composite index to measure the similarity of a third state's political culture compared to the EU is more sophisticated compared to the previous IV indicators. The reason is that two different indexes are combined, the Freedom House scale of one to seven points and the Index of Economic Freedom ranging from zero to 100. Moreover, the two different scores should not be weighted equally. Since four out of the five Copenhagen Criteria are about political aspects and only one about economic aspects, the Freedom House survey results will be weighted more heavily than the Index of Economic Freedom. The ratio will be 4:1. I will translate each score accordingly and create a scale of zero to five points for the new 'Index of Political Culture' (hereafter called PolitCult Index). A PolitCult score of close to zero implies that a third country is far from meeting the Copenhagen Criteria; a score of close to five implies that a third country would clearly fulfill the 'European ideal' as circumscribed by the Copenhagen Criteria.

In this context, it should indeed be stressed that the Copenhagen Criteria are in fact an ideal, given the moves towards non-liberal policies in recent years, such as in Italy under Berlusconi (see Bauböck, 2002, p. 10), in Hungary under Victor Orban (see Traynor, 2011), or, more recently, in Romania (see Euractiv, 2012). Nonetheless, the European Commission and the incumbent members thoroughly check that every state aspiring EU membership fulfills the Copenhagen Criteria. Moreover, the average PolitCult value for the EU member states is actually 4.61, which is quite close to the ideal of five points, especially when comparing it to the average PolitCult value for countries outside of the EU (2.76). In that sense, it is fair to say that the European countries rather successfully strive for a common political culture. Table 5.3 summarizes the operationalization of the independent variables once more.

Table 5.3   Overview: operationalization of the independent variables

Independent variables	IV indicators	Measurement
IV 1: Level of development of a third state	Human Development Index (HDI), 2010	HDI score between 0.000 and 0.999
IV 2: Strategic importance of a third state	Composite Index of National Capability, 2007	CINC score between 0–1
IV 3: Economic importance of a third state	Third country's trade volume with EU, 2009	Trade volume with EU in million EUR
IV 4: Political culture of a third state	Own PolitCult Index, composed of Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey, 2010, and Index of Economic Freedom, 2010	PolitCult score between 0 and 5

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

So far, I have operationalized both, the dependent variable the four independent variables for the first two steps of the analysis: the breadth of the EUD network, and the internal coordination and external representation via EU Delegations. Both these steps allow for a quantitative analysis, thereby covering the EU's diplomatic representation all over the world, which forms the basis of the European Diplomacy Centralization Index (EU-DCI). The third step, however, which analyzes the diplomatic professionalism of the Delegations, is of qualitative nature and requires a selection of cases. Both, the case selection and the operationalization for this third step will be done in the next section.

Qualitative zoom-in: China and comparative cases

Having arrived at the third step of the analysis, it must be discussed how to operationalize the degree of diplomatic professionalism of the EUD network. Diplomatic professionalism refers to the similarity of the Delegations' profile to ordinary embassies. The idea behind this indicator is that due to the hierarchical structure of diplomatic representation, EU Delegations need to be acknowledged and recognized by the in-group of nation-state diplomats (Neumann, 2007, p. 13). This can best be done by becoming 'one of them'; not only *de jure* such as through the Lisbon Treaty, but also in the perception of the other, 'traditional' diplomats. As previously mentioned, this part of the analysis will be based on qualitative data. Three different indicators are examined: firstly, the self-conception and the task profile seen from the perspective of the EUDs; secondly, the

self-conception and task profile seen from the perspective of the member state embassies; and thirdly, third countries' conception of the EU as a diplomatic player based on their representations in Brussels.

Most data are available online on the websites of the EUDs, of the member state embassies in third countries, and of the missions of third countries to the EU in Brussels. Additional information was gathered from diplomatic lists and via email and telephone correspondence. The websites will be analyzed regarding the question to what extent the EUDs' and embassies' tasks are congruent with the tasks of embassies according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It will also be checked to what degree the EUDs and the embassies deal with classical high politics. The logic is, the more congruent the EUDs' tasks are with the Vienna Convention and the more they deal with classical high politics, the more similar EU Delegations are to ordinary embassies. This strengthens their capacity to centralize European diplomacy. However, this centralization potential is mitigated if the local member state embassies also work in a traditional way. It will be investigated if the relationship between EUDs and national embassies is taken up and clarified. An example would be the explicit description of the areas that the EUD does not handle so as to emphasize the non-interfering, complementary character of the EUD's tasks alongside the national embassies.

Due to constraints in resources, websites are not always updated to the same level. Nevertheless, public diplomacy gains more and more importance. Maintaining a regularly updated website, and spending considerable time and other resources on web content and layout, has become key for foreign services (Smith and Sutherland, 2002, p. 48). In the course of the empirical data collection, it became clear that all three parties, the EEAS, the national MFAs, and third states' MFAs pay much attention to their online representation. Even if they do not do so, this is very likely to be linked to the characteristics of the third country where they operate. This can also be valuable evidence for the analysis at hand. Overall, websites are a good reflection of what the EUDs and the embassies do, and which of these tasks they consider most important.[11]

Having settled what data will be gathered and analyzed, we need to turn to the case selection. To avoid the problem of too many degrees of freedom, at least five cases must be selected to perform the qualitative analysis of step 3 (King et al., 1994, p. 120). For each hypothesis tested, three IVs need to be held constant while letting one IV vary at a time. Given the sample of 107 third states with a full EU Delegation, there is more than one single combination of fitting cases. But not all of these combinations are equally interesting and relevant. In order to

match cases, it is practical to choose a first case of high political, social, and scientific significance and match the comparative cases accordingly (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, 2007a, p. 15).

The current global political climate is marked by a serious crisis in Europe on the one hand and by the rise of emerging powers on the other. There are good reasons to claim that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the 'shining star' among the rising states. China has become a key third state when it comes to finding solutions to the European debt crisis. The visit of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Beijing in February 2012 exemplifies this. During that visit, the arguably most powerful European Head of government asked China 'for help'; not just to solve the Euro-crisis, but also in geopolitical matters such as the civil war in Syria and Iran's role in global politics (Sandschneider, 2011; Jacques, 2012; Der Spiegel, 2012).

Despite China's importance, it has been widely criticized that the EU is incapable of speaking with one voice to Beijing. The two examples that are most frequently cited to prove this point are firstly, the EU arms embargo, and secondly, the issue of granting China market economy status (MES) within the rules framework of the WTO (Smith, 2006; Fox and Godement, 2009; Gaenssmantel, 2010, p. 379). The arms embargo has been put in place on human rights grounds, sanctioning the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. It has not been lifted because all EU member states have to unanimously agree to such a decision. This has not happened until today. In 2005, under the leadership of the former German Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac, an agreement to put an end to the embargo seemed close. However, the Council eventually decided against it (Tang, 2005, p. 317; Rettman, 2011b; Deutsche Welle, no date). The same goes for the MES within the WTO: attempts were made at granting China the MES, but so far EU member states have not achieved unanimous agreement (see Rémond, 2007; Willis, 2010a).

For both of these conflicts, the differences in member state interests seem too big to be overcome. It was hoped that the EEAS and most of all Lady Ashton would be able to mitigate the problem of disunity by acting as a single European interlocutor to deal with EU-China matters. The reaction by the EU and its members to the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the Chinese writer and human rights activist Liu Xiaobo in 2010 was disappointing in that respect: the community of Ambassadors posted in Oslo were all invited to attend the Nobel Prize award ceremony. Since the PRC's leadership considers Liu Xiaobo a criminal that seeks to overthrow the Chinese government, the PRC asked all Oslo-based Ambassadors not to attend the ceremony. Indicating once more

the lack of one voice, only a minority of the 23 Union member state Ambassadors posted in Oslo as well as the Head of the local EU Delegation confirmed their attendance right away, disregarding the Chinese bid. Germany quickly confirmed as well but merely sent the Deputy Head of its embassy in Norway to the ceremony. The other EU member states eventually attended, but confirmed much later (European diplomats, 2010; Bristow, 2010; China Radio International, 2010a, 2010b; Moskwa and Fouche, 2010; Ashton, 2011).

This did not seem to put off Catherine Ashton who shortly thereafter came up with a proposal to lift the arms embargo. France and Spain supported the initiative, but the proposal was rejected by the UK and other countries. Again, a unanimous decision could not be taken (Rettman, 2011b). As previously mentioned, a similar problem occurred when the EU Ambassador to China spoke out against the detention of Chinese artist Ai Weiwei in April 2011. Although all the Beijing-based Ambassadors 'agreed on the text,' they did not give the Head of the EU Delegation the permission to speak on behalf of the EU as a whole.

Based on such evidence, one may be tempted to dismiss the EEAS to make a real difference when it comes to centralizing European diplomacy towards China. However, this judgment should be treated with care as it is largely based on anecdotal evidence. Until now, there is no study that approaches the issue of the EU as a diplomatic player in an encompassing way based on stable, long-term evidence. This book closes this research gap, notably with the encompassing evidence of steps 1 and 2 of the analysis, which covers the breadth, the internal coordination, and the external representation via EU Delegations.

As far as the qualitative third step of the analysis on the professionalism of EU Delegations is concerned, taking China as a starting point is promising. This is due to the social relevance of China in global politics. More importantly for this book, China is a scientifically decisive case: if we apply the four general hypotheses about the level of centralization of European diplomacy to the case of China, the expectations are quite different from the common judgment of 'no common voice in Beijing':

- *H1:* Despite significant improvements since the 1980s, China is still a developing country in many ways. It has an HDI of just 0.660, a vast rich-poor gap, immense environmental and social problems, and numerous other issues of domestic development have yet to be tackled and solved (cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2011c). Following the logic of H1, a high level of centralization of European diplomacy in Beijing can be expected.

- *H2:* China is a strategically highly important country. It ranks first on the CINC index and it is one of the very few states worldwide possessing nuclear weapons (Singer et al., 1972; Kristensen, 2012). Despite China's geographical distance from Europe, this makes the PRC important for European security as well. Following the logic of H2, and contradicting to the expectations of H1, a low level of centralization of European diplomacy in Beijing can be expected.
- *H3:* China is the EU's second most important trading partner after the US (European Commission – DG Trade, 2010). As mentioned above, its economic weight plays a decisive role in the current European debt crisis and for the global economy at large. Following the logic of H3, the EU Delegation in Beijing should be very strong – but also the member state embassies, leading to an ambiguous level of centralization of European diplomacy in the PRC's capital.
- *H4:* Despite its economic reform policy, which has led to opening and reform in other areas as well, the PRC is still ruled by an authoritarian one-party government (Freedom House, 2010b; Dreyer, 2012). Its political culture, including the way the PRC's government controls the economy, is very different from Europe (Miller and Holmes, 2010). Following the logic of H4, a high level of centralization of European diplomacy in Beijing can be expected.

Different theories of European integration thus provide different predictions about European diplomacy centralization towards China. This substantially challenges the popular view of a lack of a common European voice towards China. It makes China an interesting testing ground for the validity of the different theories. For this reason, I will take the EU's diplomatic representation in Beijing as the first case to study for the qualitative analysis of step 3.

Taking into account the need to control for special relations, China is a good choice as well: although some Chinese cities have been under the control of former colonial powers, notably the UK, France, and Germany, European states have never colonized the entire country (Osterhammel and Mommsen, 1986). China belonged to the Communist block during the Cold War. However, because of the Sino-Soviet split in 1964, relations to the former Communist countries and today's CEEC Union members were limited (Luthi, 2008). In that sense, Chinese relations to any single country or a group of Union member states are not particularly 'special' (European diplomat, 2010j). Needless to say, China is not a country with any prospects of entering the EU, which does not increase the institutional interest of the Commission on that front.

To judge how centralized European diplomacy in Beijing actually is, China must be compared with four other cases. These cases need to be selected in an effort to hold three variables constant and let one factor vary at a time. In order to do so, we should next remember the exact operationalization of the independent variables. Table 5.4 provides an overview:

Table 5.4   Overview: operationalization of the independent variables for steps 1 and 2

Independent variables	IV indicators	Measurement
IV 1: Level of development of a third state	Human Development Index (HDI), 2010	HDI score between 0.000 and 0.999
IV 2: Strategic importance of a third state	Composite Index of National Capability, 2007	CINC score between 0–1
IV 3: Economic importance of a third state	Third country's trade volume with EU, 2009	Trade volume with EU in million EUR
IV 4: Political culture of a third state	Own PolitCult Index, composed of Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey, 2010, and Index of Economic Freedom, 2010	PolitCult score between 0 and 5

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

The indicators are operationalized through continuous ordinal or scale measurement. This measurement is appropriate for the quantitative analysis of steps 1 and 2, which analyze the breadth of the Delegation network and the EU's capacity to internally coordinate and externally represent European diplomacy. To perform the case selection for the qualitative analysis of step 3, which analyzes the diplomatic professionalism of the Delegations, the IV indicators should be recoded into sensible binary categories.

Starting with IV 1, the level of development, the economists who came up with the HDI differentiate among four categories: 'very high human development' (HDI above 0.790), 'high human development' (HDI between 0.789 and 0.700), 'medium human development' (HDI between 0.699 and 0.520), and 'low human development' (HDI below 0.519; United Nations Development Programme, 2010b). Regarding the usual distinction of developed versus developing countries, the HDI statisticians only consider countries with a 'very high level of human development' to be part of the group of developed countries (Sumner and Tribe, 2008, p. 11). Somewhat paradoxically, countries with a 'high

level of development' are still considered to be developing countries according to the HDI (United Nations Development Programme, 2010c). Although most of the EU members are *very* highly developed countries in HDI terms, some of them belong to the second category, for example Bulgaria and Romania. Of course, the EU itself does not consider its members to be developing countries. The same goes for third states that are in that second HDI category such as the Russian Federation or Lebanon. These countries are not targets of EU development aid.[12] The EU and its Delegations' role in development aid are, however, at the heart of the first hypothesis. It is therefore sensible to fuse the first two HDI categories (very high and high development) and distinguish this new category from the rest. As far as the case selection for step 3 is concerned, I will distinguish 'developed countries' (HDI above 0.700) from 'developing countries' (HDI below 0.700).

Let us move on to IV 2, the strategic importance of a third country. Few scholars would deny that the bipolar global political structure has been transformed since 1989, thereby including new key players. However, the number of countries that are of real strategic importance for global security is still limited. Hence, I will make use of a binary category that distinguishes the (non-EU) countries with the top ten CINC-scores from the rest. Additionally, the presence/absence of nuclear weapons for a given third country will be checked. The possession of nuclear weapons dramatically increases the strategic significance of a country in world politics (Sagan, 1996).

Recoding IV 3, the economic importance of a third state, into a binary categorical variable is similarly straightforward, namely by checking if a third country is within or outside the group of the top ten trading partners of the EU.

Finally, the PolitCult Index which measures the similarity of a third country's political culture compared to the EU, will be split into countries with a value above 3.00 and countries with a value below 3.00. Three out of five points constitutes over 60 percent of the maximum score on the PolitCult Index. Such a score is fairly close to potentially meeting the Copenhagen Criteria, especially if we consider that the EU's own PolitCult Index mean value is 4.61 and not the ideal value of 5.00, and that the mean value of all third countries is 2.76. Table 5.5 summarizes the recoded independent variables.

One should first select on the independent variable that narrows down the number of relevant cases most significantly. Due to the limited number of states that possess nuclear weapons, this would be IV 2, the strategic importance of a third country. Apart from China, there are four other non-EU countries with a full EU Delegation that are within the top ten CINC ranking and that possess nuclear weapons: Russia, Pakistan,

Table 5.5   Overview: operationalization of the independent variables for step 3

Independent variables	IV indicators	Binary categorical measurement
IV 1: Level of development of a third state	Human Development Index (HDI), 2010	Developed country (HDI score above 0.700)/ developing country (HDI score below 0.700)
IV 2: Strategic importance of a third state	Composite Index of National Capability, 2007	Within/outside of first top ten CINC countries, combined with presence/absence of nuclear weapons (NW)
IV 3: Economic importance of a third state	Third country's trade volume with EU, 2009	Within/outside of top ten EU trading partners
IV 4: Political culture of a third state	Own PolitCult Index, composed of Freedom House's 'Freedom in the World' survey, 2010, and Index of Economic Freedom, 2010	PolitCult score above/ below of three points out of five

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

the USA, and India. However, only four of these five countries will be part of the case selection. This is because one case is needed that does not belong to the top ten CINC nuclear powers to avoid indeterminacy regarding the second hypothesis. To find out which of these five countries should be replaced, it must be checked how the five countries score on the other independent variables. For that purpose, Table 5.6 is helpful. It shows that the USA is a problematic case. Compared to the other four countries it differs on two variables, the level of development and the similarity of political culture. To match the other cases, the US should be replaced with a developing country that is among the top trading partners of the EU. Moreover, this country should not be significant in terms of strategic importance as measured by its national capabilities. Finally, it should exhibit a substantial difference in terms of political culture compared to the EU. As the third IV, economic importance, limits the number of potential cases to ten, the top end of the list of EU trading partners should be checked with the help of Table 5.7.

Table 5.6 Case selection of step 3 (1)

	IV 1: Level of Development (HDI score)	IV 2: Strategic Importance (CINC score, nuclear weapons – NW)	IV 2: Economic Importance (trade volume with EU in million EUR)	IV 4: Political Culture (PolitCult score)
China	Developing (.660)	High (.19; NW)	High (296,313)	Little similarity to EU (0.86)
Russia	Developed (.719)	High (.04, NW)	High (180,990)	Little similarity to EU (1.51)
USA	Developed (.902)	High (.14, NW)	High (364,279)	High similarity to EU (4.78)
Pakistan	Developing (.490)	High (.014, NW)	Low (6,925)	Little similarity to EU (2.22)
India	Developing (.519)	High (.073, NW)	High (52,895)	High similarity to EU (3.55)

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Table 5.7 Top trading partners of the EU (2009)

	Third country	Trade volume with EU (in million EUR)
1	USA (not suitable as case study)	364,377
2	China (suitable as case study)	296,312
3	Russia (suitable as case study)	180,990
4	Switzerland (not suitable as case study)	162,313
5	Norway (not suitable as case study)	106,344
6	Japan (not suitable as case study)	91,820
7	Turkey (not suitable as case study)	79,951
8	South Korea (not suitable as case study)	53,548
9	India (suitable as case study)	52,895
10	Brazil (not suitable as case study)	47,223
11	Canada	40,208
12	Singapore	35,019
13	Algeria	32,010
14	South Africa	31,026
15	Saudi Arabia	30,494

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Inspecting Table 5.7, we already know that the USA does not match; Switzerland and Norway are EEA and EFTA members respectively and already closely linked with the EU. As this implies 'special ties' to Brussels, neither Switzerland nor Norway should be chosen. The same goes for Turkey, which has prospects of becoming a Union member. The other countries that are still within the group of top ten trading partners are Japan, South Korea, and Brazil. They do not match due to their values on the independent variables: all three are developed countries according to the above discussed categorization. Moreover, their political culture is not significantly different from the EU (United Nations Development Programme, 2010a). More flexibility is therefore needed regarding IV 3, namely by choosing countries that are still important trading partners, but outside of the top ten. While Canada and Singapore do not match either, Algeria fits the needed criteria as Table 5.8 shows. Moreover, the table shows the following:

– All five countries except for Russia are developing countries.
– All five countries except for Algeria have considerable national capabilities and strategic importance.

