

Other essays argue the familiar. In "Pericles, Thucydides, and the Defense of the Empire," Donald Kagan says that Pericles used defense and delay, the point made by Plutarch when the ancient biographer paired Pericles and Fabius Cunctator. In "Slave Wars of Greece and Rome," Barry Strauss reports the failure of ancient slave rebellions, but supplies a biography of Spartacus rather than an explanation for these failures. In spite of the second half of the title of Adrian Goldsworthy's "Julius Caesar and the General as State," this essay is one more biographical treatment.

Several essays argue anew. David Berkey's "Why Fortifications Endure: A Case Study of the Walls of Athens during the Classical Period," takes on a subject that only recently has received monographic treatment from a military viewpoint, and shows how Athens's walls served symbolic as well as practical purposes. Victor Davis Hanson returns to a subject that he has treated before, the successes of Epaminondas of Thebes, and shows how this general, known (and sometimes misunderstood) because of his tactics, and also known for liberating Messenia from Spartan domination, recasts this liberation in strategic terms: when freeing Messenia the Thebans capped a pre-emptive war against Sparta by weakening Sparta's military potential. Whereas Hanson deals with strategy, John Lee, in "Urban Warfare in the Classical Greek World," supplies a cogent chapter missing from recent military-history handbooks. The last essay in the volume, Peter J. Heather's "Holding the Line," condensing his recent work on Roman frontiers, is also the only essay to pay attention to enemy strategy, to unintended consequences, and to the interplay of diplomacy and war.

Heather also avoids catchwords such as "nation-building" and "counterinsurgency." Editor Hanson may have hoped his contributors would put such catchwords to good use. Hanson himself did, but not the others. In a volume that does not mention Carrhae, Trajan's eastern campaign, or the defeat of Julian, references to Iraq are jarring.

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**Roman Warfare.** By Jonathan P. Roth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. ISBN 978-0-521-53726-1. Illustrations. Maps. Timeline. Glossaries. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvii, 310. \$19.95.

As someone who teaches courses on Roman military history, I was delighted to see that Jonathan Roth had written a short, affordable volume on Roman warfare as part of the Cambridge Introduction to Roman Civilization series. Roth is known to military historians as the author of the superb *Logistics of the Roman Army at War* (264 B.C.-A.D. 235) as well as many reviews and book chapters, including a contribution to *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*.

Since the series is a program of books designed for use by students who have no prior knowledge of, or familiarity with, Roman antiquity, they are meant to

prepare the reader to move on to more specialized scholarly and critical studies. The book attempts to reflect the most up-to-date research while integrating primary texts into the narrative. These references are limited, however, since the text is meant to be closely linked to readings and topics presented in the Cambridge Latin course. This would explain why the sources for the Punic wars list Livy but not Polybius. The book has a clearly-stated agenda.

The text covers Roman history from the wars of early Rome to the fall of the empire in the West. The introduction lays out clearly the topics to be covered: the changing arms and equipment of the soldiers, unit organization and command structure, and the wars and battles of each era. Roth focuses on Rome's changing tactics and strategy, combat techniques, and logistics. He gives the usual caveat about the lack of reliable sources, and indicates the places where there is "vigorous scholarly debate" as with the archaeological evidence for early Rome or how the hoplite phalanx functioned. Of course, without footnotes or a specialized bibliographical section, a reader will have no way of knowing what these debates are or where to go to read up on them.

One *lacuna* that strikes the careful reader is the complete lack of a discussion on military intelligence. Twenty years ago, that was an understandable oversight, but now that we have two major books out on the subject (Austin, Rankov, *Exploratio*, is cited in the bibliography; Sheldon, *Intelligence Activities*, is not), there should be at least a brief mention of how the Romans moved military information. No army can function, let alone succeed, without the ability to communicate with its headquarters or do reconnaissance in the field. Missing in the glossary are terms for the Roman soldiers who performed these duties: *exploratores*, *speculatores*, etc. Nor is there any reference to signaling, a subject amply covered by David Woolliscroft's *Roman Signalling*. Reference to Woolliscroft's work on the Battle of Mons Graupius would also have brought the narrative on Roman Britain up to date, especially if the author is making the claim that he is taking archaeological evidence into account. Even with the bibliography being as limited as it is, the addition of these subjects and the seminal books on them would not have lengthened the text to any great degree.

These few quibbles aside, this is a lively, well-written book written in the same vein as Adrian Goldsworthy's *Roman Warfare*. Both are handbooks that are highly useful for introductory classes in Roman history or on the Roman military. Where one goes from there is entirely up to the reader. The book is written in clear, jargon-free language. The printing on the maps seem a bit unclear at times (particularly the one on p. 15), making the text hard to read but, generally speaking, the production values are good. The volume is beautifully illustrated with halftones and color plates that enhance the narrative. There are battle diagrams and summaries, historical reconstructions by Peter Connolly, and camp lay outs. As a user-friendly introductory text, this book is a success.

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