Table 5.8   Case selection step 3 (2)

	IV 1: Level of Development (HDI score)	IV 2: Strategic Importance (CINC score, nuclear weapons – NW)	IV 2: Economic Importance (trade volume with EU in million EUR)	IV 4: Political Culture (PolitCult score)
China	Developing (.660)	High (.19, NW)	High (296,313)	Little similarity to EU (0.86)
Russia	Developed (.719)	High (.04, NW)	High (180,990)	Little similarity to EU (1.51)
Algeria	Developing (.677)	Low (.005, no NW)	High (32,010)	Little similarity to EU (1.52)
Pakistan	Developing (.490)	High (.014, NW)	Low (6,925)	Little similarity to EU (2.22)
India	Developing (.519)	High (.073, NW)	High (52,895)	High similarity to EU (3.55)

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

- All five countries except for Pakistan are significant trading partners of the EU.
- All five countries except for India have a significantly different political culture compared to the EU and its member states.

In summary, the chosen cases differ on those variables that are required for the qualitative analysis of step 3, about the diplomatic professionalism of EU Delegations. Meanwhile, other variables can be held fairly constant. Some doubts may be raised about the latter aspect, namely the range of scores of countries that are put in the same category. This issue shall be discussed for each IV in turn.

Concerning the level of development, none of these countries belong to the group of least developed countries (LDC; United Nations Office of the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, no date). Although the four variables represent factors that can be clearly distinguished from each other, some connection cannot be excluded. This is all the more so because globalization does not only make countries, cities, regions, or people interdependent but also issue areas. In other words, an extremely poor country usually does not score very high on trade or strategic importance. Most of the LDCs have not made much progress in terms of development over the past decades. It is somewhat doubtful to put them in the same category of develop*ing* countries as those where such progress can actually be observed, for example in China, India, or Algeria (United Nations Development Programme, 2010c).

Another issue is the somewhat arbitrary decision of dividing a continuous scale into different categories. An example is the above chosen threshold of an HDI of 0.700 to distinguish developed from developing countries. Russia has a score of 0.719, which is just above that threshold. Also, it is part of the so-called BRICS, which includes Brazil, India, China, and also South Africa. The BRICS are countries that are on their way to become regional or even global powers, thereby changing the current global political architecture (Hurrell, 2006). I have previously discussed that the categorization of the BRICS is doubtful in itself because there are enormous differences between Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (Armijo, 2007, p. 38). More importantly, emerging on the global political scene and human development are two different concepts. The way that the EU and its members view these countries is decisive here. Despite an HDI score that cannot compete with Western European states, Russia is certainly not considered or treated as a developing country by Europe. This is different for the other four selected cases.

Moving on to the second independent variable of strategic importance, there are large differences for the CINC scale. Inspecting Table 5.8 more closely, it becomes clear that China's score is three times as high as Russia's and fourteen times higher than Pakistan's. One reason is the demographic aspect within the CINC scale. Out of the 7 billion people in the world, about 1.34 billion are Chinese (World Factbook, 2011). The sheer number of people is doubtful when it comes to military-strategic power, even more so in a globalized world. To mitigate this variation, I added the factor 'absence / presence of nuclear weapons' to this variable for the small-n case selection. This allows for a rather clear-cut selection on this variable.

There was no such option for the third independent variable of economic importance. Also for this indicator, the variation is considerable – even for the group of top ten trading partners. China's trade volume with the EU is nine times higher than Algeria's, which should not come by surprise. As a result, a Sino-Algerian comparison in IR studies is not common. In contrast, China is often compared to India or Russia. But actually China's trade volume with the EU is also 5.6 times higher than India's and 1.6 times higher than Russia's.

Although this variation is quite large, there is a clear need to conduct comparative research in IR so as to *explain* the mechanisms of contemporary global politics (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000, p. 471). Putting the variation into perspective, China, India, and Russia are all among the top ten trading partners. Algeria only ranks 13th. However, its trade volume with the EU is still considerably higher than that of the fifth selected case of Pakistan, which ranks 37th only (European Commission – DG Trade, 2010).

Discussing the final indicator, China, Russia, Pakistan, and Algeria certainly all have very different political cultures, based on unique paths of history. Nonetheless, regarding the decisive aspects as stipulated in the Copenhagen Criteria and measured by the PolitCult Index, these four countries are all considerably different from the EU and its members. Meanwhile, India is a democracy with a fair level of economic openness since the 1990s (Jenkins, 1999).

Beyond the selection of independent variables, alternative factors need to be controlled for. As none of the countries has any serious prospects of entering the EU, there is no special institutional relationship to the Commission. However, India and Pakistan were British colonies, while Algeria used to be under French control. The latter culminated in a terrible war that still impacts on contemporary Franco-Algerian relations (Hodson, 1993; Horne, 2006). Russia's predecessor state, the USSR,

used to control today's Central and Eastern European countries. As a result, the selected countries have special relationships with one or more EU member states. Nevertheless, the capital cities Moscow, New Delhi, Islamabad, and Algiers also have a high density of member state embassies. This should mitigate the dominating impact of certain EU members on the level of centralization of European diplomacy on the ground.[13]

Overall, the case selection of the EU's diplomatic representation to China, Russia, Algeria, Pakistan, and India is both socially and scientifically relevant to answer the question of why the EU can more easily centralize European diplomacy in some countries than in others. The cases are selected on the four independent variables that are to be tested. Furthermore, the influence of alternative variables can be largely excluded. As a result, the combination is the best that the empirical reality can offer for the qualitative analysis of step 3. This step is about finding out in which kinds of countries the EU maintains Delegations with a high or a low level of diplomatic professionalism. With this in mind, I will now move on to the data analysis.

6
Political Giant, Economic Power, Normative Dwarf: European Diplomacy Centralization across the Globe

In this chapter, the four hypotheses will be tested to answer the central research question of why the EU can centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others. Table 6.1 recalls the previously developed hypotheses.

Following the three-step methodology suggested in Chapter 5, I will first investigate the breadth of the Delegation network through logistic regression. The entire population of 161 third countries with which the EU can have diplomatic relations of various degrees will thereby be covered. As a second step, I will tackle the two aspects of internal coordination and external representation of European diplomacy in

Table 6.1 Overview: four hypotheses about the level of centralization of European diplomacy

H1	The less developed a third country, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country.
H2	The lower the strategic importance of a third country, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country.
H3	The higher the economic importance of a third country, the stronger the EU Delegation *and* the stronger the member state embassies are. Hence, in countries of high economic importance centralization of European diplomacy is ambiguous.
H4	The more different the political culture of a third country is compared to the EU member states' political culture, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

third country capitals. This involves linear and logistic regression of the sample of 107 third countries that host full EU Delegations. As a third step, the criterion of diplomatic professionalism of EU Delegations will be analyzed through a qualitative analysis of five selected third countries: China, Russia, Algeria, Pakistan, and India. Table 6.2 summarizes the methodology once more.

Table 6.2 Summary: methodology to analyze the level of centralization of European diplomacy

Analytical step	Aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy	Sample	Indicators	Method used
1	Breadth of the EUD network	EU diplomatic representation to 161 third countries	Presence/absence of full-fledged EUD	Quantitative analysis: logistic regression
2	Internal coordination and external representation via EUDs	107 third states with full EUDs	Number of member state embassies; Number of EUD diplomatic staff; HoD seniority; HoD career background; Early/late Lisbon transformation	Quantitative analysis: linear and logistic regression
3	Diplomatic professionalism of the EU Delegations	Five selected cases (China, Russia, Algeria, Pakistan, India)	Self-conception and task profile of the EUDs, of the member state embassies, and seen by third countries	Qualitative analysis

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

As I make use of a variety of indicators for the dependent variable, which differ in steps 1 and 2, I will analyze the structure of these DV indicators in the respective sections of this chapter. The independent variables, however, remain the same for both steps 1 and 2, so that they will be explored through univariate analysis. Table 6.3 summarizes the most important descriptive statistics for the IVs.

Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables

	IV 1: Level of development (HDI)	IV 2: Strategic importance (CINC)	IV 3: Economic importance (trade volume*)	IV 4: Political culture (PolitCult Index)
N	138	161	158	149
Missing values	23	0	3	12
Min	.140	.000	1.00	.10
Max	.938	.199	364,279	4.83
Mean	.592	.0053	13,896	2.74
S.E. mean	.015	.0016	3,466	.104
Median	.621	.0010	1,098	2.77
S.D.	.175	.0205	43,562	1.27
Skewness	−.209	7.48	5.85	−.064
S.E. skewness	.206	.191	.193	0.199
Kurtosis	−.732	61.97	38.91	−.995
S.E. kurtosis	.410	.380	.384	.395

Note: * in million EUR.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Let us start with the univariate analysis of the first independent variable, the level of development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) for 2010. The IV 1 column shows that the HDI data constitute a continuous variable between zero (low development) and one (high development). This variable is approximately normally distributed. The values range from 0.140 (Zimbabwe) to 0.938 (Norway) and the histogram for the HDI variable (not reported here) indicates that there are no relevant outliers (Diez et al., 2011, p. 17). The mean of 0.592 is a bit smaller than the median of 0.621. This explains the slight negative skewness of –0.209. The skewness is limited and not statistically significant. This also goes for the kurtosis, which indicates the variability of values. Overall, there is no need to recode the data or manipulate them for the analysis.

This is different for the second variable of strategic importance as measured by the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) for the year 2007 (Singer et al., 1972). CINC data are available for all 161 third countries. A quick glance at the histogram in Figure 6.1 shows that the distribution has an extremely positive skewness, revealing that the vast majority of countries (144) have very small CINC values. The value is below 0.01, which does not even constitute one percent of the world's total of national capabilities. Just a small share of 17 countries has a CINC value higher than that.

Figure 6.1   Histogram IV2 strategic importance (CINC)

This division also explains the extremely high kurtosis value, which results in a very pointy histogram (see Figure 6.1). It implies a low variability of values which is problematic regarding the assumption of linearity between variables (Diez et al., 2011, pp. 19, 113). Above the value of 0.01, the range is still very high, with extreme values for countries such as China, Russia, or the United States. Given this distribution structure, the CINC variable will be recoded into a binary categorical variable. Based on the histogram above, the two categories shall be countries with 'low strategic importance' (CINC of equal and below 0.009, meaning below one percent of the total national capabilities worldwide) and countries with 'high strategic importance' (CINC higher than 0.009). The bar chart below (Figure 6.2) illustrates the recoded IV 2.

I now move on to the independent variable number 3, the level of economic importance of a third country as measured by the trade volume with the EU in Euros for the year 2009 (European Commission – DG Trade, 2010). A quick glance at the overview table of descriptive statistics and at the histogram (not reported here) shows that the third IV is similarly structured as the second one. Data are available for almost the entire population (158 observations). Just like for the CINC variable, the histogram for IV3 of trade volume reveals a positive skewness. This indicates

Figure 6.2   IV2 strategic importance (CINC) recoded

that the vast majority of countries (139) have quite modest trade rela-
tions with the EU (equal to or below EUR 25 billion for the year 2009).
Only 19 countries are above that threshold. Accordingly, the kurtosis is
very high for IV3 as well. Again, there are partly similar extreme cases,
for instance the US and China (cf. European Commission – DG Trade,
2010). However, the group of countries is still different from those that
score high on CINC. North Korea and Iran, for example, have consider-
able capabilities, but score low or even extremely low in terms of trade
relations with the EU (cf. European Commission – DG Trade, 2010).
Given this distribution structure, IV3 will also be recoded into a binary
categorical variable for the quantitative analysis. The two categories shall
be countries with 'low economic importance' (trade volume of equal to
or below EUR 25 billion) and countries with 'high economic importance'
(trade volume higher than that). The recoded IV3 is illustrated in the bar
chart below (Figure 6.3).

Finally, the fourth independent variable which measures the political
culture of third countries in comparison to the EU needs to be inspected.
The PolitCult data constitute a continuous variable with values between
one and five. It is approximately normally distributed. The values range
from 0.10 (North Korea) to 4.83 (Australia) and there are no relevant
outliers. The mean of 2.73 is slightly smaller than the median (2.77).
This explains a very small, negative skewness of –0.064 that is statisti-
cally significant. The kurtosis is negative which implies a high level of
variability. Its absolute value is 0.995 and statistically significant at $p <$
0.05. Since these values are still fairly moderate there seems to be no
need to recode the data for IV4 or to manipulate them further for the

Figure 6.3 IV3 economic importance (trade volume) recoded

analysis at this stage. However, each regression analysis will of course be tested for the needed assumptions (Field, 2005, p. 169).

Having investigated each IV in turn, a check for multicollinearity still needs to be performed. Running multivariate regressions with correlated IVs may lead to faulty results. An example is the non-significance of a given variable while in fact it has a significant and powerful impact (Type II error). Statisticians disagree in their judgment if evidence for multi-collinearity may cause a problem or not and what to do about it. Field suggests being vigilant for correlation coefficients of .8 and above. Many other authors set it at .7 (O'Brien, 2007; Field, 2005, p. 175; Ganzach, 1998, p. 619). This shall give guidance when inspecting Table 6.4:

Table 6.4 Correlation matrix of the independent variables (Pearson's r)

	IV 1: Level of development	IV 2: Strategic importance	IV 3: Economic importance	IV 4: Political culture
IV 1: Level of development	1			
IV 2: Strategic importance	.31**	1		
IV 3: Economic importance	.48**	.64**	1	
IV 4: Political culture	.52**	.13	.26**	1

Notes: ***** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); ****** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

The matrix in Table 6.4 shows the correlation coefficients for all four IVs. There is for example a statistically significant correlation between the level of development and all other three variables. Some correlation in that respect does not come by surprise and is generally quite normal (see Diez et al., 2011, p. 312). A least developed country (LDC) is very unlikely to have flourishing trade relations. However, these correlations are rather weak and seem unlikely to pose a threat to the regression analysis (Field, 2005, p. 174). The highest significant correlation is that between the level of national capabilities and the trade volume (Pearson's r = .64). As mentioned in the methodology section, despite the fact that some correlation was expected for these two variables, they are conceptually distinct. Even though it is the highest correlation in the matrix, the value as such does not seem threatening. It will nevertheless be taken into consideration when performing the analyses in the following section.

Step 1: The breadth of the EU Delegation Network across third countries

It should be recalled that the breadth of the Delegation network, meaning the actual presence of the EU in third country capitals, is fundamental with regards to centralizing European diplomacy. To be able to centralize diplomacy in third country capitals, the EU has to actually 'be there.' We know already that the EU's presence is not uniform: four different modes of representation with a decreasing strength of presence can be distinguished: first, a full EU Delegation with a resident Ambassador; second, an EU office without a resident Ambassador; third, mere accreditation without a physical presence; and finally no accreditation at all. Let us explore this first DV indicator through univariate analysis:

Figure 6.4 shows the frequency distribution of the different types of EU diplomatic representation. The majority is made up of full EU Delegations (n = 107; over 66 percent). There are EU offices without a residing Ambassador in 21 countries (13 percent), and 31 countries have diplomatic relations with the EU, but do not host an EU office of any sort (over 19 percent). There are only two countries (just over one percent) to which the EU is not even accredited.

As already indicated in the previous chapter, there are doubts about keeping the above-proposed four-level categorization. It was found that the category of 'EU office' includes a conspicuously high variety of EU representations. More importantly for this chapter, the fourth category only includes two countries, North Korea and Iran. These two countries

Figure 6.4 EU diplomatic representation by type (Lisbon transformation of EU delegations)

are vital in terms of global security: both North Korea and Iran have a CINC value of .013. This puts them into the above-established category of 'high strategic importance.' The fact that neither of these two countries has any form of official diplomatic relationship with the EU constitutes crucial evidence in support of hypothesis 2: it reveals that the EU is not very capable of centralizing European diplomacy in strategically important countries. Nevertheless, from a statistical perspective these countries seem like the 'odd ones out.' A senior EU diplomat confirms that the lack of an EU presence in North Korea and in Iran seems like a mistake that is soon to be corrected (European diplomat, 2010j; Rettman, 2013b).

Consequently, what is really vital regarding the aspect of 'presence' of the EU abroad is still the dichotomy of 'full EU Delegation' versus 'no full EU Delegation.' For the tests of the four hypotheses in this section, I will stick to this binary categorization of the dependent variable. It is visualized in the bar chart in Figure 6.5.

As the indicator for the dependent variable for this section consists of two mutually exclusive categories, binary logistic regression is the method of choice. It will tell us how likely the EU is to maintain a full EU Delegation depending on the characteristic of the third country.

Although statistically significant, the model in Table 6.5 does not add much predictive power compared to a constant only model (two percent). The Nagelkerke's R square test statistic, which approximates the effect size for logistic regression, indicates a meager relationship between the IVs and the presence or absence of an EU Delegation (Burns

Figure 6.5   EU diplomatic representation by type

Table 6.5   Logistic regression Model 1.1: breadth of the Delegation network

IV	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	95% confid. interval for Exp(B)	
HDI	−5.24**	1.66	0.005	0.00	0.14
StratImp	1.50	1.13	4.46	0.48	41.11
EconImp	1.52	0.92	4.58	0.76	27.60
PolitCult	0.45*	0.19	1.56	1.07	2.29
Constant	2.86				

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; −2 Log likelihood: 132.82; Residual chi square: 15.41**; Nagelkerke R square: .18.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

and Burns, 2008, p. 580; Field, 2005, p. 223). Even though the effect is tiny, it is nevertheless worthwhile to see which variables add to that effect. Table 6.5 shows that there is a relationship between the level of development and the presence of an EUD. There is also an impact of the political culture on the presence of an EUD. According to the model, neither strategic nor economic importance has any significant relationship. A quick glance at the list of countries hosting an EUD versus those who do not, causes serious doubts about this result.[1] Keeping in mind the moderately high collinearity between strategic and economic importance, I decided to run the regressions separately: first with IVs 1, 2, and 4; then with IVs 1, 3, and 4. For both these models (reported below) the variables of strategic and economic importance change from statistically

insignificant to significant. Meanwhile, the results remain roughly the same for the other two predictors. These very different results reveal the impact of the collinearity of strategic and economic importance on the overall model with all four predictors. It may be a fundamental problem for the remainder of the analysis.

There is plenty of advice to overcome multicollinearity. The first method that usually springs to mind is increasing the sample size (Farrar and Glauber, 1967, p. 97; Grewal et al., 2004, p. 521). This is not an option here. In fact, the sample is already very large. CINC data are available for all observations and trade volume data could be gathered for as many as 158 out of the total of 161 observations. Other suggestions in the literature are to simply drop either of the correlating IVs (Grewal et al., 2004, p. 521). As previously mentioned, dropping either IV 3 or IV may 4 be an option that can be based on the literature review: a range of IR scholars claim that a central feature of globalization is the trend of economic performance becoming the new 'high politics.' It 'competes with' or even replaces foreign and security policy, which is traditionally seen as the most sensitive field for nation-states to keep control. The high correlation found above can be seen as important evidence for that trend.

Nevertheless, we should recall that the research question of this book aims at finding out about the logic of dissipation of traditional state power, authority, and sovereignty, and centralizing it at the supranational level. I am interested if and under which circumstances the EU becomes a major player in foreign policy and diplomacy; an area that is traditionally seen as nation-state territory. As seen in the literature review, a number of scholars, notably (Liberal) Intergovernmentalists, still take this view despite the ubiquitous presence of the notion of globalization. I expect different outcomes for the two variables 'strategic importance' and 'economic importance' as expressed in hypotheses 2 and 3. Analyzing both variables in turn is vital to answer the research question at hand. I will continue the analysis by first performing regressions with three predictors each (first IVs 1, 2, and 4; then IVs 1, 3, and 4). Thereafter, an overall regression will be run to see if collinearity is a problem for the overall model.

Model 1.2 (see Table 6.6) tests the variables of level of development, strategic importance, and political culture, and their influence on the presence or absence of an EU Delegation. Again, the effect is significant but small. Nevertheless, it is slightly bigger than for the previous model: this time, the improvement in predictive power compared to the constant model is about 5 percent.

Table 6.6 Logistic regression Model 1.2: breadth of the Delegation network

IV	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	95% confid. interval for Exp(B)	
HDI	−4.16**	1.48	0.02	0.001	0.28
CINC	2.17*	1.08	8.73	1.06	72.17
PolitCult	0.41*	0.19	1.51	1.04	2.18
Constant	2.41				

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; −2 Log likelihood: 135.97; Residual chi square: 13.07**; Nagelkerke R square: .15.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

To answer the research question, the predictive power of the single variables needs to be examined. In logistic regression, the B coefficient requires logarithmic transformation. The most crucial information is included in the column 'Exp(B),' which expresses the odds ratio (a number between zero and infinity). If the value is less than one, this implies a negative relationship between the independent and the dependent variable. If it is higher than one, then there is a positive relationship. If the confidence intervals range accordingly, with both the upper bound and the lower bound either between zero and one, or above one, then this confirms the direction of the relationship (Burns and Burns, 2008, pp. 569–82; Field, 2005, pp. 225, 2009, pp. 177, 270, 289).

Applied to the data in Model 1.2, Exp(B) for HDI is 0.02, which means the lower the level of development, the higher the chance of a full EU Delegation. This figure can be recalculated into probabilities in order to better grasp its meaning (Sweet and Grace-Martin, 2008, pp. 180–1; Field, 2009, p. 266; Burns and Burns, 2008, p. 582): the probability of an underdeveloped fictive country A with an HDI level of .200 to host a full EU Delegation is .83. For a developed fictive country B with an HDI of .900 the chance is only .21. This, together with the confidence level for this variable leads to confirming evidence for hypothesis 1.

Exp(B) for the second variable of strategic importance is 8.73, which clearly means that the greater the national capabilities of a country are, the higher is the chance of a full EU Delegation being present in the capital city. The confidence interval confirms this positive relationship. This provides evidence to reject hypothesis 2. One should be careful concerning the actual effect. The probability to host a fully fledged Delegation in a strategically important country is .99, while it is as high as .91 for countries that do not have a high strategic weight.

The odds ratio of the PolitCult variable is 1.51, which also implies a positive relationship: the more similar the third country's political

culture to the EU is the more likely is there a full EU Delegation. Also here, the confidence interval confirms this positive relationship. This result indicates the reverse logic compared to what has been hypothesized with hypothesis 4. When recalculating the odds into probabilities, it also becomes clear that the real impact of IV 4 is again very small. A country with a very similar political culture compared to the EU of 4.5 has a probability of .99 to host a full EU Delegation. A country with a very small PolitCult score of 0.5 has a probability of .93.

Considering diplomatic practice, one should be careful not to dismiss the influence of political culture too easily. In the event of severe problems in the relationship between one country and another, a likely diplomatic move is to recall an Ambassador or even to close an embassy entirely. As far as the European Union and its members are concerned, the reasons for such a move are often value-based, for example when a country's political culture drifts too far away from 'European ideals.' In the course of the deterioration of human rights in Belarus, for instance, European foreign ministries withdrew their Ambassadors posted in Minsk as a sign of protest (Taylor, 2012). Considering such practice, the logic of H4 for step one may need adjustment: for countries that diverge extremely from the EU's ideal in terms of political culture, EU Delegations are not established in the first place. To see if this is a reasonable claim, let us check the EU's presence in the countries with the biggest divergence from European political culture.

Table 6.7 confirms that in countries with a very large divergence in terms of political culture, the EU tends not to maintain full EU Delegations. The logic also works the other way around. The most recent openings of EU Delegations provide evidence for this: after the civil war in Libya of 2011 was over, and political change from Gaddafi's dictatorship was evident, Catherine Ashton swiftly opened an EU Delegation in Tripoli. One of the main purposes of this EU Delegation is to 'support [...] the Libyan people's efforts to build a new Libya based on the rule of law, democracy and human rights' (European Commission, 2011). In other words, the EU Delegation is there to help Libya become 'more European' in terms of its political culture. This is evidence for the Social Constructivist logic of hypothesis 4 and for viewing the EU as a normative power. Similar developments can be observed in Myanmar. In a move to 'demonstrate[e] support for Myanmar's political reforms,' which took off in spring 2012 after decades of authoritarian rule by a military junta, HR/VP Ashton opened an EU office there, too (European Voice, 2012). Although these are single cases rather than statistically significant results, they provide strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 4.

Table 6.7 Type of EU presence in countries with a low PolitCult score

Third country	PolitCult score	Grayscale	Type of EU presence
North Korea	0.1		*Full EUD*
Eritrea	0.37		*EU office*
Burma/Myanmar	0.38		*No office*
Libya	0.39		*No accreditation*
Turkmenistan	0.44		
Uzbekistan	0.46		
Equatorial Guinea	0.48		
Cuba	0.62		
Chad	0.79		
Belarus	0.82		
Laos	0.85		
Syria	0.85		
China	0.86		
Guinea	0.86		
Zimbabwe	0.89		
Saudi Arabia	1		

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Before moving on, the goodness of fit was checked (Field, 2005, p. 245). The respective examination of the residuals was acceptable for Model 1.2 except for a value higher than 1 for Cook's distance for the case of Iran (Field, 2009, p. 293). This statistic underlines the oddity of no EU Delegation being present in Teheran as discussed above. As a next step, the logistic regression is run with IV 3, economic importance, instead of IV 2.

Table 6.8 Logistic regression Model 1.3: breadth of the Delegation network

IV	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	95% confid. interval for Exp(B)	
HDI	−5.16**	1.66	0.006	0.00	0.15
EconImp	2.01*	0.85	7.50	1.43	39.31
PolitCult	0.43*	0.19	1.54	1.06	2.25
Constant	2.91				

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; −2 Log likelihood: 135.08; Residual chi square: 14.00**; Nagelkerke R square: .16.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Model 1.3's predictive power is again significant but very small: it improves the model by merely two percent. Also for this regression, all variables make a statistically significant contribution to the DV. The

odds ratio Exp(B) for PolitCult has not changed much. HDI remains significant, too, but it has a smaller impact now which may be due to some correlation with economic importance. High economic importance is positively associated with the presence of a full EU Delegation, which hints towards partial confirmation of hypothesis 3. However, the difference in probability is even smaller than for the CINC index: economically important countries have a .99 probability of hosting a fully fledged EU Delegation, while it is .95 for minor trading partners. Hence, the real impact is negligible.

Let us now summarize the results of step 1 of why European diplomacy is more centralized in some countries than in others as measured through the presence or absence of EU Delegations:

- Hypothesis 1 obtains confirming evidence when it comes to the breadth criterion of centralizing European diplomacy abroad. The EU tends to be present with a fully fledged EU Delegation in countries that are underdeveloped.
- Hypothesis 2, by contrast, can be rejected. Overall, it is not the case that the EU tends not to be present with a full EUD in countries that are strategically important. There is statistical evidence for the opposite direction. However, this result does not yet constitute decisive evidence for the EU having become a diplomatic player in the traditional sense and the dissipation of power in high politics. Checking the probabilities of strategically important countries and strategically unimportant countries to host full EU Delegations shows that there is only a minor difference. Moreover, there are strategically highly important countries where the EU is not present, notably in North Korea and Iran.
- As for hypothesis 3, the EU is present in countries that constitute important trading partners. But also here the difference in probability between important and unimportant economic trading partners to host full EU Delegations is minor. It remains to be seen in the next section if the member states are present in big numbers in such countries as well.
- Regarding hypothesis 4, the relationship between the political culture and the presence of the EU is statistically significant. However, it is in opposite direction of what has been hypothesized: the EU tends to maintain fully fledged Delegations in countries that are similar to Europe in terms of political culture, not in countries that are 'significant Others.' When calculating the odds into probabilities, there is not much actual difference. Nevertheless, European diplomatic practice works in such a way that diplomatic relations may be suspended,

notably as a sign of protest in the case of severe human rights viola-
tions. Once there are signs of change, European diplomats are eager
to support reforms to make third countries' political culture 'more
European.' A crucial tool in this respect is the establishment of an EU
Delegation. Libya and Myanmar are cases in point. Although this is
anecdotal evidence, it helps explain the regression result and at the
same time it still provides some support for hypothesis 4.

With these results in mind, I will now move on to step 2 of the empir-
ical analysis. It will cover the second and third aspect of the centrali-
zation of European diplomacy: internal coordination of European
diplomacy in third countries via the Delegations and the EU's external
representation.

Step 2: Internal coordination and external representation through the EU Delegations

Measuring internal coordination and external representation of the EU
abroad is not as straightforward as the sheer presence of the EU in third
countries. These two aspects will be operationalized with a variety of
indicators (see Chapter 5). The selected indicators are useful for both
operationalizing 'internal coordination' and 'external representation.'
They are summarized once more in Table 6.9.

For exploratory reasons, each indicator will be tested individually.[2]
Thereafter, a final analysis will be performed. Hereby, the individual
indicators' scores will be transformed so as to be added up on a ten
point scale, the 'European Diplomacy Centralization Index' (EU-DCI).
A score of ten implies a high level of internal coordination of European
diplomacy and external representation of the EU abroad; a score of zero
implies the opposite. Linear regression is the method of choice unless
the indicators are categorical in which case I will use logistic regression.

Most of the indicators are only meaningful for the countries with fully
fledged EU Delegations. Therefore, the respective sample of 107 third coun-
tries hosting such EUDs in their capital cities will be examined. Univariate
analysis of the independent variables for this sample of 107 observations
shows that the characteristics essentially remain the same compared to
the whole population: HDI remains a linear, continuous, and normally
distributed variable. The same goes for the PolitCult data. The continuous
variables of strategic and economic importance expose the same problems
such as extreme values on skewness and kurtosis, considerable outliers,
and hence non-normality. Consequently, the categorical transformation

Table 6.9 Operationalizing internal coordination and external representation of European diplomacy

Indicator	Measurement
Indicator about the relationship of EU Delegations to member state embassies	
2.1 Number of member state embassies	Continuous variable
	Values ranging from 1 to 27 embassies
Indicators relating to the EUD resources	
2.2 Number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation	Continuous variable
	Values ranging from 1 to 26 staff members
2.3 Seniority of Head of EU Delegation	Continuous variable
	Ranging from Administrator level (AD) 10 to 16
2.4 Career background of Head of EU Delegation	Binary categorical variable
	EU official = 1
	Member state diplomat = 0
	(Not yet transformed at the time of research: held constant at 0.5)
2.5 Lisbon transformation	Binary categorical variable
	Early Lisbon transformation = 1
	Late Lisbon transformation = 0
Overall ten point scale	
European Diplomacy Centralization Index (EU-DCI)	Continuous variable adding the values of all indicators up to a ten point index
	10 = high level of centralization of European diplomacy and vice versa

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

performed in the previous section will also be applied for step 2. Next, I will perform multivariate analysis of each of the five indicators in turn. Thereafter, a final regression will be run for the EU-DCI.

The first indicator is the number of EU member state embassies in a given third country capital. It should be recalled that EU member states themselves decided to set up the EEAS in the first place. Chapter 3 has shown why member states were interested in outsourcing more and more diplomatic tasks to the EU over time. Eventually, this has led to the establishment of a prototype supranational foreign service, the EEAS. At the same time, member states are weary that the EEAS interferes too much in their national foreign policies, notably in third countries of their interest. An instrument for member states to exert control over the EUDs is the maintenance of own embassies abroad. It is assumed that the higher the number of EU member state embassies in a third

Table 6.10 Descriptive statistics of indicator 2.1: number of member state embassies

N	107
Missing values	0
Min	1
Max	27
Mean	11.66
S.E. mean	.768
Median	11
Mode	2
S.D.	7.95
Skewness	.302
S.E. skewness	.234
Kurtosis	−1.172
S.E. kurtosis	.463
Sum	1248

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

country capital is, the more difficult it becomes for the EU Delegation to centralize internal coordination of European diplomacy. It also makes it more difficult for the EUD to display a unified voice towards the host country. This first indicator is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 27 embassies per third country capital. Table 6.10 presents the descriptive statistics of this indicator.

Inspecting the descriptive statistics, the number of member state embassies ranges from 1 to 27 across third countries. Hence, there is no country where the EU Delegation constitutes the only European presence (cf. Willis, 2009). On average, there are about 11 member state embassies in a given third country capital. Overall, there are as many as 1,248 EU member states' embassies in these 107 countries. More importantly for the analysis, the normality assumption seems to be satisfied: mean and median are close to each other, leading to a small, statistically insignificant skewness. The kurtosis is negative, indicating a high variability. It is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. Although I will remain vigilant when testing the assumptions after the regression analysis, the histogram (not reported here) looks acceptable, too.

Overall, this brief inspection shows that the first indicator of the number of EU member state embassies seems suitable for linear regression so I will move on to test the hypotheses. Due to a rather high collinearity of IV 2 and 3, I apply the same method as in the previous section: two tests including three independent variables, namely IV 2 and 3 in turn, and then a regression with all four IVs.

Table 6.11 Linear regression Model 2.1.1: number of member state embassies

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	20.88	3.68	.48**
StratImp	10.43	1.65	.46**
PolitCult	−0.68	0.57	−.10
Constant	0.003	1.93	

Notes: ***** Significant at the .05 level; ****** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .53**; adjusted model R square = .52**.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Model 2.1.1 shows that both a third country's level of development and its strategic importance significantly impact on the number of national embassies in the capital city. As for hypothesis 1, the more developed a country is, the higher is the number of national embassies with an effect size of beta = .48. This is confirming evidence for H1. It is relatively easy for EU Delegations to centralize internal coordination of European diplomacy and external representation of the EU in developing countries. Also, Table 6.11 provides confirming evidence for hypothesis 2: the more strategically important a third country is, the more national embassies are around. This makes it harder for the local EUD to centralize diplomacy (beta = .46). Hypothesis 4, by contrast, can be rejected. There is, as expected, a negative relationship between the number of national embassies and the similarity of political culture of a third country compared to the EU. Nevertheless, this relationship is not statistically significant. Regarding the regression diagnostics, the assumption of the independence of errors was met; the collinearity diagnostics looked healthy, just as the visualizations of the residuals. Finally, there were no outliers causing concern (Field, 2005, pp. 143–217).

I now perform the same analysis with IV 3, economic importance, instead of IV 2, strategic importance (Table 6.12).

Model 2.1.2 shows very similar results, although the first model has slightly more explanatory power (adjusted model R square = .52 instead of .46 now). Inspecting the data, notably the beta for economic importance, the main reason could be that for nation-states the question of strategic importance and security policy is still slightly more important than the economic weight of a third country.[3] Also for this model, the diagnostics reveal that the assumptions for linear regression are met.

When running the regression with all four variables (not reported here), the problem of collinearity between the indicators for strategic

Table 6.12   Linear regression Model 2.1.2: number of member state embassies

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	18.81	4.08	.43**
EconImp	9.19	1.79	.43**
PolitCult	–0.87	0.60	–.12
Constant	1.73	2.13	

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .48**; adjusted model R square = .46**.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

and economic importance can be observed, but less so than in step 1. Although the impact of both IV 2 and 3 remains statistically significant, they both lose predictive power as their coefficients shrink (IV 2: Beta shrinks from .46 to .35; IV 3: Beta from .43 to .21). Overall, the regression diagnostics of this model look healthy.

As a next step, I will examine the number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation. Recalling the rationale for this second indicator, it is assumed that the more manpower a Delegation has, the more capable it is of coordinating European diplomacy. The Delegation would also have more chances of interaction with the host government. The latter in turn may strengthen the impression of one unified European diplomatic voice abroad. Again, the indicator should first be inspected univariately.

In mid-2010, the number of EU diplomatic staff in Delegations varied between just one, which was the EU Ambassador to the newly opened

Table 6.13   Descriptive statistics of indicator 2.2: number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation

N	107
Missing values	0
Min	1
Max	26
Mean	8.51
S.E. mean	0.41
Median	8.00
Mode	8
S.D.	4.25
Skewness	1.33
S.E. skewness	0.23
Kurtosis	3.36
S.E. kurtosis	.463
Sum	911

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Delegation in Iceland, and as many as 26 in the Delegation in Beijing. There were a total of 911 diplomats spread over the 107 third country capitals with an average of over eight diplomats per EUD. Checking the histogram (not reported here), the distribution looks normal. Nonetheless, there are a number of extreme cases at the upper end, notably China (26), Russia (22), USA (22), India (19), Egypt (18), and Kenya (17). This makes China the clear outlier.

Analyzing the descriptive statistics more closely, it becomes clear that there may be a problem with the kurtosis, which has an absolute value above 3 and is clearly statistically significant ($z = 7.24$). The absolute value of the skewness is moderate and also statistically significant ($z = 5.70$). For the IVs 2 and 3 measuring strategic and economic importance, the question if and how to recode them into categorical variables was very clear. This is not so obvious for the indicator of diplomatic staff in EU Delegations. If possible, the nature of the continuous variable should be kept as it is more accurate than ordinal or categorical variables.

Some options are available to deal with this problem. Firstly, outliers, and thus skewness, can be removed by deleting the respective cases. A milder solution would be to replace their values with less extreme ones (Field, 2009, p. 153). This is no option here. The six countries that constitute extreme cases are not unrepresentative for the population. In fact, deleting them would arguably imply disregarding the most important observations in the distribution. After all, these are the cases on which the argument of the EU not speaking with one voice is most of the time based. Finally, it should be recalled that the distribution is a sample that covers all third countries with a full EU Delegation. This makes it as complete as possible (Field, 2009, p. 153).

Generally, data in the discipline of IR, which are usually related to countries, are just not as flexible like data on patients in psychology or medicine. There are close to 200 countries in the world while there are seven billion people. Despite this limitation, one option would however be to transform the data. This means adjusting each score of a 'problematic variable,' which eventually does not change the relationships between IV and DV. This path will be taken in case there are severe problems in terms of violating the assumption of linear regression for the following models.

Model 2.2.1 shows the regression results for the combination of variables 1, 2, and 4. There is no statistically significant relationship between the level of development and the number of diplomatic staff in EU Delegations. This speaks against the first hypothesis. By contrast, the factor whether or not the third country is strategically important has

Table 6.14   Linear regression Model 2.2.1: number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	−2.28	2.43	.10
StratImp	6.54	1.09	.54**
PolitCult	−0.42	0.38	−.11
Constant	10.07	1.30	

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = 0 .28**; adjusted model R square = .26**.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

an impact on the number of diplomatic staff in an EUD: these are the locations where Delegations are particularly well-equipped in terms of human resources (beta = .54). This is the opposite direction of the relationship predicted by hypothesis 2. It provides strong evidence for the EU seeking to be taken serious as a diplomatic player in the traditional sense. Finally, there is no significant relationship between the political culture of a third country and the number of staff posted in such countries. This adds to the evidence against hypothesis 4. As for the regression diagnostics, there is an unusually high standard residual for the case of China (3.031). Also, there are some issues with the residual plot:

Figure 6.6   Scatterplot: linear regression Model 2.2.1

The two 'clouds' in the above scatterplot are due to the fact that a categorical predictor is the only significant one in the model (Field, 2009, p. 293). Nevertheless, the values seem to be more spread at the upper end. I tried to overcome this problem by running the regression of Model 2.2.1 with a square root transformation of indicator 2.2 'EUD diplomatic staff' (not reported here). This mitigated the problem. As discussed above, removing or adjusting individual values is not an option. Also, complete recoding into categorical variables is not as appropriate here as for IV 2 and 3. Therefore, the above results should be accepted with some caution.

Running the regression with the IV 3 of economic importance rather than strategic importance delivers the following result:

Table 6.15   Linear regression Model 2.2.2: number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	−1.67	2.87	−.07
EconImp	3.75	1.26	.33**
PolitCult	−0.53	0.42	−.14
Constant	10.36	1.50	

Notes: ***** Significant at the .05 level; ****** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .10*****; adjusted model R square = .07*****.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Model 2.2.2 shows that the impact of IV 1, level of development, and IV 4, political culture, remain insignificant. Moreover, there is a significant positive relationship between the economic importance of a third country and the number of diplomatic staff in the respective EU Delegation. This partially confirms hypothesis 3. However, the effect size is quite a bit smaller than for the variable of strategic importance (.33 instead of .54). In other words, the EU seems to pay more attention to sending its diplomatic staff to strategically important countries in the traditional Realist sense rather than to the major trading partners. As for the regression diagnostics, the outlier China again stands out with a high standard residual of 3.24. There were no problems with the residual scatterplot but the P-P plot indicates some minor problems with meeting the normality assumptions (not reported here). The remainder of the diagnostics is acceptable.

When running the regression with all four variables (not reported here), IV 3 becomes statistically insignificant while there is almost no change for IV 2. The collinearity between IV 2 and IV 3 seems to have an important impact. However, the fact that strategic importance remains significant speaks in favor of its predictive power.

The next and third indicator, seniority of the Head of the EU Delegation within the Union's bureaucratic hierarchy, was chosen based on the assumption that the more experienced a Head of Delegation is, the more apt he or she is in coordinating European diplomacy. He or she is also more likely to enjoy high acceptance by the host country government. Table 6.16 helps us to inspect this indicator.

Table 6.16 Descriptive statistics of indicator 2.3: Head of Delegation Seniority – AD level

N	105
Missing values	2
Min	10
Max	16
Mean	13.26
S.E. mean	0.12
Median	13
Mode	13
S.D.	1.25
Skewness	0.23
S.E. skewness	0.24
Kurtosis	-0.02
S.E. kurtosis	0.47

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Table 6.17 Linear regression Model 2.3.1: Seniority of Head of EU Delegation

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	1.34	0.77	.20
StratImp	1.03	0.35	.29**
PolitCult	0.004	0.12	.004
Constant	12.33	0.41	

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .16**; adjusted model R square = .13**.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

The average Head of an EU Delegation has the AD rank of 13, but in some Delegations rather junior EU officials are the leaders (HoD Yemen:

AD rank of 10). The most senior officials (AD 16) lead the Delegations to China, Egypt, Japan, Morocco, Russia, and Uruguay. Before turning from such individual cases to the overall distribution, it should be stressed that it looks fairly normal without suspicious or statistically significant values, notably on kurtosis or skewness (Table 6.17).

Running the first regression with the predictors of human development, strategic importance, and political culture shows us that only strategic importance has a statistically significant impact at $p < .05$ with an effect size beta .29. The regression diagnostics for this model are unproblematic. Moreover, the model essentially delivers the same results when running the regression with 'trade volume' as the second IV. However, the P-P plot of the standardized residuals reveals problems with the normality assumption of this model. Running the regression with all four variables makes them all statistically insignificant.

Overall, the results imply a rejection of hypotheses 1 and 4. The EU does not send its most senior staff to developing countries or to countries that constitute 'significant Others' in terms of political culture. Instead, EU diplomats with AD ranks of 14 to 16 are posted in strategically and also economically important third countries. This is a pattern that one would expect from traditional nation-state foreign services, too. The result again refutes hypothesis 2, suggesting instead the opposite: EU Delegations in strategically important countries tend to be well-resourced. It also partially confirms hypothesis 3: there are stronger EU Delegations in countries which constitute major trading partners.

The last two indicators for internal coordination and external representation of European diplomacy are categorical variables which require logistic regression. Before performing these regressions, I first inspect them univariately. Indicator 2.4 is the career background of the Head of Delegation.[4] As previously discussed, since the Lisbon Treaty, EU officials can enter the EEAS as well as diplomats from national foreign services. Based on the concept of the 'community-reflex,' it is assumed that European diplomacy is more centralized if the Head of the EU Delegation also has an EU background and has not spend most of his or her career in national foreign services. In 2010 and 2011 HR/VP Ashton appointed the first group of EU Ambassadors according to the new Lisbon rules. Due to the system of diplomatic rotation, at that point in time, only 46 out of the 107 EU Delegations (43 percent) had a Head of Delegation that was appointed according to the new Lisbon rules.[5] Exactly half of these new positions were given to EU officials and the other half was given to member state diplomats.

Model 2.4.1 shows that none of the predictors have a significant impact at $p < .05$ on the selection of HoDs.[6] This result remains constant

Table 6.18   Logistic regression analysis 2.4.1: career background of Heads of EUDs

IV	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	95% confid. interval for Exp(B)	
HDI	−4.21	2.21	0.02	0.00	1.12
StratImp	1.12	0.88	3.05	0.55	17.04
PolitCult	−0.78	0.36	0.93	0.46	1.86
Constant	2.39				

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; -2 Log likelihood: 54.07; Residual chi square: 5.29; Nagelkerke R square: .16.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

when performing the regression for economic instead of strategic importance as well as for all four IVs in one model (not reported here). This is surprising given the heated discussion that member states would 'grab' the HoD positions in strategically and economically important countries (Formuszewicz and Kumoch, 2010; Tagesspiegel, 2010). It supports Murdoch's, Trondal's, and Gänzle's findings about a relative independence of the EEAS from the member states in recruiting its personnel (Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 13). However, Model 2.4.1 might also be yet another instance of the consensus principle that prevails in EU politics: both EU officials and national diplomats were equally placed in all sorts of locations.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the judgment of what an 'important' post is varies across member states and also regarding the nexus 'EU member states.' The decisions were certainly not as random as the logistic regression suggests. Instead, the selection is likely to be related to the alternative predictor variables that have been discussed in Chapter 4, and summarized under the heading 'special relationships' of member states and the EU with third countries. As previously mentioned, these are hard to capture quantitatively. However, Table 6.19 gives us an indication of their influence.

We can see in detail in which countries the EU officials have taken over HoD posts and where member state diplomats are posted. As for the latter, the information was added from which member state the new HoD comes (in brackets). Special relationships become evident here. Spain, for instance, got posts in its former colonies such as Nicaragua or Argentina; France sent a national diplomat to Burkina Faso; Sino-German economic relations may have played a role as well for the vacancy in Beijing (Geeraerts in Willis, 2010b).

Let us turn to the final indicator for step 2, the successive transformation of Delegations according to the new Lisbon rules. Recalling the

Table 6.19 Newly appointed Heads of Delegation after Lisbon

EU officials (n = 23)	Member state diplomats (n = 23)
Angola	Afghanistan (Lithuania)
Bangladesh	Albania (Italy)
Brazil	Argentina (Spain)
Chad	Armenia (Romania)
Fiji	Botswana (Ireland)
Gabon	Burkina Faso (France)
Guinea-Bissau	Burundi (Belgium)
Haiti	China (Germany)
Iraq	Colombia (Netherlands)
Jamaica	DR Congo (France)
South Korea	Georgia (Belgium)
Lebanon	Guyana (Czech Republic)
Mozambique	India (Portugal)
Pakistan	Japan (Austria)
Papua New Guinea	Jordan (Poland)
Philippines	Kazakhstan (France)
Russia	Macedonia (Denmark)
Senegal	Namibia (Spain)
Tanzania	Nicaragua (Spain)

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

rationale, it is assumed that Delegations that took up the new Lisbon tasks early (meaning in January 2010) were more 'ready' for a higher level of European diplomacy centralization than Delegations which were transformed at a later stage. It will now be found out whether there is a sizable and significant relationship between the timing of transformation and the characteristics of the third countries where these 'early birds' are located (see Figure 6.7 for a descriptive analysis). Figure 6.7 shows that a roughly equal amount of Delegations experienced an early transformation compared to those that lagged behind. Let us check now if any pattern can be detected regarding the four independent variables.

Table 6.20 Logistic regression Model 2.5.1: Lisbon transformation

IV	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	95% confid. interval for Exp(B)	
HDI	−6.05**	1.58	0.002	0.00	0.05
StratImp	−0.34	0.68	0.71	0.19	2.70
PolitCult	0.41	0.24	1.50	0.94	2.40
Constant	2.29				

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; −2 Log likelihood: 120.34; Residual chi square: 19.39**; Nagelkerke R square: 0.25.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Figure 6.7   Lisbon transformation of EU Delegations

Model 2.5.1 is statistically significant and has considerable predictive power compared to the constant model (about 20 percent) with a sizable effect size (Nagelkerke's R square = 0.25). It also becomes clear that only the level of development of a third country has a significant impact on the decision whether or not to transform an EU Delegation early or late. The odds ratio is .002, which implies a negative relationship: for less developed countries, the odds are higher to experience an early Lisbon transformation than for highly developed countries. In other words, for a fictive underdeveloped country with an HDI of 0.200, there is a .75 probability of experiencing an early Lisbon transformation. For a developed country with an HDI of .900, the probability is just .04. This confirms hypothesis 1 while it rejects all other three hypotheses. The confidence interval confirms the negative relationship for IV 1.

I also ran the regression replacing the variable of strategic importance with economic importance, which essentially leads to the same results (not reported here). The regression diagnostics for both models look acceptable. Running the regression with all four IVs kept both IV 2 and 3 statistically insignificant.

Despite these results and as mentioned in Chapter 3, there is nevertheless hard evidence that the decision of transformation did involve power politics and national interests. The incumbent Spanish EU Presidency was reluctant to allow an early Lisbon transformation in countries of its own strategic importance: first, those with whom an EU summit was planned (such as the US and Russia); and second, in former Spanish colonies. Next to that, the EEAS claims that the choice was 'guided by

technical issues' (Rettman, 2010b). This is congruent with the regression results above: EU Delegations in developing countries are very experienced as they have been in place longest. As a high-level EU diplomat posted in a developing country put it, 'we were simply capable and ready' to take over the new responsibilities (European diplomat, 2010j). The fact that all other variables are statistically insignificant can be traced back to the fact that cases such as the Spanish lobbying are

Table 6.21   Overview: operationalization for the indicators of step 2

Indicator	Measurement	Value on ten point European Diplomacy Centralization Index (EU-DCI)
Indicator about the Relationship of EU Delegations to member state embassies		
2.1 Number of member state embassies	Continuous variable; values ranging from 1 to 27 embassies	0: 3 points 1–5: 2.5 points 6–10: 2 points 11–15: 1.5 points 16–20: 1 point 21–26: 0.5 points 27: 0 points
Indicators relating to the EUD resources		
2.2 Number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation	Continuous variable; values ranging from 1 to 26 staff members	Above 12: 3 points 9–12: 2 points 5–8: 1 point 1–4: 0 points
2.3 Seniority of Head of EU Delegation	Continuous variable; ranging from Administrator level (AD) 10 to AD 16	AD 15–16: 2 point AD 12–14: 1 points AD 11 and below: 0 points
2.4 Career background of Head of EU Delegation	Binary categorical variable; EU official = 1 Member state diplomat = 0	From EU institutions: 1 point From member state foreign ministry: 0 points (Not yet transformed: held constant at 0.5)
2.5 Lisbon transformation	Binary categorical variable; Early Lisbon transformation = 1 Late Lisbon transformation = 0	Early: 1 point Late: 0 points

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

particularist and cannot be captured statistically with the above model. Also, it shows that the EU sought to 'try out' Lisbon in as many and as diverse places as possible. In a way, this allowed for a trial period before reshuffling the entire Delegation network.

In order to measure the aspects of internal coordination and external representation of centralizing European diplomacy, all indicators must now be added up. For this purpose, I recomputed and/or recoded all five indicators according to the method outlined in Chapter 5. This produces a new variable, the previously introduced 'European Diplomacy Centralization Index' (EU-DCI). Table 6.21 gives the respective overview. This new ten point variable 'EU-DCI' has to be inspected univariately first.

Table 6.22 Descriptive statistics of the ten point European Diplomacy Centralization Index

N	105
Missing values	2
Min	2.5
Max	7.5
Mean	5.13
S.E. mean	0.13
Median	5.5
S.D.	1.31
Skewness	−0.42
S.E. skewness	0.24
Kurtosis	−0.65
S.E. kurtosis	0.47

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

The full range of ten points is not reached, which may be problematic for regression analysis as it presupposes unconstrained variables (Field, 2005, p. 169). The lowest value on the EU-DCI is 2.5. A diverse group of countries including Argentina, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Yemen score this low regarding the centralization of European diplomacy. The maximum number of points is 7.5, which are reached for the EU's diplomatic presence in Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, and Kenya. More importantly, the distribution seems fairly normal. The mean and median are close to each other, leading to a small, statistically insignificant skewness. The kurtosis is negative, indicating some variability, which is not statistically significant either. The overall indicator seems to be suitable for linear regression. Therefore, I can continue with the final hypothesis testing of step 2. In order to get results for all four variables, I again run three regressions in turn.

Table 6.23 Final linear regression model: European Diplomacy Centralization Index

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	−4.64	0.74	−0.64**
StratImp	0.56	0.33	0.15
PolitCult	0.19	0.12	0.16
Constant	7.19	0.39	

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .30**; Adjusted model R square = .28**.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

The model in Table 6.23 includes the IVs level of development, strategic importance, and political culture. The results clearly give the strongest support for the first hypothesis: the less developed a third country is, the higher the level of centralization of European diplomacy in that country. Neither the variables of strategic importance nor political culture have a statistically significant impact at $p < .05$. With regards to meeting the assumptions for linear regression, the respective statistics and plots look healthy, although the P-P plot is not exactly straight.

A regression with the variable of economic instead of strategic importance shows that the former has a statistically insignificant impact (see Table 6.24). All regression diagnostics, now including the P-P plot, indicate that the assumptions for linear regression are met.

Table 6.24 Final linear regression Model (2): European Diplomacy Centralization Index

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	−4.10	0.79	−.57**
EconImp	−0.18	0.35	−.05
PolitCult	0.18	0.12	.16
Constant	7.00	0.42	

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .29**; Adjusted model R square = .26**.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

The fact that the predictor of economic importance does not yield statistical significance is confirming evidence for hypothesis 3, which predicted that in economically important countries, well-resourced EU Delegations will be present, but also many presumably well-resourced national embassies. As a result, the two cancel each other out, thereby leading to statistical insignificance for IV 3. A significant positive influence of a third country's economic importance on the number of national embassies present was

already found earlier on (see Model 2.1.2). Now, the insignificant result for IV 3 on the ten point EU-DCI further supports this logic. Before fully confirming hypothesis 3, it first must be checked if economic importance has a significant positive impact on the sum of the indicators related to EUD resources only (meaning EUD diplomatic staff, HoD seniority and career background as well as the timing of the Lisbon transformation). For that purpose, I first briefly inspect this summarized indicator:

Table 6.25 Descriptive statistics of accumulated indicators measuring EUD resources (Indicators 2.2 to 2.5)

N	105
Missing values	2
Min	0.5
Max	6.5
Mean	3.51
S.E. mean	0.13
Median	3.5
S.D.	1.31
Skewness	0.09
S.E. skewness	0.24
Kurtosis	–0.43
S.E. kurtosis	0.47

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

As indicator 2.1 is left out, this scale can theoretically vary between zero and seven points. In fact, values between 0.5 (Tajikistan and Yemen) and 6.5 (Kenya) are reached, which makes this variable less constrained than the previous ten point EU-DC Index. On average, 3.51 points are reached for EUD resources. Overall, it is again a fairly normal distribution: the mean and median are close to each other, leading to a small, statistically insignificant skewness. The kurtosis is negative, indicating some variability, which is not statistically significant. The overall indicator seems to be suitable for linear regression.

The model in Table 6.26 shows that there is no significant effect of the level of economic importance on how well an EUD is resourced. Only the level of development plays a role. However, the model as a whole is not statistically significant at $p < .05$. Since strategic importance and economic importance are quite highly correlated, one would expect the same outcome when running another regression accordingly. Surprisingly, there is a sizable positive and significant impact of beta = .41 for this model. Also, all regression diagnostics look healthy as Table 6.27 shows.

Table 6.26 Linear regression model: sum of indicators relating to EUD resources

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	−2.29	0.91	−.32*
EconImp	0.72	0.40	−.20
PolitCult	0.11	0.40	.09
Constant	4.40	0.13	

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .07; adjusted model R square = .04.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Table 6.27 Linear regression model: sum of indicators relating to EUD resources

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	−2.58	0.80	−.36**
StratImp	1.51	0.36	.41**
PolitCult	0.14	0.12	.12
Constant	4.40	0.42	

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .18**; Adjusted R square = .16**.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Table 6.28 Final linear regression Model: European Diplomacy Centralization Index

IV	B	S.E. B	Beta
HDI	−4.18	0.77	−.58**
StratImp	0.98	0.40	.26*
EconImp	−0.76	0.41	−.22
PolitCult	0.20	0.11	.17
Constant	6.95	0.41	

Notes: * Significant at the .05 level; ** Significant at the .01 level; Model R square = .31**; Adjusted model R square = .30**.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

I ran the regression with all four variables (not reported here) and the sizable significant impact of the predictor of strategic importance remains in place (beta = .45) while economic importance remains insignificant. To complete the analysis, a final regression was run with all four predictors on the ten point scale European Diplomacy Centralization Index as shown in Table 6.28.

These final results are remarkable: in contrast to the usual commentary of the EU being an economic giant but a political dwarf in global politics, it points to a different, and in fact the opposite logic: the EU Delegations can actually centralize European diplomacy more easily in strategically important countries and not so much in countries that are important trading partners. This confirms the idea of economics and trade having become the new high politics: Union member states try to keep them under their control. More importantly for this book, it supports the view of the EU becoming a fully fledged diplomatic, and thus political player in the world.

In order to summarize step 2 of the quantitative analysis, Table 6.29 provides an overview of all partial results as well as of the final overall regression.

With the help of the grayscale, we can see at a glance which independent variables have a significant impact as hypothesized (grayscale 60 percent); which variables have a significant impact but different/ opposite to what was expected (grayscale 30 percent); and for which variables the null hypothesis should be accepted (grayscale 10 percent). On closer inspection, Table 6.29 shows the following:

- There is confirming evidence with regards to H1 in that the less developed a third country is, the more centralized internal coordination and external representation of European diplomacy is. The centralization power stems to a large extent from a thin presence of national embassies rather than from the EUDs' resources. In other words, there are not more EU diplomats posted in developing countries than elsewhere. Moreover, the most senior Heads of Delegations are not posted in such countries either. It is also not the case that EU officials instead of national diplomats tend to become the HoDs in developing countries. Reflecting the experience of EUDs in developing countries, they experienced an early Lisbon transformation.
- IV 2, the strategic importance of a third country has a significant and sizable effect for most indicators of step 2. However, the effect is opposite to what has been hypothesized: it seems that the more strategically important a third country is, the more centralized internal coordination and external representation of European diplomacy is. It is striking that the strategic importance of a third country is most influential compared to all other variables regarding the strength of the EU Delegations (that is manpower, HoD seniority, Lisbon transformation, and HoD origin combined). This provides important evidence that the EU's days as a political dwarf might be counted. Instead, the EU seems to be on its way towards a full-fledged diplomatic player in

Table 6.29 Overview step 2: analyzing coordination and external representation through EU Delegations

	IV 1: HDI	IV 2: StratImp	IV 3: EconImp	IV 4: PolitCult
2.1 Number of member state embassies	Significant positive relationship Effect size beta .42	Significant positive relationship Effect size beta .46	Significant positive relationship Effect size beta .43	No significant relationship
2.2 Number of diplomatic staff per EU Delegation	No significant relationship	Significant positive relationship Effect size beta .54	Significant positive relationship Effect size beta .33	No significant relationship
2.3 Seniority of Head of EU Delegation	No significant relationship	Significant positive relationship Effect size beta .29	Significant positive relationship Effect size beta .30	No significant relationship
2.4 Career background of Head of EU Delegation	No significant relationship	No significant relationship	No significant relationship	No significant relationship
2.5 Lisbon transformation	Significant negative relationship	No significant relationship	No significant relationship	No significant relationship
Total EUD Resources	Significant negative relationship Effect size beta – .34	Significant positive relationship Effect size: .40	No significant relationship	No significant relationship
Total European Diplomacy Centralization Index (EU-DCI)	Significant negative relationship Effect size beta: –.58	Significant positive relationship Effect size beta .26	No significant relationship	No significant relationship

Notes: (a) significant at $p < .05$; (b) significance and effect size: for HDI and PolitCult, the significance and effect sizes for the complete model are reported (including all IVs); for StratImp and EconImp the values of the sub-models (including three variables) are reported, except for the final models (Total EUD resources and EU-DCI); (c) grayscale coding: – gray 60%: significant relationship confirming the hypothesis, – gray 30%: significant relationship of opposite direction, reject null hypothesis, – gray 10%: no significant relationship, accept null hypothesis.

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

global politics. Even for the ten point EU-DCI, there is a significant relationship although nation-states maintain many and arguably very well-equipped embassies in such countries.

- IV 3, the economic importance of a third country, correlates rather highly with IV 2. Therefore, I expected similar results here. There is a significant positive impact for most individual indicators in step

2, notably for the number of national embassies in third countries. This partially confirms H3. Nevertheless, the effect size is smaller than for strategic importance. Surprisingly, there is no significant relationship between a third country's economic importance and the EUD's overall resources. In other words, and unlike hypothesized, the chances of finding a well-resourced EU Delegation are not higher for important trading partners of the EU than for relatively unimportant ones. As mentioned above, this supports the assumption that economics are the new high politics. This in turn puts the EU's potential as an 'economic giant' in the world into question.

- IV 4, the political culture of a third country does not seem to play a role for the centralization level of European diplomacy abroad, notably concerning the aspects of coordination of European diplomacy and a unified external representation of the EU. Recalling the results of step 1, one should be careful. There was no meaningful relationship for the presence or absence of a full Delegation depending on the IV of political culture. Nevertheless, single cases provide crucial evidence for the EU acting as a normative power through its Delegations. The recent openings of Delegations in reforming Myanmar or Libya are cases in point. This illustrates that quantitative methods are somewhat biased against Constructivist approaches. It also underlines the importance of mixed method approaches. Such an approach is applied in this book. The results of step 3, which will be discussed in the next section, will be very interesting when it comes to IV 4.

Step 3: Diplomatic professionalism of the EU Delegations

We have arrived at the analysis of the final aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy: the degree of diplomatic professionalism of EU Delegations. Before starting the qualitative analysis, the case selection should first be recalled.

Table 6.30 summarizes the case selection that was made based on the four independent variables and takes into consideration possible confounding factors (see Chapter 4). The cases were selected in such a way that three independent variables are held constant for four countries and the fourth IV would vary for the fifth country: China is the socially and scientifically relevant baseline case. Russia is the only developed country among the five cases; Algeria is the only country of rather low strategic importance; Pakistan is the only country of low economic importance to the EU; and India is the only country whose political culture is similar to that of the EU.

Table 6.30 Case selection step 3: diplomatic professionalism of the EUDs

	IV 1: Level of Development (HDI score)	IV 2: Strategic Importance (CINC score, nuclear weapons – NW)	IV 2: Economic Importance (Trade volume in million EUR)	IV 4: Political Culture (PolitCult score)
China	Developing (.660)	High (.19, NW)	High (296,313)	Little similarity to EU (0.86)
Russia	Developed (.719)	High (.04, NW)	High (180,990)	Little similarity to EU (1.51)
Algeria	Developing (.677)	Low (.005, no NW)	High (32,010)	Little similarity to EU (1.52)
Pakistan	Developing (.490)	High (.014, NW)	Low (6,925)	Little similarity to EU (2.22)
India	Developing (.519)	High (.073, NW)	High (52,895)	High similarity to EU (3.55)

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

Step 3 of the analysis is about the diplomatic professionalism of the EU Delegations, meaning to what degree they have become similar to traditional embassies. The key assumption of step 3 is the more similar the Delegations have become, the more they are capable of centralizing European diplomacy. The main reason is that due to the hierarchical and elitist structure of diplomatic representation, EU Delegations need to be acknowledged and recognized by the in-group of nation-state diplomats (Neumann, 2007, p. 13). This can best be done by transforming them into 'one of them,' both *de jure* such as through the Lisbon Treaty, but also in the perception of the other, 'traditional' diplomats. However, even if EUDs work similarly to traditional embassies, this professionalism can be mitigated by the presence of EU member state embassies, which themselves still work in a very traditional way. I conceptualize a traditional way of working through a high level of congruence of national embassies with the Vienna tasks, and the preoccupation with high rather than low politics. Moreover, I assume that traditionally working embassies tend not to recognize the EU as a diplomatic player because the EU is not a state. Consequently, traditionally working embassies neither recognize the EUD as 'one of them' in the community of embassies in third country capital cities. Applying the theories that are being tested in this book to the case selection, the following patterns would be expected.

As mentioned in the methodological section, data for three indicators have been gathered for step 3. Firstly, a textual analysis of the self-conception of the EU Delegations and their concrete role and work has been conducted. The information can usually be found in the 'About us' section on the Delegation websites and/or in the Word of Welcome by the

EU Ambassador. The texts have been examined as to whether or not and how the five tasks of embassies as stipulated in the Vienna Convention were included in these texts (see Table 2.1). I have added a fifth and a sixth criterion: the fifth criterion is whether high political tasks are prominent in the description as opposed to traditional low politics such as trade relation. As the sixth criterion, I have investigated if the relationship between EUDs and national embassies is taken up and clarified, for example, through explicitly mentioning the areas that the EUD does not handle. This would emphasize the non-interfering, complementary character of the EUDs' tasks alongside the national embassies.

As a second indicator, I have performed a similar analysis of self-conception and representation online for the member states' embassies located in each of the five countries. The goal thereof is to see if the national embassies are explicitly traditional as well. This would mitigate EU Delegations of a high level of diplomatic professionalism. Where possible the congruence with the Vienna tasks has been examined by checking 'About us' sections or Words of Welcome by Ambassadors. When such data were not available, the policy domains that occupy most of the embassies activities have been examined (high-level political relations, trade ties, development, cultural relations, and so on). I have done so on the basis of the website layout and content and, if necessary, via email or telephone correspondence. To judge if the EUD is recognized as a genuine diplomatic player on the ground by the member state embassies, I have checked the content and layout of the websites: is there any mention of the EU and the EU Delegation? If so, how is it referred to? Do they form part of the self-representation of the member states' embassies? Are there visible links to the EUD website and / or the EU institutions in general? Or is there no information on the EU whatsoever?[7]

Because diplomacy is all about mutual recognition, the professionalism of the EU as a diplomatic player should also be evaluated, seen from the perspective of third countries. Therefore, the diplomatic missions of the five third countries to the EU have been examined as a third indicator. The basis of the analysis is again online representation. Where necessary, I have gathered additional information from the Brussels diplomatic list, or via email and telephone correspondence. Guiding questions for this third indicator have been: is there a separate mission to the EU or is it integrated within the embassy to Belgium? In the latter case, how many diplomats are working there? Is the EU represented as a political player, and thus a diplomatic institution, or merely as a trading bloc or aid provider? Which policy domains prevail in the work of the third

Table 6.31   Expectations for step 3 of the analysis

	If H1 is true (IV 1: Level of development)	If H2 is true (IV 2: Strategic importance)	If H3 is true (IV 3: Economic importance)	If H4 is true (IV 4: Political culture)
China (base line)	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally	EUD with low degree of professionalism, traditionally working member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, mitigated by traditionally working member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally
Russia (not developing)	EUD with low degree of professionalism, traditionally working member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, traditionally working member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, mitigated by traditionally working member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally
Algeria (not strategically important)	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally	Highly professional EUD, mitigated by traditionally working member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally
Pakistan (not economically important)	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally	EUD with low degree of professionalism, traditionally working member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, member state embassies do not work traditionally	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally
India (no different political culture)	Highly professional EUD, member state embassies do not work traditionally	EUD with low degree of professionalism, traditionally working member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, mitigated by traditionally working member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, traditionally working member state embassies

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

countries' missions to the EU? Is there any reference to the relationship between the EU and its member states?

In line with the approach taken in steps 1 and 2, I will first discuss the evidence for each of the three indicators in turn before giving the overall results. Starting with the analysis of the tasks of the EU Delegations, in China there seems to be a high degree of diplomatic professionalism of the local EUD at first sight. The very first sentence in the presentation is in accordance with the first task of the Vienna Convention: the Delegation in Beijing represents the European Union in China. Furthermore, it is clarified that this Delegation has 'full diplomatic privileges and immunities with the Head of Delegation accorded full ambassadorial status.'[8] On closer inspection, the EU takes a careful approach by playing down the Lisbon-strengthened Delegation in Beijing. There is no mention of the second task in the Vienna Convention, namely that the EU Delegation would 'defend' European interests *vis-à-vis* China. Instead, the EU Delegation in Beijing 'works closely with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States'...'[i]n all matters pertaining to the European Union.' It is thereby emphasized that the Delegation does not mingle in traditional embassy territory. Instead, it is complementary to national foreign services as it cooperates with them. The third Vienna task of negotiation with the host country is included but carefully formulated: 'The Delegation...*facilitates* the operation and development of bilateral co-operation agreements.' Regarding the fourth Vienna task, it is revealing that '[t]he Delegation keeps the *European Commission* abreast of significant political, economic and other developments in China,' rather than the EU as a whole. Furthermore, the Delegation is 'responsible for the conduct of official relations between China and the European Union.' This is somewhat more sober than the fifth Vienna task of 'promoting friendly relations between home and host state.' Concerning the sixth criterion of the traditional division of high and low politics, the Delegation's section for Political Affairs is mentioned first. Trade and Investment is only mentioned third. This indicates a rather high level of diplomatic professionalism. Finally, the division of labor between the EU Delegation and the member state embassies is clarified. It is explicitly mentioned what the Delegation does not deal with: 'trade promotion, consular matters or other issues which have traditionally been handled by the member state embassies.' Overall, the level of diplomatic professionalism of the Delegation is relatively high since there is congruence with the traditional Vienna tasks of embassies. Nevertheless, it is stressed that this professionalism does not limit the national embassies in their work and their traditional nature as diplomatic representations.

Let us now look at Russia. Although the self-representation of the EU Delegation in Moscow is not as comprehensive as the one in Beijing, there are hints of a higher degree of diplomatic professionalism here: Vienna task number 1 is clearly included as '[t]he Delegation has the status of a diplomatic mission and officially represents the European Union in Russia.'[9] Moreover, the Delegation 'defend[s] individual EU policies,' which is congruent with the second Vienna task. The reference to 'individual policies' can be interpreted in the sense that the EU is limited to its mandate. As for information gathering (Vienna task 3) and emphasis on high or low politics, there is no information in the text. A general note of negotiation competence *vis-à-vis* the host country is missing (Vienna task 4). However, it is mentioned that the Delegation 'monitor[s] the implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.' Vienna task 5 is included, though also with a more sober tone: the Delegation 'promote[s] the political and economic relations between Russia and the European Union.' It is noteworthy that the role of the EU Delegation in relation to the national embassies is not clarified in more detail. Overall, the professionalism of the EU Delegation in Moscow seems quite substantial.

Moving from Moscow down south-west, the EU Delegation in Algeria has the smallest amount of substantive information on its website. This indicates a relatively low level of diplomatic professionalism. It is said that the EUD represents the Union and that its main task is to reinforce and consolidate the relations between the EU and Algeria, notably in terms of Algerian economic reform.[10] This emphasis on low politics adds to the impression that the local EU Delegation is limited in terms of diplomatic professionalism. There is no clarification of its role as regards to the national embassies, which upgrades the level of diplomatic professionalism. However, implicitly the EU Delegation's role is presented to be limited to its competences as defined in the treaties.[11] Overall, it should be categorized as low level professionalism.

The diplomatic professionalism of the Delegation in Pakistan, by contrast, is high. The EU Delegation in Islamabad has 'the objective of fostering closer ties between the European Union and Pakistan' which is congruent with task 5 of the Vienna Convention.[12] Otherwise, there is no deciphering when it comes to the EUD's individual tasks. More importantly, however, the EUD is said to be working 'very much like embassies and high commissions but [is] called [a] Delegation.' This high level of diplomatic professionalism of the EUD is not put into perspective, such as by mentioning that it does not inhibit the traditional way of working of the member states' embassies. By contrast, it is mentioned that 'hundreds of EU Member States' diplomats' now work together with regular EU

officials in the EU Delegations as part of the new 'EU foreign service,' the EEAS. Concerning the division of high and low politics, the two dominating policy domains regarding the work of the EUDs are aid and trade. It is also emphasized that the 'relations also include a broad range of political and security cooperation.' This rounds off the impression that the EUD in Islamabad is of considerable diplomatic professionalism.

Last but not least, regarding the EU Delegation in India, the first sentence already hints at a very high level of diplomatic professionalism: 'the Delegation of the European Union in New Delhi is functioning the same way as an Embassy does.'[13] This is further stressed as the first Vienna task is included: the EUD is 'a diplomatic mission representing the European Union (EU) to India.' There is no mention of defending the EU's interests (Vienna task 3) but Vienna tasks number 4 and 5 are explicitly included: the Political Section 'is responsible for political analysis and reporting' and one of the Delegation's main tasks is 'enhancing relations between the EU and India.' Finally, the Delegation's political section is listed before all other, 'low politics sections.' Despite the high level of diplomatic professionalism, there are a few passages in the text that relativize the EUD's diplomatic professionalism *vis-à-vis* the national embassies. Firstly, areas are enlisted that the EU does not have legislative and/or administrative competences for such as consular tasks. Secondly, it is mentioned three times that the EUD closely cooperates with the member state embassies. Overall, it can be said that the EU Delegation in India has a high level of diplomatic professionalism. This is somewhat mitigated through the emphasis of the traditional tasks of the national embassies and that the EUD works complementary to that. Table 6.32 summarizes the results so far.

The overview above helps comparing the actual evidence with the expectations according to the different hypotheses. There is clearly no low level of diplomatic professionalism for the EU Delegation in Russia with the other EUDs being highly professional. Hence, the evidence does not support hypothesis 1 that the level of development plays a role regarding the aspect of diplomatic professionalism in centralizing European diplomacy. Also, H4 can be rejected based on the evidence above: the EU Delegation in India is clearly presented as a highly professional diplomatic institution. This is somewhat mitigated by relativizing the role of the EUD *vis-à-vis* national embassies. The data also do not confirm H3: the EUD in Pakistan, which is economically unimportant compared to the other four countries, has a very high level of diplomatic professionalism.

In fact, the data indicate that the diplomatic professionalism is high for all Delegations but the one in Algeria. Only for the case of China

Table 6.32   Step 3.1: EUD's website presentations

	Evidence	If H1 is true (IV level of development)	If H2 is true (IV strategic importance)	If H3 is true (IV economic importance)	If H4 is true (IV political culture)
China (base line)	Highly professional EUD, relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, mitigated by relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies
Russia (not developing)	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, mitigated by relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies
Algeria (not strategically important)	EUDs with low degree of professionalism, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUDs, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, mitigated by relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies
Pakistan (not economically important)	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies
India (no different political culture)	Highly professional EUD, some relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, no relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	Highly professional EUD, mitigated by relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies	EUD with low degree of professionalism, relativization vis-à-vis member state embassies

Source: Compiled by the author (2012).

and to some extent for the case of India is the role of the EUD relativized in relation to the existing national embassies. This mitigates the professionalism somewhat in these two places. However, this is not the so for the three other countries Algeria, Russia, and Pakistan. Due to the presence of this pattern, the results point at the importance of IV 2 in explaining the level of diplomatic professionalism of EU Delegations. But the logic is again in the opposite direction to what has been hypothesized with H2: in countries of high strategic importance, there are strong EU Delegations, but also strong national embassies – of which the EUD is very aware and whose role it seeks to complement rather than to undermine. The data are generally in accordance with this (reversed) hypothesis 2, except for the fact that there is no relativization of the EUD's role in the cases of Russia and Pakistan.

I will continue with the second indicator, the self-conception of the member state embassies and their relationship to the EUDs. A first general finding is that the conception of the EU member states' embassies is much more self-explanatory to them. There is rather little information concerning the congruence of embassies' self-representation and the Vienna tasks on the respective websites. Exceptions to that rule are for instance the online presentation of the Spanish embassy in Beijing or Slovakia's embassy in Moscow.[14] It seems that to the embassies it 'is understood' what they do. This lack of information may also stem from the fact that nation-state diplomacy is still very secretive (European diplomats, 2010). Reacting to the reproaches of a democratic deficit, the EU Delegations seek a much higher level of transparency about what they do and regarding their 'right to exist' (cf. Moravcsik, 2004). This is all the more the case given the sensitive nature of their relationship *vis-à-vis* member states' embassies (see Chapter 3). These findings point to a rather traditional self-conception, no matter in which country national embassies are.

Having examined the profiles of the community of member state embassies, it becomes clear that the embassies in all five countries work in a pretty traditional way: they deal with high politics in the first place. Reflecting economic globalization, trade relations with the host country come in second for virtually all of them.[15] Depending on the country's profile, some tasks are more diverse, such as including development policy – but mostly without or just with very little mention of the EU in this context (see for instance the Dutch embassy in Islamabad: in Netherlands Embassy Islamabad, Pakistan, 2011). It is also striking that the embassies in all five countries see the fostering of bilateral cultural relations as a central task. However, normative terms are rarely mentioned in this context. Instead of interpreting this in the sense that member states are the actual 'normative

powers' rather than the EU, this can be interpreted as a sort of 'advertisement' for the unique culture (and thus the legitimacy) of EU member states. During interviews with European diplomats in Beijing it became clear that such cultural advertisement is more often than not a way to foster trade relations. It is not a means to support an EU-led normative mission of changing China's political culture (European diplomat, 2010m). This can be supported with the evidence at hand: over two thirds of all member state embassies posted in Beijing, Moscow, and India stress the need to foster cultural ties. Fifty percent of embassies in Algiers do so as well, while it is only 38 percent of national embassies in Islamabad, the country with the lowest economic importance out of all five.

Overall, the self-conception of member state embassies in all five countries is very traditional. On top of that virtually none of them refer to the role and tasks of the local EU Delegation on their website despite their Lisbon-strengthened role. This underlines the traditional workings of national embassies. They do not easily accept the EU Delegations as 'one of them,' let alone as a supranational embassy that centralizes their individual diplomatic practice. Although the way that the embassies refer to the EU varies across the five countries (such as through buttons linking to the EU institutions; through news about the EU; or without any reference to the EU at all), there is no variation that would lead us to clearly support or reject any of the four hypotheses.

Moving on to the third and final indicator of step 3, I will now check whether the EU is a highly professional diplomatic player in the eyes of the five third states. Starting with China, it strikes that the PRC maintains a separate mission to the EU (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2011a). When diplomatic relations between two countries are concluded, the mutual establishment of a permanent presence in the respective capital cities usually follows suit very quickly. We saw in the third chapter that the Commission Delegations were not meant to be diplomatic missions in the beginning. As a consequence, Commission Delegations were opened quite some time after the establishment of diplomatic relations. Thus, it took 13 years until the Commission Delegation in Beijing was opened (from 1975 to 1988; Delegation of the European Union to China and Mongolia, 2011). It took even longer to open a Chinese mission to the EU. In 2001, the PRC opened a mission that was integrated into its embassy to Belgium. Only since 2008, there is a separate full-fledged Chinese mission to the EU in Brussels.

At first sight, this may reveal a rather limited extent of diplomatic professionalism of the EU. After all, Chinese embassies to EU member states have existed for a long time already. Putting the case of China into

perspective, out of the five countries under consideration, only China and Russia maintain a mission to the EU in Brussels that is separate from their embassies to Belgium (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2011; European Commission – Secretariat General, 2011). Moreover, out of the 161 sovereign third states with which the EU has diplomatic relations, only 19 states maintain such a separate diplomatic representation. Granted, given the small size of the country of Belgium, third states' embassies in Brussels are disproportion- ately well-resourced in terms of the number of staff compared to other EU members of similar size.[16] Clearly, the reason for this disproportion is that third states are busier in liaising with the EU rather than bilaterally with Belgium. Nevertheless, a separate mission with an Ambassador that specifically handles relations with the EU is an important sign that China by now considers the EU a genuinely professional diplomatic player.

Taking a closer look at the website of the PRC's diplomatic representa- tion to the EU, it strikes that it is not called an 'embassy' but a 'mission.' This is a legal issue as the EU is not a state. Nevertheless, it is headed by a Chinese diplomat of ambassadorial rank. According to the EU's diplomatic list, there are 74 diplomats working in this mission, which is clearly above the average number of 29 for the Chinese embassies to EU member states.[17] Reading the 'Welcome Message' of the Ambassador, it becomes clear that China attaches great political importance to the EU. The PRC supports EU integration and a strong role of the EU in global politics. Due to the 'increasing interdependen[ce]' China purposefully 'go[es] beyond bilateral context' and invests in its relations with the EU, which are of 'strategic significance.' Examining the layout of the website, the mission's 'Diplomatic Activity' and 'China-EU Bilateral Contacts,' 'China-EU Relations,' and 'China-EU Summits' are the most visible buttons. These buttons link to information on high politics matters such as high-level visits. More technical, low politics areas such as trade and economics, or science and technology are further below. Additionally, there is a separate link to the EU Delegation in Beijing. Only at the bottom of the website can one find a link to the Chinese embassies to EU member states (Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union, 2011b). Concerning the EU as a norma- tive power, there is plenty of information on human rights related topics. Such information can also be found on most of the websites of Chinese embassies to EU member states. It thereby does not give special support for the EU to be a normative power.

Overall, China's diplomatic representation to the EU reveals that the PRC attaches high importance to the EU as a diplomatic player. From

a Chinese perspective, the EU is a professional diplomatic institution. This is all the more striking because EU-China diplomatic relations and representation have been firmly based on their trade relations. The EU seems to have become a political partner of the PRC in the first place and not merely an economic partner. Let us now turn to the other five cases to put China into perspective.

As previously mentioned, the Russian Federation also maintains a diplomatic representation to the EU which is separate from its embassy to Belgium. According to the EU's diplomatic list, it has 60 diplomatic staff, which is clearly above the average of staff in Russian embassies to EU member states (about 40). However, it is still less than half of the number of staff in the Russian embassy to Germany which has as many as 138 diplomats. The representation is also not an embassy but a 'permanent mission.' However, it has a full-fledged Ambassador representing Russia to the EU. Russia opened its mission only two years after diplomatic relations with the then EC were established in 1989. This is much faster than China. While 'trade, commercial and economic cooperation' have been the basis, also the Russians consider their relations to the EU to be of highly political 'strategic' importance. On the website, the EU is called Russia's 'most important foreign-policy all[y],' especially in a world that is marked by border-transgressing issues, 'such as the global financial and economic crisis and climate change.' Russia first and foremost wants to 'foster' its relations to the EU 'by diplomatic means' such as by informing on Russian domestic and foreign policy, through high-level visits and so on. This introduction to Russia's permanent mission reveals that Russia considers the EU as a professional diplomatic player as well (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2011a, 2011b).

This can be confirmed when examining the website's layout. All major buttons are on classical political issues such as 'Russian Foreign Policy' or 'Russia-EU relations.' The EU's geopolitical significance, notably its role in security, is prominent. There is also information on more technical, low politics domains like trade or science and technology. However, this information is subordinate and cannot be found that easily. This is in contrast to the links leading to the EU-Russian 'Political Dialogue' or the 'Inter-parliamentary dialogue' (Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2011a, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e). The fact that there are no links on the website referring to Russia's bilateral embassies to EU member states underlines the importance that it attaches to the EU as a diplomatic player.

Continuing with Algeria, there is first of all no separate Algerian mission to the EU, but one that is integrated into the embassy to Belgium.

Nevertheless, the EU has a Delegation in Algiers since 1979, three years after diplomatic relations were established (Algerian Embassy in Brussels, 2011; Delegation of the European Union to Algeria, 2011). With 13 diplomats, the mission is better equipped in terms of human resources than the average of nine Algerian embassies to EU member states. However, the embassy also gives priority to bilateral relations with Belgium and Luxembourg as well as to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Informing on 'the activities of the EU and the other European institutions which are of interest to Algeria' is only mentioned last on the website.[18] The activities referred to are concrete agreements with the EU such as the Association Agreement, the Union for the Mediterranean, or financial cooperation and EU investments in Algeria (Algerian Embassy in Brussels, 2011). Some of these agreements have a very political dimension.[19] Moreover, the overall amount of information on the EU that can be found on the website exceeds that on Belgium, Luxembourg, or NATO. Nevertheless, there is no such high political speak in relation to the EU as can be found on the websites of the Chinese or the Russian missions to the EU. Overall, from an Algerian viewpoint, the EU is not a diplomatic player with a high degree of diplomatic professionalism.

Moving on to the case of Pakistan, there is no separate mission to the EU either – although the EU maintains a Delegation in Islamabad since 1985 (Delegation of the European Union to Pakistan, 2011). What is more is that there are only three diplomats posted, which is below the already low average of five diplomats per Pakistani embassy to EU member states. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan's embassy to the UK is the one with most diplomats (23). Interestingly, Pakistan maintains an 'Embassy *in Brussels*, Belgium,' so there is no prioritization of nation-states (in this case Belgium or Luxembourg) as traditional diplomatic players (Embassy of Pakistan in Brussels, 2011a; emphasis added by the author). However, His Excellency Jalil Abbas Jilani 'is the Ambassador of Pakistan *to the EU*, Belgium and Luxembourg' (Embassy of Pakistan in Brussels, 2011b; emphasis added by the author). Apart from that, the online representation is more about Pakistan itself than about bilateral relations to Belgium, Luxembourg, or the EU.

Some hints concerning the latter can be found under the heading of 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy.' It is mentioned that 'Pakistan is committed to the continuous development of beneficial and strong ties with all major powers,' including 'regional blocs' such as the EU. The reason is quite pragmatic: the EU is seen as an 'economic power center [...]' and a 'major partner [...] of Pakistan in trade, economic and technological cooperation.' These are considered key issue areas in contemporary global politics

that becomes visible on the website: there are very visible buttons on 'Economic Information' and the 'Commercial Section.' By contrast, there is no link through which one can clearly and visibly access information on high political issues. Nonetheless, when it comes to classical diplomatic relations, there seems to be a priority for nation-states rather than the EU: 'Mindful of the inherent strength of Europe [...], Pakistan has endeavored to intensify relations with major European countries and increase our interaction with the European Union' (Embassy of Pakistan in Brussels, 2011c, 2011a). Overall, the data show that Pakistan does attach importance to the EU, but sees it more as an economic giant rather than a political or diplomatic player in the traditional sense.

Turning to the final case, India maintains an 'Embassy to Belgium, Luxembourg, and the European Union.' Its function as an embassy to Belgium and Luxembourg takes precedence over the fact that '[t]he Embassy *also* functions as the Mission of India to the EU and its various Institutions' (Embassy of India to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union, 2011a, 2011b). Also, with ten diplomats, its human resources are just about the average of diplomatic staff posted in EU member states.[20] In contrast to the embassy websites of Pakistan, there is a very visible button linking to information on India's relations with the EU. Information on the EU is richer than on the bilateral relations with Belgium and Luxembourg. Also, political relations with the EU clearly take precedence over low politics such as trade or science and technology. Not without pride, it is stated that India 'was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the [then] European Economic Community (EEC)' in the 1960s. As a result, it seems a bit odd that the Commission opened a Delegation in Delhi only in 1983 – and that India still does not have a separate mission to the EU in Brussels. Similar to the cases of China and Russia, India also considers that its relationship to the EU has gone 'well beyond trade and economic cooperation' not least because of the Union's 'increasing political [...] weight' and because the Union is a 'pillar in the multipolar world.' It is for this reason that traditional diplomacy towards the EU, for example in the form of summits, need to be fostered. There are even summaries of all EU-India summits that have taken place up to date (Embassy of India to Belgium, Luxembourg and the European Union, 2011a, 2011c).

Overall, while India does not maintain a separate mission to the EU, it still sees the EU as an important political player, even more so than an economic one. I will now summarize the findings and discuss them.

From Table 6.33 we can see that China, Russia, and India consider the EU to be a diplomatic player with a high level of professionalism. This

Table 6.33 Step 3.3: third countries' missions to the EU in Brussels

	Evidence	If H1 is true (IV level of development)	If H2 is true (IV strategic importance)	If H3 is true (IV economic importance)	If H4 is true (IV political culture)
China (base line)	Highly professional EUD	Highly professional EUD	EUDs with low degree of professionalism	Highly professional EUD	Highly professional EUD
Russia (not developing)	Highly professional EUD	EUDs with low degree of professionalism	EUDs with low degree of professionalism	Highly professional EUD	Highly professional EUD
Algeria (not strategically important)	EUD with low degree of professionalism	Highly professional EUD	Highly professional EUD	Highly professional EUD	Highly professional EUD
Pakistan (not economically important)	EUD with medium to low degree of professionalism	Highly professional EUD	EUDs with low degree of professionalism	EUDs with low degree of professionalism	Highly professional EUD
India (no different political culture)	Highly professional EUD	Highly professional EUD	EUDs with low degree of professionalism	Highly professional EUD	EUDs with low degree of professionalism

is less the case for Pakistan, but clearly least for Algeria. These results point to the IV 2 of strategic importance as the most important determinant of the diplomatic professionalism of EUDs. However, just as for the previous analysis of internal coordination and external representation (step 2), the reverse logic is at work: in countries of high strategic importance, the EUDs' level of professionalism is high as well; so is their capacity to centralize European diplomacy.

I will now summarize the results for step 3 of the empirical analysis by discussing the evidence for each hypothesis in turn:

- *H1:* The above evidence does not support hypothesis 1 according to which the less developed a third country is, the higher the level of diplomatic professionalism of the local EUD is. Concerning indicators 1 and 3, neither the self-conception of the EUDs abroad, nor the profiles of third country representations in Brussels vary according to the level of development. Regarding indicator 2, member state embassies report about their own development programs on their websites. They do so without reference to the EU in general or to the EU Delegation in particular.
- *H2:* There is considerable evidence for the impact of the second independent variable, strategic importance. The logic is, however, opposite to what has been hypothesized. Firstly, the way that EU Delegations conceptualize themselves and how they present their work reveals a high level of diplomatic professionalism in countries of strategic importance, notably China, Russia, Pakistan, and India. This is mitigated by stressing the complementarity rather than the replacement of member state embassies in the case of China and – somewhat less – in the case of India. Also, with the exception of Pakistan, it is these strategically important countries whose missions in Brussels reveal that they consider the EU a very professional diplomatic institution.
- *H3:* The evidence reveals some overlap for IVs 2 and 3. However, there is a highly professional EUD in Pakistan. Meanwhile, the EUD to Algeria exhibits a rather low degree of diplomatic professionalism. This pattern shows that strategic rather than economic importance seems to be the more convincing explanatory variable for the centralization of European diplomacy. Additionally, the Pakistani embassy in Brussels gives more weight to the EU as a diplomatic player than the Algerian embassy in Brussels.
- *H4:* Finally, none of the indicators show supporting evidence for H4. Normative politics are virtually never mentioned, neither by the EUDs nor by the member state embassies. What is more, fostering

cultural relations is a priority for the vast majority of member state embassies. This cultural promotion should be seen as a way to foster bilateral trade rather than member states being the 'actual' normative powers.

Overall, as far as the role of the European Delegations in the world are concerned, the results of this chapter suggest that the European Union is on its way to become diplomatic and a 'political giant.' The EU is without doubt still an 'economic power.' However, the empirical results above put into question the label of 'economic giant,' which the Union received from scholars and politicians alike (see for example Diez Medrano, 2004). Finally, it follows from the analysis that the EU appears to be a 'normative dwarf' rather than a normative power. With this in mind, let us now move on to the final conclusion of this book.

7
Conclusion: A Diplomatic Service of Different Speeds

Summary: The EU as a diplomatic actor of different speeds

With the Treaty of Lisbon the European Union has taken a major step towards integrating one of the most sensitive politics areas: diplomatic representation. The Lisbon Treaty has established a Brussels-based foreign service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), which includes a network of diplomatic representations of the Union in third countries all over the world. These so-called 'EU Delegations' had previously existed as representations of the European Commission for over six decades. In many ways, Lisbon has transformed them into prototype 'embassies for Europe.' The Treaty thereby provides third countries with a local telephone number of the European Union. Hence, over time and notably through the Lisbon Treaty, the Delegations formally as well as informally obtained the power to channel diplomatic activity in EU matters.

I have termed this channelling the 'centralization of European diplomacy' in non-EU countries' capital cities. This centralization is comprised of four aspects: first, the increasing breadth of the Delegation network, making it the fourth largest diplomatic network compared to all EU member states; second, the internal coordination of EU policy among member state embassies which is channelled through the EU Delegations; third, a more and more unified external representation abroad not least since the Delegations have taken over the EU Presidency in third country capitals; and fourth, the growing diplomatic professionalism of the EUDs, making them similar to embassies in the traditional sense. This centralization of European diplomacy reflects a crucial phenomenon of contemporary international relations: the dissipation of state sovereignty upwards to international organizations with supranational characteristics (SN-IGOs).

There has been widespread criticism of the EEAS and its effectiveness in strengthening the EU's voice in global politics. From a theoretical point of view, state-centrism in EU foreign policy tends to persist. Hence an implicit distinction of high and low politics persists as well. While the EU Delegations are unlikely to make national diplomatic representations outright superfluous, this book puts the state-centrism and the related critique regarding the EEAS into perspective. It has shown that over time and notably since Lisbon, the Delegations have gained tremendous influence in centralizing European diplomacy in the world.

Yet, there are still several obstacles. Some of these are simply a question of consolidation and require time. Examples are the need to clarify the lines of reporting to the various institutions in Brussels or the integration of diplomats from member states' MFAs into the EEAS and its Delegations.[1] But one barrier is unlikely to be overcome as time goes by: the fact that the power of EU Delegations to centralize European diplomacy varies across the third states in which they are posted. A frequently cited example is that the EU does not speak with one voice towards countries such as the People's Republic of China. Meanwhile, such complaints are rare when it comes to speaking with one voice towards Lesotho, Canada, or East Timor. This variation makes Europe's new External Action Service a 'diplomatic service of different speeds.' The goal of this book was to uncover the underlying logic of these different speeds by giving an answer to the question of why the EU can centralize European diplomacy more easily in some third states rather than in others.

Based on the major theories of European integration, I have tested four hypotheses to give an answer to this question. I will now summarize the test results, including their limitations and the implications for European integration theory. Thereafter, I will give suggestions for further research on the centralization of European diplomacy as an instance of sovereignty dissipation in current global politics. Finally, a number of policy recommendations for the EEAS will round off the book.

The first hypothesis stipulated that the less developed a third country is, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. This first hypothesis was based on the oldest theory of European integration, Neo-Functionalism, which regards European integration as a series of spillover effects from one policy domain towards another. The theory predicts that eventually, even high politics, such as diplomacy, are communitarized (Haas, 1961, p. 373). A more recent approach in EU studies, Historical Institutionalism, supplements the Neo-Functionalist logic with the concept of path dependence: once EU institutions control a policy field, they gain technical expertise and can further expand

their influence (Christiansen and Piattoni, 2004, p.158; Barnett and Finnmore, 2004 in Haftel and Thompson, 2006, p. 254). Since most of the first Delegations were opened in developing countries, it follows that these long-standing Delegations are particularly well equipped and positioned to centralize European diplomacy. It is likely that their originally very technical tasks, for instance implementing development aid, have spilled over to genuine diplomatic work (Spence, 2004, p. 65).

As for the first aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy, the breadth of the Delegation network, there is confirming evidence for this hypothesis: the EU tends to be present with a fully fledged EU Delegation in countries that are underdeveloped.

Regarding the second and third aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy, the internal coordination and the unified external representation of European diplomacy, Delegations in developing countries are also quite well positioned: there tend to be few national embassies in such countries. This arguably eases coordination and also facilitates a unified external representation: the EU Delegation can be more visible. Moreover, it is Delegations in developing countries that were entrusted early on with the new Lisbon tasks. This is an indication that they were better prepared than others to take over the new diplomatic responsibilities. There are not more diplomatic staff in such Delegations than in others; neither are the Heads of Delegation particularly senior, nor do they tend to come from the EU rather than the member states' foreign services.

Concerning the fourth aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy, the Delegation's diplomatic professionalism, no confirming evidence could be found for hypothesis 1. Delegations are not very similar to traditional embassies, neither in their own self-conception, nor from the perspective of the local member states' embassies. Also, the examination of developing countries' diplomatic missions to Brussels shows that these countries do not consider the EU a diplomatic player on par with member state embassies.

These results should now be linked with the implications for European integration theory. The confirming overall evidence for the first hypothesis not only supports Institutionalist perspectives on EU foreign policy but also seems at first sight like a small theoretical revolution (Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009; Petrov, 2010): although even the founding father of Neo-Functionalism, Ernst Haas, has abandoned his own theory, it now seems to have validity for the most sensitive of policy areas, diplomatic representation.

Such a conclusion, however, needs to be qualified with a view to the current state of the EEAS. The EU's Delegation network is already large

and the last gaps in the network are being filled with new Delegation openings. This shows that the presence of an EU Delegation as such is becoming somewhat a natural state of affairs. Regarding the sheer presence of the EU, the EEAS can soon no longer be considered a diplomatic service of different speeds. It seems plausible though that the long-term experience of the EU in developing countries has triggered an early Lisbon transformation in such countries. This is in line with the insights on the historical development of Delegations (Chapter 3), which has revealed a number of spillover effects over time.

However, it should not be forgotten that no relationship was found for other decisive indicators such as the number of diplomatic staff, the seniority of the Head of an EU Delegation, and the diplomatic professionalism of such Delegations. The ease of centralizing diplomacy in developing countries is also very much due to the fact that the representation of member state embassies is rather thin. The reason could be that least developed countries are quite rarely the most important ones in terms of strategic and economic importance. While the overall result of the EU being able to centralize diplomacy to developing countries needs to be recognized, it is doubtful whether real spillover logic is at work.

Let us move on to the second hypothesis that claimed that the lower the strategic importance of a third country, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. This second hypothesis was based on the Intergovernmentalists among EU theorists who consider European integration to remain a function of member state interests. These theorists argue that high politics, notably diplomacy, would always remain under the control of EU member states (Hoffmann, 1966; Union for Staff of the European Institutions, 2010). As such, the very existence of the EEAS and the Delegations is at odds with this Realism-inspired strand of European integration theory (Hill and Smith, 2005, p. 389). Applying the Intergovernmentalist logic to the issue at hand, one would expect that Delegations in the countries of highest strategic importance, such as in terms of national capabilities, would be the most restricted in centralizing European diplomacy.

The results for this hypothesis test are probably the most interesting ones since they point out that the opposite logic is true: the stronger the national capabilities of a third country are, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. Let us examine this conclusion. As for the first aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy, the network's breadth, the EU tends to be present with a full-fledged EU Delegation in countries of global strategic importance. The effect size of this relationship is small. Yet, this result stands in contrast to the persisting

assumption that the EU cannot speak with one voice in strategically important countries. It should be stressed that two countries of clear strategic importance do not host an EU Delegation so far: North Korea and Iran. Recent openings of new EU Delegations however suggest that the Lisbon-strengthened EEAS seems to be capable of correcting this.

Putting this result into perspective, it was already mentioned that the presence of an EU Delegation is no longer all that special and specific to a certain type of country. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence that in countries of high strategic importance, the EU is well-resourced and equipped for the second and third aspects of the centralization of European diplomacy. These aspects are internal coordination with local member state embassies and a unified external representation of the EU towards the host country. Delegations in strategically important countries have many diplomatic staff and their Heads of Delegation tend to be more senior than those posted in other places. However, it is also in these countries that there are many and arguably well-resourced national embassies present. This mitigates the capacity of the EU Delegations concerning internal coordination of European diplomacy and external representation of the EU abroad.

Concerning the fourth aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy, the data show that the degree of diplomatic professionalism of Delegations located in strategically important countries is clearly high: EU Delegations work similarly to traditional embassies according to their own self-conception and in the eyes of their host countries, too. This is somewhat mitigated by stressing the complementarity of EU Delegations alongside national embassies. Still, the EU's diplomatic representation in strategically less important countries seems less professional. Here, the EU is first and foremost regarded as a trading partner and / or a donor rather than a political and diplomatic entity.

Overall, the EU is a central player in local diplomacy, especially in countries of strategic importance. Although this also counts for national embassies, well-resourced EU Delegations may better exploit the new Lisbon competences than others. These results provide evidence against the validity of Realism-based theories to explain European integration in the field of diplomacy and the dissipation of state sovereignty to supranational actors in general.

The third hypothesis stipulated that the higher the economic importance of a third country is, the stronger the EU Delegation *and* the stronger the member state embassies are. In countries of high economic importance, centralization of European diplomacy was expected to be ambiguous. This third hypothesis was based on the Liberalism-inspired

updates of Intergovernmentalism, notably by Andrew Moravcsik. He stresses the importance of domestic politics to explain international relations. Accordingly, and in contrast to what traditional Realists assume, the preferences of nation-states can change and are not set in stone. Given the influence of globalization, particularly regarding economic ties across states, trade relations have become an absolute priority area of all nation-states (Pierre and Peters, 2000, p. 86). As a result, states try to foster trade relations through common rules, which is why the EU has a central role in this respect. However, nation-states are also economic competitors (Bungenberg et al., 2011, p. 177). Hence, it is plausible to assume that they do not let the EU deal with economic diplomacy all the way. Under this hypothesis, ambiguity in terms of diplomatic representation to key trading partners is the likely result: a strong EU Delegation and strong member state embassies should be present simultaneously.

I will now discuss the results of this hypothesis test. Concerning the first aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy, the Delegation network's breadth, it is true that the EU tends to maintain full-fledged Delegations in countries of economic importance rather than in countries that are no key trading partners. But the effect size is very small. Regarding the second and third aspects of centralizing diplomacy, internal coordination and external representation, the variable of economic importance tends to follow the same pattern as the variable of strategic importance. For instance, the higher a third country's economic importance, the more national embassies are present in the respective capital. With regards to the indicators that only measure the EUD's resources rather than the relationship to national embassies, the effect size is smaller (such as for the number of diplomatic staff and for the seniority of the Head of Delegation). Adding all indicators related to EUD resources together, there is no significant relationship. Thus, unlike what was hypothesized, the chances of finding a well-resourced EU Delegation are not higher for important trading partners of the EU than for relatively unimportant trading partners. When it comes to the diplomatic professionalism of the EU and its Delegations, the results also point to strategic importance of a third country as a more decisive variable than economic importance. Concerning the overall implications for European integration theory, these results support the assumption that economics are the new high politics. This result puts the EU's role as an 'economic giant' in the world into question, which is arguably quite a new perspective on the EU.

Last but not least, I hypothesized that the more different the political culture of a third country is compared to the EU and its members,

the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. This fourth hypothesis is related to the heated debate related to Social Constructivism and Europe as a normative power in the world. Social Constructivism stipulates that ideas and mutual perception determine international relations. Actors categorize other actors into 'friends and foes.' A 'common Other,' for example a state with a very different political culture, gives a group of states that share this 'common Other' the feeling of belonging together (Wendt, 1999, 1992, pp. 396–7, 404; Hyde-Price, 2006). Additionally, the EU has been described as a normative force that promotes and diffuses democratic values and norms around the world. Applied to the research at hand, the EU Delegations can be seen as a tool in this endeavor.

As far as the results are concerned, this hypothesis has the weakest confirmatory evidence. Regarding the first aspect of the centralization of European diplomacy, the network's breadth, EU Delegations tend to be present in countries of similar political culture rather than the other way around. But again the effect size is virtually negligible. On closer inspection, this does not necessarily dismiss the last hypothesis' logic. After all, European diplomatic practice is such that diplomatic relations, for instance the presence of an Ambassador or of an entire embassy may be suspended. Such action is a sign of protest, for example in the case of severe human rights violations. Once there are signs of change, European diplomats are eager to support reforms to make third countries' political culture 'more European,' notably through an EU Delegation. The rationale for the recent openings of EU Delegations to Libya and to Myanmar are cases in point (European Voice, 2012; European Commission, 2011). Although this is not statistically significant, it still provides evidence in support of hypothesis 4.

The results of the second and third aspects of the centralization of European diplomacy, internal coordination and external representation, clearly show that there is no significant relationship with any of the indicators. This may be due to the bias of quantitative methods against Constructivist theory. But the qualitative analysis of step 3 also does not support the idea that the EUDs in third states with a very different political culture are diplomatic players with a high degree of professionalism. Overall, the Social Constructivist strand of European integration theory does not seem to be very useful in explaining the patterns of European diplomatic representation in the world.

To put the results in a nutshell, I transformed the hypotheses into the following theses about the centralization of European diplomacy

across third states. They are ordered according to the strength of the evidence:

- *Thesis 1:* The higher the strategic importance of a third country, the better the resources and conditions for EU Delegations to centralize European diplomacy. This is mitigated through the presence of many, arguably well-resourced member state embassies in such countries. In countries of high strategic importance, centralization of European diplomacy is ambiguous. Yet, well-resourced EUDs are likely to exploit the new Lisbon competences more than others.
- *Thesis 2:* The less developed a third country, the more centralized European diplomacy is in that country. This is mostly due to the long-term experience of Delegations in developing countries as well as the thin presence of national embassies. Yet, the logic does not apply to decisive EUD resources such as the number of diplomatic staff or the seniority of a Head of Delegation. Also, Delegations in developing countries do not exhibit a higher degree of diplomatic professionalism than Delegations elsewhere.
- *Thesis 3:* The higher the economic importance of a third country is, the better some of the resources and conditions for EU Delegations are to centralize European diplomacy such as the number of staff. This is, however, mitigated through the presence of many well-resourced member state embassies in such countries. In countries of high economic importance, centralization of European diplomacy is not easy.
- *Thesis 4:* There is no relationship between the similarity of political culture of a third country compared to the EU and the EU's capacity to centralize European diplomacy. Nevertheless, the EU Delegations are an important tool for the Union to support countries that have started reform towards a more 'EU-like' political culture.

With these central findings, the book has contributed to an understanding of the state and the development of the EU's new External Action Service. The reproach that the EU does not speak with one voice is only partially true. It requires qualification, namely by including external variables: the long-term trend of the EU's capacity to be a unified diplomatic player in the world depends on the counterpart of the dialogue, the third country. The strategic importance of a third country is most decisive and, to a lesser extent, so too is its level of development. Centralization of diplomacy towards major trading partners seems more difficult than expected and normative aspects such as political culture only play a very marginal role. These findings are particularly interesting

as they put the common assumption of the EU being an economic giant, a normative power, and a political dwarf into question. The EU is no longer the 'lonesome rider' as there are an increasing number of international organizations with supranational characteristics (SN-IGOs). Therefore, the findings also help understand the logic of the upward dissipation of state sovereignty in more general terms.

Need for further research

There are of course a number of limitations to this study and further research is required to overcome them. Firstly, research on the centralization of diplomacy from nation-state to the supranational level needs to be conducted for SN-IGOs other than the EU. The EU is certainly a crucial case as it is arguably the most integrated and in that sense 'advanced' SN-IGO in the world. Nevertheless, it would be extremely insightful to see if and how other SN-IGOs develop their own network of representations to conduct their external relations with countries as well as with other international organizations.[2] While some research on this issue has been conducted a few decades ago, work on the diplomatic representation of IGOs other than the European Union is surprisingly hard to come by nowadays (Dembinski, 1988; Kunz, 1947; Alger and Brams, 1967, p. 662).

Secondly, a real challenge for this study was to reconcile the need for establishing a comprehensive analytical framework and generalizable findings with diplomacy being a highly complex and very often context-bound endeavor. I tried to address this challenge in three ways: first, by applying the concept of European diplomacy centralization consistently throughout this book; second, by seeking to verify the explanatory value of the dominant theoretical paradigms in European integration theory; and third, by analyzing a rich variety of indicators for which there exist comparable data across the majority of third countries.

There are still a lot of limitations in attempting to capture all facets, notably the processes and exact causes for the centralization of (European) diplomacy. This constitutes a research gap that can be better addressed through in-depth qualitative studies on single cases. Edith Drieskens has done so in her cutting-edge work on the EU Delegation to the United Nations in New York; Arnout Justaert and Stephan Keukeleire have provided interesting insights for the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Serena Kelly has enriched the research on EU Delegations with a regional approach on the Asia-Pacific region. I have attempted to contribute to filling the research gap in my work on the case of China (Drieskens, 2012; Justaert and Keukeleire, 2010; Kelly, 2012; Austermann,

2012b). China is a particularly interesting case because it has evolved from one of the poorest developing countries in the world towards a major power in global politics. Respectively, the possibilities and the style of centralization of European diplomacy towards Beijing have changed over time. It would be interesting to compare this case to other third countries that have evolved in similar ways, such as the other BRICS.

Generally, such 'thick description type' studies can be very useful and are indeed necessary. After all, the EU has been, still is, and is likely to remain a project that is in constant flux without a blueprinted outcome. Therefore, the exact processes, the 'how' rather than the 'why,' need to be continuously re-examined. In this context, it would be especially interesting to find out how the centralization of European diplomacy has changed as third countries have evolved, such as from poor developing countries.

However, this recommendation alone is one-sided as it leads to the well-known trade-off of depth versus breadth. Generalization of such findings to the universe of cases is difficult. I therefore simultaneously plead for further developing a quantitative approach, for example by refining and complementing the 'European Diplomacy Centralization Index,' which has been proposed in this book. I would welcome innovative ideas on indicators that capture diplomatic professionalism, meaning the similarity of EU Delegations compared to traditional embassies, quantitatively. One way would be to investigate the staff structure within each Delegation, that is, the human resources of the different departments, notably the nascent political sections.

Streamlining speeds of diplomacy? Recommendations and outlook

What are the lessons to be learned from this book for diplomatic practice, especially in Europe and for the EU? The External Action Service by now has been in place for almost three years. Critical voices are still abundant. Such critique and the fact that a general review of the EEAS has been published in July 2013 make it worthwhile to reflect on policy recommendations for Catherine Ashton and her team (Ashton, 2013).[3]

First and foremost, the analysis of the likely causes for a diplomatic service of different speeds should allow for a more systematic mapping of holes in the Union's diplomatic grid. On that basis, these holes can subsequently be filled. However, notwithstanding the emphasis on the influence of third countries on the impact that an EU Delegation can make, clarity in Brussels is of course vital. Without clear lines of reporting, an unambiguous division of labor across institutions, and

Brussels-based cooperation instead of inter-institutional competition, it is hard for the EEAS' diplomatic antennas to make their contribution to a more unified European voice in the world (Blockmans, 2012, p. 8; cf. Murdoch, 2012, p. 1011). Such a common voice was one of the main rationales behind the creation of the EEAS. It is therefore necessary to avoid or at least to quickly solve turf fights of the sort we have seen during the set-up of the EEAS.

Beyond that, and given the persisting sensitivity of the European Union entering diplomatic territory, the Delegations' added value should be clear to and appreciate by national MFAs and their embassy networks. A cooperative work attitude on the part of EU Delegations is needed so as to stress their potential to coordinate and to channel European diplomacy, and to be an accessible hub for information and expertise with regard to their respective region. This has largely been the work mode of the previous Commission Delegations, and it is worthwhile to continue and expand (Drieskens, 2012; European diplomats, 2010). The Delegations themselves benefit from openness and accessibility towards national foreign services not least because they are being transformed from a technocratic service into a more political one. This is where the member states' MFAs can 'upload' their experiences to the EEAS (cf. Börzel, 2002, p. 196).

An emphasis on transparency and sharing information is also useful when it comes to inter-Delegation cooperation. Despite the vastly different contexts that EUDs face from one country to another, previous research, and also this book have shown that there are general trends. In other words, groups of Delegations are likely to deal with similar issues (Bruter, 1999). Throughout conducting this research, it became clear that the institutional memory of each Delegation should be strengthened. Archiving the work of Delegations still seems to be rudimentary. At times, there was the impression that when a new Head of Delegation arrives, he or she has to start many things from scratch again due to a lack of communication and continuity (European diplomat, 2011c). Additionally, frequent exchange and promotion of best practices of Delegations across countries seems to be a very recent development, too. This is worthwhile developing.

Nevertheless, a balance needs to be kept between coherence of the foreign service across third countries on the one hand, while catering to specific local needs on the other. Accordingly, a sort of 'Open Method of Coordination' across EU Delegations could be developed. This is a work mode known from other EU policy domains (Buchs, 2007). The necessity to strike this balance puts the whole endeavor of speaking with

one voice into perspective, thereby echoing the Union's founding motto 'unity in diversity.' As a high-level European diplomat put it, instead of streamlining the diplomatic system of the EU towards one common voice, the different actors and institutions should perhaps 'sing the same song from the same sheet of music [but] by all means, with several voices.'

Lastly, one should not expect miracles from the EEAS. Doubts about the future of European integration, which have been expressed notably due to the European debt crisis, as well as Europe's relative decline in contemporary global politics, are unlikely to be prevented by yet another body within the institutional jungle of Brussels.

Notes

1 Introduction: European Diplomacy after Lisbon – Different Speeds Instead of One Voice

1. Compare Art. 18.3 of the Treaty of Amsterdam with Art. 18.2 of the Treaty of Lisbon (see European Union, 2010, 1997).
2. These are the total number of staff members that is EEAS officials, seconded personnel, local staff, and so on. One must add about 2,500 staff members from the European Commission who are working in the EU Delegations (see Ashton, 2013; Hemra et al., 2011, p. 12).
3. See Annex of the Lisbon Treaty: Departments and Functions to be Transferred to the EEAS
4. In this book, the term 'European diplomacy' refers to the diplomatic activities of both the European Union institutions and its member states. I intentionally avoid the term 'EU diplomacy' because the diplomatic activities of member states and of the EU as whole may very well still be different from each other as decision making is not fully integrated. At the same time, the EEAS crosses the lines between diplomatic activities at EU level and diplomatic activities at the EU member state level, which will be shown later in this book. The term does not include the diplomatic activities of countries that are located on the European continent but are not members of the European Union.
5. A few very insightful studies have been produced or are in the making, for example by John Fox and François Godement (see Fox and Godement, 2009) or by May-Britt Stumbaum (see Stumbaum, 2012). Nonetheless, these studies are limited in terms of their comparative approach as they only cover one or a few countries.
6. For a critical view on the EU's common voice in trade policy, see Meunier (2000).

2 Centralization of European Diplomacy in Theory

1. Although with his seminal definition Ernst Haas avoids a regional restriction, his work was mostly related to the case of European integration: "a process 'whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions process or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1958, p. 16).
2. Translation from Latin: "Whose Realm, His Religion"
3. The standard definition of power frequently used in political science was given by Robert Dahl: "A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not do otherwise," see Dahl, 1957.

4. Some scholars, however, maintain that international hierarchy has always been present but simply ignored, notably so by Realist thinkers, see Lake (2003, p. 303).
5. Close to 1000 Administrator-posts (AD5 to 16) and close to 700 Assistant-posts (AST1 to AST11; see European Union, 2013)
6. Additionally, 3,500 Commission officials are working in the EU Delegations (Ashton, 2013, p. 14).
7. See Art. 30: 'The High Contracting Parties and the Commission, through mutual assistance and information, shall intensify co-operation between their representations accredited to third countries and international organizations.'
8. Albeit the fact that Delegations have not always been successful in reaching out to these stakeholders, see Chaban et al. (2009) and cf. Blockmans (2012, p. 16).

3   Diplomatic Representation of the EU Over Time

1. Calculated by the author on the basis of European Commission information (websites, secondary literature, email, and telephone correspondence in spring 2011). It is assumed that the Delegations to Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso were opened in that decade as well (European Economic Community, 1957).
2. Calculated by the author on the basis of European Commission information (websites, secondary literature, email, and telephone correspondence in spring 2011). It is assumed that the Delegations to Tanzania and Djibouti were opened in that decade, too.
3. On average, about nine years before a country accesses the EU, a Delegation is opened in the respective capital city (calculated by the author based on all 21 European countries that accessed the EC/EU after its establishment in the 1950s).
4. Compiled by the author based on EU Delegation websites, and websites of member state foreign ministries and embassies (accessed in February/March 2011). For the sake of comparison, only fully fledged embassies and EU Delegations towards sovereign states outside the EU-27 were counted (that is excluding member state consulates, EU liaison offices other than Delegations, embassies of one EU member state towards another, and permanent representations to international organizations); Bar chart first published in Austermann (2012a). The empirical research for this book was conducted before the accession of Croatia as the 28th member state. It is therefore not included in the data set.
5. This refers to the Directorates General of the Commission that handle 'traditional' external relations portfolios, notably trade, development, enlargement, international cooperation, humanitarian aid, and crisis response; see (Rüger, 2012).
6. Calculated by the author based on HR/VP Ashton's answer to a parliamentary question by MEP Ingeborg Grässle; see (Ashton, 2009a).
7. While EP officials who are seconded to the EEAS are also directly accountable to the HR/VP during their time of service at the EEAS, they might contribute to increase the level of centralization of European diplomacy based on their previous socialization in the EP. The EP is generally weary of an intergovernmental, 'de-communitarised' foreign service (Behr et al., 2010, p. 6; Hemra et al., 2011, p. 18; Wisniewski, 2011, p. 13; Murdoch et al., 2013, p. 2).

8. AD level refers to "administrator function group," which is part of the system of bureaucratic hierarchy in the European Union; see European Personnel Selection Office (2012).

9. In the previous versions of the Treaty on European Union, the member states' embassies and the Commission Delegations were merely supposed to "cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented"; see European Union (2006), Art. 20.

10. To refer to Ambassadors and Heads of EC/EU Delegations, I will make use of the masculine form. It shall be understood in a gender-neutral way, including both male and female Ambassadors.

11. Member state embassies were counted by the author based on diplomatic lists (see for example US Department of Defense, 2012)

12. The Spanish Presidency during the first semester of 2010 still sought to secure its prestige such as by postponing the takeover of the Presidency in third countries with whom the EU had scheduled summits or in third countries that are former Spanish colonies (see Rettman, 2010b). The Spanish Ambassador to Beijing also made bold – and arguably uncoordinated – moves in terms of lifting the arms embargo (see Barber and Anderlini, 2010). Belgium, by contrast, gave way to Catherine Ashton and the EEAS, not only because of its traditional pro-EU stance, but also due to the lack of a government for over 500 days (see European diplomats, 2010; BBC News, 2011b). Finally, Poland promised its support for Ashton, but still sought "to make a historic mark on EU affairs during its six-month tenure too" (Rettman, 2011a).

13. Calculated by the author on the basis of European Commission, 2010. Only bilateral Delegations to non-EU sovereign states were included.

14. EU members such as Cyprus, Slovenia, or the Baltic states have a network of Delegations of just 20 embassies (calculated by the author based on Union member states' MFAs; NB: Consulates or missions to IOs are not counted).

15. Such was the experience while conducting the empirical research for this book when the documents that officially opened the Commission Delegations to China, Russia, Algeria, Pakistan, and India were requested from the EU's respective archives. In some cases, the responsible officials were, however, unable to identify these documents; see EU official, 2011).

16. It is certainly possible that 28 member states unanimously agree on a given issue and convey the same message to a third state via their embassies. Vice versa, a given issue can also be very sensitive for just a few member states. As a result, the EU may seem highly disunited towards a host country, even if only four or five of them are present with an embassy. Nevertheless, in the former case all 28 member states must at least be asked for their opinion in the first.

17. First published in Austermann (2011, p. 59).

4 Analyzing the Patterns of European Diplomacy Centralization

1. Representatives of HI are rather lenient when it comes to the distinction between an institution and an organization. They 'associate institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization' (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 938).

2. One of the early institutionalists challenges this distinction, see Selznick (1996).

3. Short for the French term 'Relations Extérieures' (External Relations).

4. It should be stressed that theories based on Liberalist thought can be state-centered, too, as well as assuming rational interests. The biggest difference is probably the view on the possibility of state cooperation and the focus on the role of traditional power that is the role of the distribution of state capabilities to outcomes in IR, see Jackson and Sørensen (2007, p. 49) and Moravcsik (1997, p. 513).

5. This is essentially what Andrew Moravcsik stated in a panel discussion at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC in April 2010: 'Baroness Ashton's position is essentially, broadly speaking, a takeover by the member states of traditional commission prerogatives in foreign policy. It's presented as a melding of commission prerogatives and council prerogatives, member state actions like diplomacy and traditional EU actions like funding and trade. But, in fact, it's the member states clawing back power, like control over the EU delegation here in Washington, like control over funding; clawing back policy power back into the hands of member states,' see Union for Staff of the European Institutions (2010).

6. Prominent examples are that the largest share of EU member states' development aid is sent to their former colonies; see Alesina and Dollar (2000, pp. 33–4). A 'special example of special relations is contemporary German reconciliation policy with neighboring countries as well as Israel as a consequence of the atrocities committed during the World War II,' see Gardner Feldman (1999).

7. In this context, colonies are broadly defined territories claimed to belong to one of the EU member states (cf. Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d. All 161 current non-EU states were checked if any of the current EU member states used to politically control them in the past. In the case of several EU members having dominated one and the same country at some point, the last colonial power before independence was chosen to be the one with 'special ties.'

5   Measuring European Diplomacy Centralization

1. The majority of the personal interviews were conducted in the diplomatic quarter of Beijing. Additionally, telephone and email interviews were conducted, with diplomats based in Moscow, Algiers, Islamabad, New Delhi as well as Brussels and various EU member state capital cities.

2. At the time that the empirical research was completed (July 2012), there were 193 sovereign nation-states, with South Sudan being the most recent member. See United Nations (2012b).

3. The empirical research for this book was conducted before the accession of Croatia as the 28th member state. It is therefore not included in the data set.

4. For a directory of the EU Delegations see European Union (2012b). The distribution of the different types of offices was examined at the end of 2010/beginning of 2011.

5. At the time the empirical research was concluded (July 2012), these offices have been turned into fully fledged EU Delegations.

6. Edited volumes are more suitable for such endeavors. See for example Balfour and Raik (2013), and Hocking et al. (2005).

7. Civil servants belonging to the two main function groups in the EU system were counted: administrators and assistants (see European Personnel Selection Office, 2012). Data were taken from European Commission, 2010 (see column "Establishment plan posts"; document received via email correspondence with a Member of the European Parliament).

8. At the time of research, these were: Barbados, Ukraine, Thailand, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Colombia, China, Australia, Uruguay, Guyana, Lesotho, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Saudi Arabia, Jamaica, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Kazakhstan (counted by the author based on EU Delegation websites).

9. Data are taken from Ashton (2010). Document received via email correspondence with a Member of the European Parliament.

10. Data are taken from Rettman, (2010b), and Vogel (2010).

11. Other researchers take a similar approach such as Jelica Stefanovic-Štambuk in her paper '"About_Us": Whom the EU Delegations in third countries represent?' presented at the Workshop 'The EU Diplomatic System after Lisbon: Institutions Matter' of the research network The Diplomatic System of the EU, on 19 November 2010 in Maastricht, the Netherlands. Another example is Jesper Schlæger's work on values in public organizations, such as exhibited on their websites (paper presented during the conference 'New European Research on Contemporary China,' July 4–6, 2012, Beijing).

12. However, it should be mentioned that the European Union, via its agency EuropeAid, implements projects in these countries, such as assisting Russia 'on human rights and or civil society' (European Commission, 2012d) or helping Lebanon to become a 'democratic, politically open and economically strong neighbour' (European Commission, 2012e).

13. Since the number of national embassies is actually an indicator for this study's explanandum, notably step 2 of the analysis, this is strictly speaking a selection on the dependent variable. This practice has been dismissed by most social scientists because it delivers biased results (see for example Geddes, 1990) . However, when it comes to the selection of cases for step 3 of the analysis, it is a necessary means to control for the confounding factor of special ties.

6 Political Giant, Economic Power, Normative Dwarf: European Diplomacy Centralization across the Globe

1. The group of countries not hosting an EU Delegation is dominated by such countries as Antigua and Barbuda, Honduras of the Solomon Islands. These are arguably not of very high strategic or economic importance to the EU.

2. An alternative way would be factor analysis that checks significant correlations among indicators ('clusters') to group them into factors that tap into the same concept (see Field, 2005, p. 619) . I decided against this option as it is first and foremost interesting to see, based on the previously reviewed theory and development of EUDs, which indicators are relevant at all (individually and combined) before grouping them to factors. Moreover, to grasp the whole concept of the centralization of European diplomacy, a mix of

quantitative and qualitative data was necessary which cannot be easily summarized via factors.

3. One should be careful with this judgment as economic importance and HDI correlate slightly more than strategic importance and HDI (Pearson's r for the former: .31; for the latter: .49; calculated by the author). The result may have been that HDI has slightly lost in terms of prediction power in the second model compared to the first.

4. Data are taken from European Union (2010), and Council of the European Union (2011).

5. A diplomat's appointment in a specific country usually lasts about four years. This term first had to come to an end for a given EU Ambassador before Catherine Ashton could appoint a replacement.

6. It should be mentioned that level of development is close to meeting that criterion with $p = 0.056$.

7. Where possible, the English version of these websites was checked. Where necessary, the websites were translated with the help of online software.

8. All quotations of this paragraph are taken from Delegation of the European Union to China and Mongolia, 2011. Emphasis has been added by the author.

9. All quotations of this paragraph are taken from Delegation of the European Union to Russia, 2011.

10. Original quote: "L'objectif principal qui lui est assigné est d'apporter son soutien au développement et aux réformes économiques algériennes en renforçant et consolidant les relations de [sic] entre l'Union européenne et l'Algérie," see Delegation of the European Union in Algeria, 2011. All information of this paragraph is taken from Delegation of the European Union in Algeria, 2011.

11. Original quote: "Comme près de 130 délégations et bureaux à travers le monde, elle a représenté la Commission européenne en Algérie dans toute l'étendue des compétences qui sont dévolues à la Commission par les traités de Rome, de Maastricht et d'Amsterdam et de Nice," see Delegation of the European Union in Algeria, 2011.

12. All quotations of this paragraph are taken from Delegation of the European Union to Pakistan, 2011.

13. All quotations of this paragraph are taken from Delegation of the European Union to India, 2011, and Delegation of the European Union to India, 2012.

14. There is a (quite unusually) detailed description of the role and tasks of the Spanish as well as the Slovenian embassy in Beijing, see Embassy of Spain in Beijing, 2011, and Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in Beijing, 2012.

15. Insight to the full data sheet of the qualitative analysis can be requested from the author. A typical example for a traditionally working embassy is the Slovakian embassy in Moscow. The very first task mentioned when it comes to the embassy's role is: "carr[ying] out Slovakia's foreign policy in the field of bilateral relations as well as foreign policy, security and economic interests of the Slovak Republic." See Slovak Embassy in the Russian Federation, 2011.

16. Belgium: 1253 third state diplomats in Brussels; the Netherlands: 612 third state diplomats in The Hague; Germany: 1497 third state diplomats in Berlin; counted by the author based on diplomatic lists.

17. The highest number of Chinese diplomatic staff can be found in the Chinese embassy in Berlin (102).
18. Quote in the original: "Vous y trouverez également des informations sur les relations avec les partenaires belges, luxembourgeois, européens, ainsi que sur l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord (O.T.A.N.), les activités de l'UE et les autres Institutions européennes d'intérêt pour l'Algérie." See Algerian Embassy in Brussels, 2011.
19. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is about peace, stability, and prosperity, see http://www.algerian-embassy.be/eu/euromed/process-barcelone.htm.
20. Unsurprisingly, the Indian embassy to the UK has most staff, 43 diplomats; counted and calculated by the author based on diplomatic lists.

7 Conclusion: A Diplomatic Service of Different Speeds

1. European diplomats confirm that more than two years after the ratification of Lisbon, things are working much more smoothly in the Delegations abroad; see European diplomat (2013, 2012).
2. I am grateful to Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt for his suggestions in this regard.
3. I have summarized these recommendations elsewhere: Austermann (2012a).

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